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Model checking is a powerful technique for the veriﬁcation of distributed systems but
is limited to verifying systems with a ﬁxed number of processes. The veriﬁcation of a
system for an arbitrary number of processes is known as the parameterised model checking
problem and is, in general, undecidable. Parameterised model checking has been studied
in depth for non-probabilistic distributed systems. We extend some of this work in order
to tackle the parameterised model checking problem for distributed protocols that exhibit
probabilistic behaviour, a problem that has not been widely addressed to date.
In particular, we consider the application of network invariants and explicit induction to
the parameterised veriﬁcation of state-based models of randomised distributed systems.
We demonstrate the use of network invariants by constructing invariant models for non-
probabilistic and probabilistic forms of a simple counter token ring protocol. We show
that proving properties of the invariants equates to proving properties of the token ring
protocol for any number of processes.
The use of induction is considered for the veriﬁcation of a class of randomised distributed
systems. These systems, termed degenerative, have the property that a model of a system
with given communication graph eventually behaves like a model of a system with a
reduced graph, where reduction is by removal of a set of nodes. We distinguish between
deterministically, probabilistically and semi-degenerative systems, according to the manner
in which a system degenerates. For the former two classes we describe induction schemas
for reasoning about models of these systems over arbitrary communication graphs. We
show that certain properties hold for models of such systems with any graph if they hold
for all models of a system with some base graph and demonstrate this via case studies: two
randomised leader election protocols. We illustrate how induction can also be employed
to prove properties of semi-degenerative systems by considering a simple gossip protocol.
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xiChapter 1
Introduction
Outline In this chapter we provide some context for the thesis, introducing model check-
ing and probabilistic model checking. We deﬁne the parameterised model checking problem
in particular and highlight some of the work that has been carried out on this to date.
We then describe our work on the problem, providing an outline of the thesis whilst high-
lighting our contribution to the body of work before concluding with a thesis statement.
1.1 Veriﬁcation of Distributed Systems
Software and hardware systems are being used more and more for safety-critical applica-
tions and hence reliability has become a key issue in the systems development process.
This is especially true of distributed (or concurrent) systems, consisting of a set of pro-
cesses executing in parallel that can communicate by some means (for example by a set
of shared variables or over a set of communication channels). The interleaving of process
executions makes analysis of distributed systems complex and therefore such systems are
diﬃcult to guarantee as reliable.
A common means of ensuring reliability of a system is by validation, whereby a set of
test-cases is input to a system and the output generated by the system is checked against
the expected output. However, it is diﬃcult to produce a set of cases that will guarantee
complete coverage of a system, particularly if it is of a complex nature as in the case
of distributed systems. An alternative to validation is veriﬁcation, whereby a system
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is described formally and the description is veriﬁed against some speciﬁcation. Proving
correctness increases conﬁdence in the reliability of the system.
Theorem proving and model checking are two commonly used techniques for veriﬁcation of
distributed systems. Theorem provers, such as PVS [51], can be used to automate parts of
a veriﬁcation proof. Although a useful veriﬁcation technique, theorem proving requires a
considerable amount of eﬀort in order to establish a theoretical framework for a particular
proof. We do not consider theorem proving further.
Model checking is a veriﬁcation technique whereby a model (generally deﬁned in terms of
a state-transition system) of a system is deﬁned according to some system speciﬁcation.
Properties that capture the correct behaviour of the system are formally deﬁned (for
example using a temporal logic) and veriﬁed by an automated search of the full state
space of the model. Model checking is usually employed for veriﬁcation of ﬁnite state
systems but it is also possible to verify inﬁnite-state systems using this technique. We
focus on verifying ﬁnite state systems.
Formally, the model checking problem is to establish, for a model M and a property φ,
whether M |= φ (M satisﬁes φ). Several formalisms for specifying M and φ exist. When
reasoning about concurrent software/hardware systems we often employ a temporal logic
to formalise φ, and M is usually described by some form of ﬁnite-state automata model
(e.g. a Kripke structure).
A variety of algorithms exist to check that a temporal logic property is true in some
model. These algorithms have been employed in a number of diﬀerent model checking
tools. These tools allow the user to write the speciﬁcation of a system using a modelling
language and to deﬁne properties in some temporal logic. The model checker will then
build an internal representation of the model using the system speciﬁcation and search it
to verify a property, giving back a true/false answer and possibly a counter example if the
property does not hold. Two examples of such model checking tools are SMV [47] and
SPIN [32], which use diﬀerent modelling languages, underlying veriﬁcation algorithms and
temporal logics, but serve the same purpose.3
1.2 Veriﬁcation of Randomised Distributed Systems
One of the key features of traditional model checking is non-determinism. This has proven
to be an essential element in traditional model checking tools since it allows details of
a system (or its implementation) to be abstracted away in the model, and it provides
the means to model the interleavings of concurrent processes executions arbitrarily. In
order to verify a model with non-determinism, a model checking tool must explore all
possible non-deterministic choices. However, there are some instances under which it is
not suﬃcient to simply examine the possible choices but it is also necessary to look at the
likelihood of making a choice. This is the basis of probabilistic model checking.
Probabilistic model checking has become an important area of research due to the increased
use of probabilistic algorithms and the requirement for analysis of not just system cor-
rectness but also system performance. Probabilistic model checkers, such as PRISM [40],
Rapture [36] and LiQuor [7], enable properties such as “the system will fail with probability
less than 0.01” and “with probability 1, a leader will be elected” to be veriﬁed.
Probabilistic model checking is similar in many ways to traditional model checking. Indeed,
the model checking problem can be stated in exactly the same way for both. The main
diﬀerence, then, lies in the representation of the model of a system, and the logic that
is used to describe a system’s properties. As for traditional model checking, probabilistic
veriﬁcation involves traversing the state space of a model to determine reachable states,
but in addition to this the probability of reaching these states must be calculated.
To understand the beneﬁts of probabilistic model checking, consider the issues of modelling
failure and analysing system performance. In the case of the former, although it is possible
to capture the concept of erroneous behaviour using traditional models, in some cases it
may not be enough just to consider whether an error will occur. It may also be necessary
to reason about how likely the error is to happen and the impact this has on the overall
system behaviour. For example, for a randomised leader election protocol, the probability
of message transmission failure can be modelled, or for a multimedia protocol the frame
loss rate can be modelled [55]. A model of the system can be deﬁned using a probabilistic
model checking tool, and it is then possible to measure diﬀerent aspects of performance,
such as throughput, average response time and mean waiting time, while varying some
system parameters. This is not possible using traditional model checking tools.4
1.3 Parameterised Veriﬁcation of Distributed Systems
Model checking provides the means to explore the full state space of a system model
automatically and is therefore extremely useful in the veriﬁcation of ﬁnite-state distributed
systems. In spite of these beneﬁts, model checking has its limitations. For example, if
a system model (or property) has not been deﬁned correctly it is possible to wrongly
conclude that the behaviour of the system is correct. Note that this is an issue for any
formal veriﬁcation method. One of the constraints particular to model checking is that
it is only possible to verify distributed systems with a ﬁxed number of processes. So, if
a property is veriﬁed for a given system with a set number of processes (identical up to
renaming) and another process of the same type is added, it is necessary to carry out the
veriﬁcation again to prove that the property still holds. Ideally, it would be possible to
verify a property for a system of a ﬁxed size by model checking, and then prove that the
property holds for that model with any given number of additional identical components.
This is known as the parameterised model checking problem (PMCP).
The parameterised model checking problem is in general undecidable [4], but it is possible
to verify parameterised systems, either by considering methods that are sound but incom-
plete or by restricting the set of systems that are analysed. An example of a common
method for tackling the PMCP of the former type is the network invariant (a term ﬁrst
used in [62]) approach. In [62], the authors give an inductive proof rule (the network
invariant rule) for a network invariant. If a ﬁnite-state invariant, I, can be constructed
(manually) such that I satisﬁes the conditions of this rule, then any properties that are
veriﬁed for the invariant will also hold for any particular size of the system under con-
sideration. The conditions state that, for a single process P, P   I and P||I   I, for
some containment relation   and a parallel composition operator ||. The work presented
in [62] is based on a variant of CCS and CSP style speciﬁcations but can be used with
any process theory given a set of conditions including monotonicity with respect to par-
allel composition. The authors give examples of a simple buﬀer and a token ring mutual
exclusion protocol to demonstrate their approach. They also provide a general theorem
stating that that there are instances of the PMCP for which ﬁnite-state invariants do not
exist.
More recently, in [39] the authors outline a method for tackling the PMCP using network5
invariants. This approach is a partially automatic method for processes arranged in a
ring. The authors provide a proof rule with conditions that allow the checking of the
invariant rule to be discharged automatically, assuming that an abstraction mapping and
an invariant are supplied. The conditions ensure that any fairness constraints are preserved
under the abstraction mapping, thereby allowing liveness properties of the system to be
considered. Examples of the approach are given for two dining philosophers protocols: a
deterministic asymmetric system and a probabilistic symmetric one.
The network invariant approach is adopted in [19]. Here, the parameterised family of
systems is described using a network grammar and the properties to be veriﬁed are speciﬁed
in a regular language. An invariant is created using an abstraction method which groups
states according to the atomic formula that they satisfy. It is shown that the invariant
is greater under the simulation preorder (see Section 2.5) than any given system in the
family and therefore any property that holds for the invariant will be satisﬁed for every
member of the family of systems. By way of example, this method is applied to Dijkstra’s
token ring algorithm and to a binary tree algorithm for calculating the parity of the leaves,
where each leaf has a binary value.
Another solution to the parameterised model checking problem is presented in [29] for
arbitrary sized token rings. For certain forms of indexed CTL*\ X (see Section 2.3)
properties it is shown that if the property holds for a ring of size less than some cutoﬀ
value then it will hold for any size of ring. Therefore model checking can be used to verify
the property for a ring of a given size and it can then be deduced that the property holds
for an arbitrary sized ring.
In general the network invariant approach only enables consideration of safety properties
and is not strong enough to allow veriﬁcation of liveness properties. Intuitively, this is
due to the introduction of inﬁnite behaviours, a result inherent to abstraction. In [53],
a method is described based on counter abstraction. The approach is by counting the
number of processes in a given local state, representing any count above 1 by the value 2.
Each state in the concrete model is then represented in the abstract model by the counts
of the process’ local states. The authors’ emphasis is on deriving fairness constraints
that preserve liveness properties under the counter abstraction. Although the fairness
requirements require some amount of manual derivation, heuristics are given which allow
automation for certain types of property. The technique is applied to a number of examples6
including two algorithms for mutual exclusion. Note that this approach is limited to
systems with a fully connected topology that use shared variables for communication.
In [52] an approach to the veriﬁcation of safety and liveness properties of parameterised
systems is described. The authors represent sets of reachable global states by regular ex-
pressions over a ﬁnite alphabet that represents the local state of a process. A transition
relation between states is deﬁned by a transducer, with properties to be veriﬁed also repre-
sented by regular expressions. Verifying that a property is an invariant of a system can be
carried out in two ways: by forward exploration, starting from the initial state and itera-
tively considering the possible successor states; or by backward exploration, starting from
each state that violates the property and iteratively considering the possible predecessor
states. Neither of these are guaranteed to terminate for parameterised systems.
An accelerated transition, in which (an unbounded) number of processes perform a tran-
sition, can be used. This is a sound but incomplete method. Acceleration schemes must
be deemed warranted and then selected manually but a number of “common” schemes
are supplied: local acceleration (several transitions by one process); global acceleration of
unary transitions (several processes make some transition, sequentially); global accelera-
tion of binary transitions (several processes make some binary transition). Acceleration
essentially combines a possibly unbounded number of applications of individual transitions
into one “accelerated transition relation”. Acceleration schemes are successfully applied
to an example mutual exclusion system with synchronous communication. Note that the
approach also deals with liveness properties by examining fairness constraints.
Much of the work on parameterised model checking assumes that the system has a regular
topology. This is not the case in [12]. The authors deﬁne a simple concurrent language
and describe how it can be used to describe parameterised programs. They employ an
invariant approach but, rather than specifying an invariant for the system, they consider
an invariant of a property. In particular they provide an invariance rule to prove that a
state formula p is an invariant of some program P (i.e. always p is true over P) as follows:
1. The initial condition for P implies that some auxiliary assertion on states, z is true.
2. The assertion z implies p.
3. For every transition t of P, t and z implies z holds in the successor state for t.7
The method of invisible invariants is employed such that z is derived automatically. By
employing a colouring technique to deal with reachability predicates included in safety
properties, it is possible to verify systems with irregular topologies.
In [22], a method for verifying parameterised systems is described that is based on data
independence. A system is deemed data independent for a type if the type can be substi-
tuted by any other non-empty type and the operations on the type are restricted to input,
storage, output and equality tests. For example a communication protocol that transmits
data between processes is independent of the data content of the messages. Theorems for
establishing a threshold collection for a data independent type are provided in [45]. If it
can be shown that a property holds for every value in the threshold collection then the
property is true for all values of the data independent type.
Data independence and induction are combined to provide a technique for the veriﬁcation
of systems parameterised by some data type, T, for simple topologies, in [22]. The method
relies on the construction of an invariant that is also ‘parameterised’ by T. Induction is
used to show that the invariant captures the behaviour of each system instantiated by a
value in T. The data independence of T is then used to show that the property holds
for the invariant for every value in some threshold collection of T. Discharging these two
proofs implies that the property is true for every system instantiated by a value in T. The
CSP process algebra is used to specify systems and the FDR model checker is used to
reason about the systems. Two example protocols are veriﬁed using this technique. The
method is extended in [23] to be applicable to more general network topologies, such as
rings.
Finally, in [49] an approach used to verify the Firewire IEEE 1394 leader election protocol
for any number of network nodes is described. The protocol enables the identiﬁcation of
a leader within a set of network nodes (connected in an acyclic topology). Each node can
send be my parent, be my child requests or acknowledgement messages to neighbouring
nodes. If a node receives be my parent requests from at least all but one of its neighbours
then it responds to each of its neighbouring nodes with a be my child request. Once a
node becomes a ‘child’ it sends an acknowledgement message to its ‘parent’ and then takes
no further part in the protocol. This behaviour, whereby nodes ‘drop-out’ of the system,
is termed degenerative [49].8
The protocol is modelled and veriﬁed for ﬁxed conﬁgurations using the SPIN model
checker. The degenerative nature of the system is shown to be reﬂected in the under-
lying model of the system created from the SPIN speciﬁcation. An inductive argument is
then used and it is shown that the paths in the model of an arbitrarily sized system are
stutter-equivalent (see Section 3.5.2) to the paths in the model of the ‘degenerate’ system.
This implies that certain types of property will be satisﬁed in the model regardless of the
number of network nodes considered.
1.4 Parameterised Veriﬁcation of Randomised Distributed
Systems
As for classical model checking, probabilistic model checking is restricted to verifying
systems of a ﬁxed size. Again, certain classes of system have been veriﬁed for an arbitrary
number of processes: a survey of some of this work is provided in [50].
In [5] two methods for verifying liveness properties with probability 1 over parameterised
probabilistic systems are presented. The ﬁrst of these employs a planner to convert the
probabilistic system to a non-deterministic one. Proving that a property holds in the
nondeterministic system then guarantees that the same property will hold with proba-
bility 1 in the probabilistic one. Traditional solutions for non-probabilistic systems can
then be used to verify that the property will hold for the nondeterministic version of the
parameterised system. The second approach introduces a notion of γ-fairness. A (simple)
temporal property will hold with probability 1 for a probabilistic system if and only if
every γ-fair computation of the system satisﬁes that property. Again, methods for solving
the non-probabilistic parameterised problem can then be employed.
In [27] the convergence of self-stabilising randomised protocols for a ring topology is con-
sidered. It is shown that, given a non-increasing measure on the state space of the model,
if there exists a ‘distance’ measure between states and an ordering relation on the distance
metric that satisﬁes certain conditions, then it is possible to deduce that the protocol will
converge to some legitimate set of states with probability 1. They also provide a method
to calculate the expected time of convergence by lumping the state space according to the
distance measure.9
The methods described above have only been applied to veriﬁcation of qualitative prop-
erties i.e. properties that hold with probability 0 or 1. Parameterised model checking of
quantitative properties has not been widely addressed, although some manual proofs of
quantitative properties have been devised. For example, Aspnes and Herlihy [6] describe
a weak shared coin protocol, that uses a shared counter which all processes can read from
or write to. When a process reads the counter and it is above (below) a certain value
the process will then choose to return ‘heads’ (‘tails’). By appealing to results from ran-
dom walk theory, they show that the probability of all processes returning heads (tails)
is bounded below by the value (K − 1)/2K, where K ≥ 1 is an integer constant that is
independent of the number of processes. Another manual correctness proof is given in the
original paper describing the Itai Rodeh protocol [35] and in a further paper [30] describ-
ing simpliﬁcations of the Itai Rodeh protocol. Here it is shown that with probability 1 a
unique leader will be elected for an arbitrary size of ring.
1.5 Thesis Outline and Contribution
In this thesis we explore the topic of parameterised model checking for state-based models
of randomised distributed systems, adding to the body of previous work in this area, some
of which is detailed in the previous sections. In Chapter 2 we begin with a review of the ﬁeld
of model checking, outlining background information relevant to the remainder of the thesis.
In particular, we give a description of the use of state-based models and temporal logics in
model checking. This is followed by a discussion of particular examples of model checking
tools, and techniques that they exploit, before a review of some structural relations. In
Chapter 3, probabilistic model checking is introduced. Probabilistic state-based models
and temporal logics are discussed, before an overview of a probabilistic model checking
tool is given. A survey of some probabilistic structural relations is provided at the end of
this chapter. The work in these two chapters is standard from the literature.
In Chapter 4 we describe an approach to the PMCP using invariants, based on data
abstraction, that can be used to tackle the parameterised model checking problem. The
invariant method is applied to an example of a non-probabilistic system (a simple token
ring protocol) in order to show how it can be used in practice. Thereafter a demonstration
of how the technique can be applied to a probabilistic version of the token ring protocol is10
provided. The work contained in this chapter extends that of [17] through application of
the technique to a new system and demonstrating that it can be applied to a probabilistic as
well as a non-probabilistic form of the system. The probabilistic version of data abstraction
described is similar to the abstraction via simulation of [24].
In Chapter 5 we describe an inductive proof schema for tackling the parameterised model
checking of a particular class of systems, described as deterministically degenerative, using
the Firewire IEEE 1394 Tree Identify Protocol to illustrate the technique. In Chapter 6
we extend this work, outlining a similar proof schema but for a wider class of probabilistic
systems (described as probabilistically degenerative). We then describe the Itai Rodeh
protocol and how it is modelled and veriﬁed using PRISM, explaining how the PMCP
is tackled for the Itai Rodeh protocol using the proof schema. The work in these two
chapters extends that of [49].
In particular, in Chapter 5 we generalise and extend the proof given for the IEEE 1394
Firewire protocol such that it is applicable to a class of probabilistic systems. The model
speciﬁcation for the Firewire IEEE 1394 protocol described in this chapter is based on
the speciﬁcation described in [49] but we have adapted it for the PRISM model checker
and resolve root contention probabilistically rather than non-deterministically. The proof
of correctness is again based on [49] but is adapted to take into account the probabilistic
element of the models. The work in this chapter is also presented in [31].
The extension described in Section 5.7 has not been previously considered. In Chapter
6 we further extend the work described in Chapter 5. Although also based on the proof
of correctness of the Firewire protocol given in [49], Theorem 6.1.7 is a new result. The
PRISM speciﬁcations given for the Itai Rodeh leader election protocol described in this
chapter are closely based on those given in [1] and outlined in [30]. The use of the inductive
proof schema to prove correctness of this protocol is novel.
In Chapter 7 we introduce a class of protocols known as gossip protocols and describe a
particular example and its analysis using probabilistic model checking. The parameterised
model checking problem is then tackled for this protocol using an inductive approach. To
our knowledge, the work described in this chapter is entirely new.
In Chapter 8 we describe some open problems and ﬁnally, Chapter 9 presents our conclu-
sions.11
1.6 Thesis Statement
We investigate the parameterised model checking problem, considering two approaches that
have been successfully applied to non-probabilistic distributed systems. The ﬁrst approach
employs an invariant and is based on a form of abstraction; the second approach employs
induction and is applicable to the class of degenerative systems. Both rely on establish-
ing structural relations between state-based models of distributed protocols. We establish
whether, using probabilistic structural relations between probabilistic state-based models,
these approaches can be extended in order to be applicable to randomised distributed
systems.
Summary In this chapter we have introduced the parameterised model checking prob-
lem and outlined some of the work that has been carried out on this to date for both
probabilistic and non-probabilistic systems. We have outlined our contribution to this
work, describing the contents of the thesis and providing a thesis statement.Chapter 2
Modelling and Verifying
Distributed Systems
Outline In this chapter we discuss some of the background to model checking that is
relevant to the remainder of the thesis. We introduce Kripke structures and the tempo-
ral logics, Computational Tree Logic (CTL and CTL*) and Linear Time Temporal Logic
(LTL). We also describe the veriﬁcation techniques possible using the SPIN model checking
tool, and outline the Promela modelling language. Finally, we consider the bisimulation
and simulation structural relations for Kripke structures.
2.1 Introduction
The analysis of distributed systems is complex: unforeseen interactions between communi-
cating processes can lead to errors in the design of such systems. Model checking provides
the means to consider every combination of the executions of interacting processes (at an
appropriate level of abstraction) and therefore is a useful veriﬁcation technique when con-
sidering distributed systems. Model checking tools accept a (usually ﬁnite-state) model
of a system speciﬁed by the user. Properties (usually deﬁned using a temporal logic) are
conﬁrmed as being satisﬁed by the model, or not, in which case a counter-example to the
property may be provided. A variety of model checking tools exist that employ diﬀerent
modelling and veriﬁcation techniques. In this chapter we consider Kripke structures, the
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temporal logics CTL*, CTL and LTL and focus on the SPIN model checker. We consider
these in particular since they are relevant to this thesis. For a more general introduction
to model checking see, for example, [48].
Much of the work in the remainder of the thesis is concerned with verifying that a given
property of a model of a system holds (by model checking) and then establishing a relation
between the model and some other set of models. Structural relations between models are
therefore integral to the thesis. We give a summary of some relevant relations over Kripke
structures in the ﬁnal part of this chapter.
2.2 Modelling Distributed Systems
A number of formalisms for modelling distributed systems exist. The majority of these
are a variation of a state transition graph. One of the key features that all these graphs
exhibit is that of non-deterministic choice. When modelling distributed systems we want
to consider all possible interleavings of the executions of the processes: non-determinism
enables this. We focus here on state-labelled transition graphs in the form of labelled
Kripke structures.
Deﬁnition 2.2.1. A (labelled) Kripke structure K is a tuple (S,S0,R,L), where
• S is a ﬁnite set of states.
• S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states.
• R ⊆ S × S is a total transition relation.
• L : S → 2AP is a function that labels each state with a set of atomic propositions
from AP, true in that state.
The operation of a Kripke structure can be described in terms of paths. A ﬁnite path
in a Kripke structure, K = (S,S0,R,L), starting in state s0 ∈ S, is a sequence of states
π = s0,s1,s2,...,sn, for n ≥ 0, such that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, si ∈ S and for all 0 < i ≤ n,
(si−1,si) ∈ R. An inﬁnite path, π = s0,s1,s2,... is deﬁned similarly but for an inﬁnite
sequence of states. For an inﬁnite path, π = s0,s1,s2,..., the path πi is deﬁned as the
suﬃx of π, starting from state si. If a ﬁnite path ω is a preﬁx of a path π we write ω ≤ π14
(or ω < π if it is a strict preﬁx). For a path, π = s0,s1,s2,...,sn, the length of π, |π| is
n + 1. For an inﬁnite path, |π| = ∞.
For any pair of states s,t ∈ S such that (s,t) ∈ R we say that (s,t) is a transition in K,
written s →R t or s → t if R is clear from the context. Note that the transition relation for
a Kripke structure is total, meaning that there must be at least one transition associated
with each state. If, in the modelling of a system, a state s is deﬁned with no outgoing
transition we can ensure the transition relation is total by adding the self-loop transition,
(s,s), to R. We describe any state s with no outgoing transitions, other than self-loops,
as terminal.
The trace for a path π is given by the sequence of sets of atomic propositions that
label each state in the path. If π = s0,s1,...,sn is a ﬁnite path then trace(π) =
L(s0),L(s1),...,L(sn), and similarly if π = s0,s1,... is an inﬁnite path then trace(π) =
L(s0),L(s1),....
We generally consider Kripke structures with a single initial state. For a Kripke structure
K = (S,S0,R,L) with S0 = {s0}, we write K = (S,s0,R,L).
We can consider a Kripke structure as a directed graph in which vertices represent states
and edges transitions between states, as dictated by the transition relation. The labelling
function associates each vertex with the set of atomic propositions that are true in that
state. Indeed, we will often present Kripke structures diagrammatically in this form, with
dashed lines indicating a transition between states, shown as circles on the diagram. Any
labelling of a state will be included within the circle representing that state. Furthermore,
we use the terms Kripke structure and model interchangeably throughout this thesis.
Example: Consider a single process participating in a mutual exclusion protocol that
is idle, trying to enter its critical section, in its critical section or has failed to reach its
critical section. We model this in two ways by the two Kripke structures given in Figure
2.1, using the single variable, state, to maintain the state of the process. Each of the
states of K and K′ are labelled by one of the propositions state = idle, state = trying,
state = critical or state = failed. The ﬁrst Kripke structure assumes that the choice of
whether a process enters its critical section or fails to do so is only made once the process
tries to do so. In the second Kripke structure this outcome is pre-determined when the
process moves from being idle to its trying state.15
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Figure 2.1: Kripke structures representing two versions of mutual exclusion for a single
process
2.3 Temporal Logic
Temporal logics were ﬁrst used by philosophers as a way of dealing with the progression of
time in natural language arguments. They are an extension of modal logic and normally
include some notion of ‘always’ in the future and ‘eventually’ in the future [18]. In terms
of model checking, the semantics of temporal logic formulae are deﬁned with respect
to a Kripke structure. Therefore, a formula is described in terms of states, paths and
atomic propositions. There are a number of diﬀerent temporal logics used within diﬀerent
application domains. Three temporal logics that are commonly associated with model
checking are deﬁned below. These deﬁnitions are taken from [18].
2.3.1 Computational Treel Logic* (CTL*)
There are two path quantiﬁers in CTL*, deﬁned as follows:
A The universal path quantiﬁer. Aφ means for all paths φ holds.
E The existential path quantiﬁer. Eφ means there exists some path along which φ holds.
The main temporal operators in CTL* are as follows:16
G: The ‘always’ operator. Gp means “p is always true in the present and at any point
in the future”.
F: The ‘ﬁnally’ operator. Fp means “p will eventually be true at some point in the
future”.
X: The ‘next’ operator. Xp means “p holds in the next state”.
U: The strong ‘until’ operator. pUq means “p holds until q holds and q must eventually
hold”. Note that there is also a weak version of ‘until’, namely W, which is satisﬁed
even if q does not eventually hold.
Formulae in CTL* are either state formulae or path formulae. CTL* is the set of all state
formulae, where the syntax is deﬁned by the following rules.
• If p ∈ AP then p is a state formula.
• If f and g are state formulae, then ¬f, f ∧ g and f ∨ g are state formulae.
• If f is a path formula then Ef and Af are state formulae.
• If f is a state formula, then f is also a path formula.
• If f and g are path formulae, then ¬f, f ∨g, f ∧g, Xf, Ff, Gf and f Ug are path
formulae.
CTL* consists of all the state formulae deﬁned by the above rules.
The semantics of CTL* are deﬁned in terms of a Kripke structure, K = (S,S0,R,L). If
f is a state formula then for a state s ∈ S, s |= f (s satisﬁes f) means that f is true at
state s. If g is a path formula then π |= g (π satisﬁes g) means that g is true along the
path π of K. Let p ∈ AP and let f1,f2 be state formulae and g1,g2 path formulae, then
the semantics of CTL* are deﬁned inductively as follows.
1. s |= p ⇔ p ∈ L(s)
2. s |= ¬f1 ⇔ s  |= f1
3. s |= f1 ∨ f2 ⇔ s |= f1 or s |= f217
4. s |= f1 ∧ f2 ⇔ s |= f1 and s |= f2
5. s |= Eg1 ⇔ there is a path π from s such that π |= g1
6. s |= Ag1 ⇔ for every path π starting from s, π |= g1
7. π |= f1 ⇔ s is the ﬁrst state of π and s |= f1
8. π |= ¬g1 ⇔ π  |= g1
9. π |= g1 ∨ g2 ⇔ π |= g1 or π |= g2
10. π |= g1 ∧ g2 ⇔ π |= g1 and π |= g2
11. π |= Xg1 ⇔ π1 |= g1
12. π |= Fg1 ⇔ there exists k ≥ 0 such that πk |= g1
13. π |= Gg1 ⇔ for all i ≥ 0,πi |= g1.
14. π |= g1 Ug2 ⇔ there exists k ≥ 0 such that πk |= g2 and for all 0 ≤ j < k,πj |= g1
2.3.2 Computational Tree Logic (CTL)
CTL is a subset of CTL*, in which the operators are restricted to the form QL, where Q
is a CTL* path quantiﬁer (A or E) and L a CTL* temporal operator (F, G, X or U).
More formally, the syntax of CTL can be deﬁned by restricting the rules for path formulae
for CTL* to the following rule.
• If f and g are state formulae, then Xf, Ff, Gf and f Ug are path formulae.
2.3.3 Linear Time temporal Logic (LTL)
LTL (Linear Temporal Logic), like CTL, is a subset of CTL*. LTL is restricted to formulae
of the form Af, where f does not contain any path quantiﬁers. In general the operator
A in state formulae is implicit and does not need to be included. In addition, G can be
written as   and F as ♦. The syntax of LTL path formulae can then be described by the
following rules:18
• If p ∈ AP, then p is a path formula.
• If f and g are path formulae, then ¬f, f ∨g, f ∧g, Xf, ♦f,  f and f Ug are path
formulae.
It is often useful to consider the subset of LTL that does not include the next-time operator
which we denote by LTL\X. Since we generally reason about events that occur at some
point in the future rather than reasoning about the next step of a distributed algorithm,
excluding this operator is not a great hardship. By considering this subset of LTL we have
more ﬂexibility in the analysis we can do.
CTL vs LTL The logics CTL and LTL are most commonly employed in model checking.
Although CTL and LTL are both subsets of CTL*, they are not subsets of each other.
Nonetheless, the majority of properties can be speciﬁed in both logics. When they cannot,
sometimes there are ways around the problem. For example, a property of the form Eφ,
for a LTL path formula φ, cannot be expressed in LTL because LTL only allows formulae
to be quantiﬁed over all possible execution paths whereas in this case it is necessary to
show the existence of a path. However, observe that Eφ is equivalent to ¬A¬φ. By ﬁnding
a counterexample for Aφ in a model, the property Eφ can be established.
Linear Time vs. Branching Time Logic The temporal logics, CTL and CTL*, are
described as branching time logics whilst LTL is described as a linear time logic. Branching
time logic is quantiﬁed over paths from a state, whereas linear time logic is quantiﬁed over
single computation paths.
Example: A classic illustration of the diﬀerence between branching and linear time logics
is given in Figure 2.1. The two Kripke structures, K and K′, show how a single process
might act when trying to enter its critical section. The traces for the computation paths
for both K and K′ are given by,
state = idle,state = trying,state = critical,state = critical,... and
state = idle,state = trying,state = failed,state = failed,....
Both structures have the same set of traces, and therefore a linear time logic cannot
distinguish between the two state graphs. However, in a branching time logic, it is possible19
to describe a property such as if a process is trying to enter its critical section then it can.
More formally this would be written in CTL as
AG(state = trying → EXstate = critical).
This property would be satisﬁed by K′ but not K, so it is possible to diﬀerentiate between
the two structures.
Safety vs Liveness Temporal logic properties can be classiﬁed by two types: safety
properties and liveness properties. Safety properties must never be violated, while liveness
properties are properties that a system must, at some point, satisfy [32]. So, for example
a LTL property ♦p, where p is an atomic proposition, is a liveness property whereas  p
is a safety property.
2.4 Model Checking Tools & Techniques
One of the biggest problems that any model checking tool must combat is the state space
explosion problem. This occurs because it is necessary to verify properties across all pos-
sible execution traces of a system model. Therefore, all possible interleavings of processes
execution statements must be considered. This means that the state space of a model ex-
pands rapidly with the size of the system being modelled resulting in increased demands
for resources. Eventually the demand for resources cannot be satisﬁed by the system
running the model checker and complete veriﬁcation is then no longer possible.
Diﬀerent model checking tools use diﬀerent techniques to address this problem. In this
section we consider two model checkers and the methods they employ to tackle state space
explosion. In particular, we describe the SPIN and SMV model checking tools. We make
use of SPIN in Chapter 4 so we give more detail in this case, including only a brief outline
of SMV for the sake of comparison.
2.4.1 SPIN
SPIN is a model checking tool that supports the Process meta language, Promela. Promela
is used to specify a model of a system, and SPIN can be used to verify LTL properties20
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Figure 2.2: An example where partial order reduction can be exploited
of a Promela speciﬁcation. We brieﬂy outline some of the features of SPIN, examining
the techniques it uses to reduce the time and memory requirements of veriﬁcation before
describing Promela.
The default algorithm that SPIN employs to traverse all the reachable states in the state
graph during veriﬁcation is essentially a depth-ﬁrst search. However, the algorithm has
been modiﬁed to allow properties to be veriﬁed and to permit on-the-ﬂy veriﬁcation.
Veriﬁcation on-the-ﬂy means that the correctness of a property is checked at the same
time as the state graph is built. Using this technique, it may not be necessary to construct
the entire state space for two reasons. First, a counter-example for a property may be found
before the entire state space has been constructed. Second, the property being checked
‘guides’ the construction of the state graph, and so any states that are not relevant to the
property can be ignored. On-the-ﬂy veriﬁcation can therefore be useful in saving time and
memory resources.
To combat the state space explosion problem, SPIN also avoids constructing the entire
state space of a model, by exploiting a technique known as partial order reduction. A
classic example of this is given in Figure 2.2. The Kripke structure shown in the ﬁgure
represents an assignment to the variables x and y. The two paths of the model represent21
these assignments made in diﬀerent orders (x:=1;y:=1; compared with y:=1;x:=1;).
The ﬁnal state is the same, regardless of the path taken, so the graph can be reduced
by removing one of the paths. Note that a property is not preserved under partial order
reduction if it contains the next time operator (X).
During veriﬁcation, SPIN also allows the user to employ the weak fairness option. Weak
fairness is used to ensure that no process in a speciﬁcation is starved of execution time
for an inﬁnite time, i.e. that any process that can execute a statement will eventually
execute it. This is useful because often, when performing a veriﬁcation, a property will
not hold because a particular process is never allowed to execute. Weak fairness, however,
introduces a signiﬁcant overhead to veriﬁcation, particularly for systems with a large
number of processes [32].
Promela
Before describing Promela it is important to note that modelling languages, such as
Promela, are used to specify a system rather than to explicitly implement one. It is
also important to distinguish between the speciﬁcation of a system and the model of a sys-
tem. A speciﬁcation is a syntactically convenient way to represent the model. The model
can therefore be derived from the speciﬁcation. In the case of Promela speciﬁcations, the
underlying model is given by a (representation of a) Kripke structure.
Promela has a C-like syntax, with only one type of module, deﬁned by proctype. A
proctype speciﬁcation is given, and instantiations can then be executed either automati-
cally, by declaring the process to be active, or manually by declaring an init process with
a run statement for each process. Any number of processes can be executed concurrently,
with a unique id being assigned to each process. As with a procedure, a process can take
a set of parameters, although values can only be assigned to these when using run.
Data types are restricted and variables can only be deﬁned as mtype, unsigned, bit, int,
short, byte, bool, chan or pid. It is also possible to declare arrays of any of these types.
Most of the types are similar to the data types deﬁned in C, but mtype, chan and pid
require further explanation. The type, pid, is the simplest and is associated with the
unique id assigned to each process. Note that it is possible to assign a variable to a
process’ id at runtime (e.g. id1=run process1).22
The type mtype is an enumerated type, which can be assigned to include any set of labels.
For example, it is possible to write mtype={idle, trying, critical}. A declaration
mtype state=idle, then sets the variable state to be of mtype, initialised to trying.
An important feature of Promela is message passing along channels. A channel is declared
to be of type chan. The length of the channel must also be declared. Declaring a channel
with length greater than zero results in asynchronous message passing, but if a channel
of length zero is deﬁned then a receive and send on that channel will block until both
are ready (synchronised). A type for each element of the channel must be declared too.
Note that values of any type can be passed along channels, even channels themselves.
Messages can be sent along channels using the ! command or read from channels using
the ? command.
For example, the declaration chan msg=[2] of {mtype, bool} sets msg to be a channel
of length two, with each message on that channel consisting of an enumerated type and
a boolean. To pass a message of the form msg!trying,true along channel msg, the
statement msg!trying,true is used. The statement msg?state,end can then be used to
retrieve a message, where end is of type bool.
Promela also provides a selection and a repetition structure, respectively if and do. The
code segments below give an example of each of these:
if
:: (done) -> out!msg;
:: (!done) -> msg--;
fi;
do
:: (in?1) -> out!3;
:: (in?2) -> out!4;
od;
Two important points about if and do statements in Promela are that selection is non-
deterministic and the statement will block until at least one of the conditions is true.
Non-deterministic choice means that if two conditions are true, then one will be selected
arbitrarily.23
Having blocking conditionals is also important as it provides a means whereby a process
can wait for some condition to hold. Note that this is not unique to if or do statements.
A conditional can in fact be inserted at any point in a process. For example the line
(state==trying); would block, assuming state was not equal to trying, until some
other process set state equal to trying.
One ﬁnal useful feature that Promela provides is the atomic statement. This allows a
section of code to be marked such that it will be executed as one statement, without
being interrupted by other processes. For example atomic{x=1;y=1;}. Once this piece of
code is executed, x and y will be set to one before any other process can execute. Note,
however, that if any statement within an atomic statement blocks (for example a channel
read where the channel is empty), then atomicity is broken and any other process may
then execute.
2.4.2 SMV
SMV is a model checker with its own language component, that allows one to verify CTL
properties using Symbolic Veriﬁcation. SMV was designed mainly for veriﬁcation of syn-
chronous hardware circuits but can also be used to model check asynchronous concurrent
software systems.
Symbolic Model Checking is implemented using Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Dia-
grams (ROBDD). A Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) is a tree-like representation of a
boolean formula. The BDD, in Figure 2.3(a), represents the boolean formula (P ∧Q)∨R.
Each path through this tree is an assignment of truth values to the variables P,Q and R,
with the leaf nodes representing the value of the formula, given this assignment [18].
Binary Decision Diagrams are not a particularly concise representation of boolean formulae
and contain a signiﬁcant amount of redundancy. A Reduced Ordered Binary Decision
Diagram (ROBDD) is a BDD in which the variables have been given some ordering and
the BDD has been reduced to canonical form (up to ordering of the variables). An example
of the ROBBD obtained from the Binary Decision Tree in Figure 2.3(a) is given in Figure
2.3(b) where the ordering of variables is P < Q < R. Note that the order of the variables
is important in determining the size of the OBDD and that, although ﬁnding an optimal
ordering is infeasible, there are heuristics available to ﬁnd a reasonable one [18].24
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Figure 2.3: BDD and corresponding ROBDD for the formula (P ∧ Q) ∨ R
Let K = (S,S0,R,L) be a Kripke structure, then K can be represented by an ROBBD, if
S,R and L are encoded using boolean vectors. The translation of a Kripke structure into
an ROBDD can be done by ﬁrst producing an explicit representation of K and then doing
the encoding, but this is not necessarily practical due to the size of the explicit structure.
Therefore, usually the ROBBD is created directly from a high level speciﬁcation of the
system [18].
The advantage of using the symbolic model checking technique described above is that
ROBDDs can be an eﬃcient and compact representation of a Kripke structure (subject
to the variable ordering, as explained earlier). Therefore, this is a useful method for
combating the state space explosion problem [18].
2.5 Model Relations
Sometimes, when analysing models, it is desirable to establish some form of equivalence
between two models. In terms of model checking, equivalence between models generally
means that they satisfy the same properties. For example, a model of a system may be too
large to verify and one may therefore consider an appropriate abstraction that reduces the
state space of the model. In order to ensure that properties that are true of the abstracted
model will remain true in the original model we must establish some relation between the
models. In this section we consider the bisimulation and simulation relations and discuss
the logical characterisation of these with respect to LTL.25
2.5.1 Bisimulation and Simulation
Bisimulation for Kripke structures is well-established (see for example [18]). Roughly
speaking, two models are bisimilar if the stepwise behaviour of each model is matched in
the other. Bisimulation preserves properties expressed in temporal logics (e.g. LTL). Note
that there are two types of bisimulation, strong and weak. The weak form of the relation
essentially ignores any transitions between related states (e.g. self-loops), whereas strong
bisimulation does not. We only consider the strong form here.
Deﬁnition 2.5.1. Given a Kripke structure K = (S,s0,R,L) with atomic propositions,
AP, an equivalence relation H ⊆ S × S is a bisimulation relation if and only if for all
s,s′ ∈ S if H(s,s′) then
1. L(s) = L(s′)
2. For every state s1 ∈ S such that R(s,s1), there is a state s′
1 ∈ S with the property
that R(s′,s′
1) and H(s1,s′
1).
3. For every state s′
1 ∈ S such that R(s′,s′
1), there is a state s1 ∈ S with the property
that R(s,s1) and H(s1,s′
1).
Given two states p and q in S, p is bisimilar to q, written p ≈ q, if and only if there is a
bisimulation, H, such that H(p,q). The bisimilarity relation, ≈, is an equivalence relation.
Furthermore, it is the largest bisimulation relation over a given Kripke structure.
Lemma 2.5.2. (See for example [18]) Let K be a Kripke structure with atomic propositions
AP. Then for every LTL formula φ with atomic propositions in AP, s ≈ s′ implies
s |= φ ⇐⇒ s′ |= φ.
In some instances bisimulation is too strict a relation. In other words it may be desirable
to establish a relation between models that does not have as stringent conditions as bisim-
ulation. In this instance a simulation relation may be appropriate. Whereas bisimulation
is an equivalence relation, simulation is a preorder, hence it only guarantees preservation
of properties between models in one direction. A simulation relation is deﬁned formally
as follows [18].26
Deﬁnition 2.5.3. Given two Kripke structures K = (S,s0,R,L) and K′ = (S′,s′
0,R′,L′)
with atomic propositions, AP and AP′, respectively, such that AP′ ⊆ AP, a relation
H ⊆ S ×S′ is a simulation relation between K and K′ if and only if H(s0,s′
0) and, for all
s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, if H(s,s′) then
1. L(s) ∩ AP′ = L′(s′)
2. For every state s1 ∈ S such that R(s,s1), there is a state s′
1 ∈ S′ with the property
that R′(s′,s′
1) and H(s1,s′
1).
K′ is said to simulate K, denoted K   K′ if and only if there exists a simulation relation
between K and K′.
Intuitively, for a relation between two Kripke structures, K and K′, to be a simulation
the initial states must be in the relation and it must satisfy two conditions. Firstly for
any two states that are related, the labelling of the state in K (restricted to the set of
atomic propositions in K′), must be equivalent to the labelling of the state in K′. If this
is true, secondly it is necessary to show, for any transition s → t in K, that there exists a
transition, s′ → t′ in K′ such that the states s and s′ are related and t and t′ are related.
If the transitions satisfy these conditions we say that s → t is matched by s′ → t′. If we
can show this is true then the relation is a simulation relation.
Example: A simulation between two structures is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows
two possible models for a single process participating in a mutual exclusion protocol. In
this example K′ simulates K. This can be seen by choosing a simulation relation that
associates each state in K′ with each equivalently labelled state in K. Note, however,
that K does not simulate K′. This can be seen by observing that from the state labelled
by state = trying in K, it is possible to move to the states labelled state = failed and
state = critical. However, from one of the state = trying labelled states in K′, it is only
possible to move to one of the states labelled state = failed or state = critical but not
both.
Lemma 2.5.4 is taken from [49], as adapted from [18].
Lemma 2.5.4. Let K and K′ be two Kripke structures with atomic propositions AP and
AP′ such that AP′ ⊆ AP. Suppose that K   K′. Then for every LTL formula φ with27
atomic propositions in AP′, K′ |= φ implies K |= φ.
Summary In this chapter we have considered the model checking problem, describing
Kripke structures as a model for distributed systems and presenting the temporal logics
CTL*, CTL and LTL. We have concentrated on SPIN as an example of a model checking
tool, outlining some of the reduction techniques it employs in order to combat the state
space explosion problem, and describing Promela. We have also deﬁned the bisimulation
and simulation relations for Kripke structures.Chapter 3
Modelling and Verifying
Randomised Distributed Systems
Outline In this chapter we describe the theory of probabilistic model checking. In par-
ticular, some elements of probability are discussed before an explanation of the theory
of Markov chains. This is followed by a discussion of the logics Probabilistic CTL and
Quantitative LTL. An overview of the probabilistic model checker, PRISM, is then given,
including a description of the modelling language it uses. Finally, we examine some struc-
tural relations over probabilistic models.
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we considered model checking, a veriﬁcation technique that pro-
vides the means to formally establish properties of distributed systems. However, the
focus of this thesis is on the analysis of randomised distributed systems and therefore we
now consider probabilistic model checking. Similarly to traditional model checking tools,
probabilistic model checkers accept a model speciﬁcation and a property and verify that
the property is true of the model. However, probabilistic model checking tools also allow
probabilistic behaviour to be modelled and analysed. In this chapter we consider some
aspects of probabilistic model checking, examining in particular those features relevant
to the thesis. As discussed in Section 2.1, structural relations are fundamental to the
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results presented in subsequent chapters. In the previous chapter we deﬁned relations on
non-probabilistic models. We extend some of these and introduce some new relations for
probabilistic models.
3.2 Probabilistic Models
Probabilistic model checking diﬀers from traditional model checking in the representation
of the model of a system. There are several types of probabilistic models but the ones
that will be discussed here are all based on a Markov chain. There are two variants of
the Markov chain model that we consider: Discrete Time Markov Chains and Markov
Decision Processes. These are discussed in detail below. Other probabilistic models that
are not considered here include Continuous Time Markov Chains and Probabilistic Timed
Automata.
3.2.1 Discrete Time Markov Chains
A Discrete Time Markov chain (DTMC) can be viewed as a state transition system. A
DTMC satisﬁes the Markovian property i.e. the choice of a transition to a new state is
only determined by the current state. Transitions between states correspond to discrete
time steps and have an associated probability. Note that the state space of a DTMC model
is assumed to be discrete, and in the deﬁnition below to be ﬁnite. If we relax the ﬁrst
condition of Deﬁnition 3.2.1 to allow S to be countably inﬁnite then we say that D is an
inﬁnite state DTMC. In order to analyse DTMCs, the states are labelled with a set of
atomic propositions [55].
Deﬁnition 3.2.1. (see for example [54]) A (labelled) Discrete Time Markov Chain is a
tuple D = (S,S0,P,L), where
• S is a ﬁnite set of states,
• S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states,
• P : S × S → [0,1] is a transition probability matrix such that, for all states s ∈ S,
 
s′∈S P(s,s′) = 1,30
Figure 3.1: An example of a Discrete Time Markov Chain
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function for a set of atomic propositions, AP.
The matrix, P, describes the probability of making a transition between any two states.
For s,s′ ∈ S, this probability is given by P(s,s′). From the deﬁnition of P, above, for
every state the probabilities associated with the outgoing transitions from that state must
sum to one. If some state s does not have an outgoing transition, we can ensure this
condition is maintained by setting P(s,s) = 1. If P(s,s′) = p > 0 we say that there is a
transition from s to s′ which we write as s
p
→ s′ or just s → s′.
An inﬁnite path, ω, in a DTMC, D, is a non-empty sequence s0,s1,... where for i ≥ 0,
si ∈ S. Similarly, a ﬁnite path, ωﬁn, is a non-empty sequence s0,s1,...,sn for some n ≥ 0.
The set of all inﬁnite paths starting at state s is given by Path(s) and the set of all ﬁnite
paths starting at s by Pathfin(s) [55].
Let ωﬁn(i) = ω(i) = si denote the ith state of a path and let last(ωﬁn) = sn. Let |ωfin|
denote the length (the number of states) of a path (with |ω| = ∞). By an abuse of notation,
let P(ωﬁn) = P(s0,s1) × P(s1,s2) × ... × P(sn−1,sn) (with P(ωﬁn) = 1 if ωﬁn = s0).
Let traceAP′
(ω) denote the sequence given by the labelling of the states in ω restricted to
the set of propositions in AP′ ⊆ AP. For two paths, ωﬁn and ω′ with ωﬁn ﬁnite, if ω is a
preﬁx of ω′ we write ω ≤ ω′ (and ω < ω′ if it is a strict preﬁx). For states s,t ∈ S we say
that t is reachable from s if and only if there exists a path ω = s → s1 → ... → t such
that ω ∈ Pathﬁn(s).
Note that we will generally consider DTMCs with a single initial state, s0. In this instance,
instead of writing D = (S,S0,P,L), we write D = (S,s0,P,L).
Example: Consider a simple coin-tossing process. Initially the process can move to a31
state from which it will either wait a time step, with probability 0.2, or it will toss a coin.
In the latter case it will throw either a head or a tail, with equal probability. If it throws
a tail, the process will restart and move back to the initial state, but if the process throws
a head, it will move to a terminal state and cannot toss the coin again.
The DTMC in Figure 3.1 models this simple process (taken from [55]). The DTMC
consists of four states, with S = {s0,s1,s2,s3} and initial state, s0. Each state is labelled
with atomic propositions from the set {init, toss, heads, tails}. The transition probability
matrix is given by:
P =

 
 



0 1 0 0
0 0.2 0.4 0.4
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

 
 



A Probability Measure for DTMCs
For a ﬁnite path, α, of a DTMC, starting in state s deﬁne the path cylinder C(α) by,
C(α) = {ω ∈ Path(s)|α ≤ ω}.
Then we can deﬁne the probability measure, Probs, on the smallest σ-ﬁeld that contains
all the sets C(α) for all α, such that, Probs(C(α)) = P(α). For more detail see, for
example, [37].
3.2.2 Markov Decision Processes
The systems we seek to verify are randomised distributed protocols: concurrent systems
for which individual processes can make a probabilistic choice. When describing these sys-
tems, we would like to model the scheduling of process statements non-deterministically
(if the probabilities are unknown or irrelevant, we may also wish to model a probabilistic
statement of a process abstractly as a non-deterministic choice). Hence, to model ran-
domised distributed systems we require a model that exhibits both non-deterministic and
probabilistic choice (note that DTMCs only exhibit probabilistic choice). We therefore
consider Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), which can be considered as a generalisa-
tion of DTMCs. In particular, we consider state-labelled MDPs, where the states are
augmented with a set of atomic propositions true in that state.32
In the sequel, for any set Y , we let Dist(Y ) denote the set of all discrete probability
distributions over Y . That is, Dist(Y ) is the set of all functions   : Y → [0,1] such
that
 
y∈Y  (y) = 1. For a set X ⊆ Y and a distribution   ∈ Dist(Y ), we let  (X) =
 
x∈X  (x). Furthermore, for a distribution   over Y , let support( ) = {y ∈ Y | (y) > 0}.
Deﬁnition 3.2.2. (See, for example, [54]). A (labelled) Markov Decision Process is a
tuple M = (S,S0,Steps,Act,L) where,
• S is a ﬁnite set of states,
• S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states,
• Act is a set of actions,
• Steps : S → 2Act×Dist(S) is the probabilistic transition function such that
∀s ∈ S,Steps(s)  = ∅,
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function over a set of atomic propositions AP.
The main diﬀerences between a MDP and a DTMC is the addition of an action set, Act
and the replacement of the two-dimensional probability transition matrix with Steps. For
MDP, M = (S,S0,Steps,Act,L), the function, Steps, maps each state in S to a non-empty
subset of Act × Dist(S), where Dist(S) is the set of all probability distributions over S.
Intuitively, for some state s ∈ S, Steps makes a non-deterministic choice over |Steps(s)|
possible (action, distribution) pairs, choosing action a and distribution  , say. According
to the distribution,  , a probabilistic choice is made over the states of the model where
the probability of moving to a state s′ is given by  (s′).
For a state s and an (action, distribution) pair (a, ) ∈ Steps(s), we say that a is enabled
from s. If  (s′) > 0 for some state s′ we say that there is a transition from s to s′ which
we write as s
a, 
→ s′ or just s → s′ if it is clear which element of Steps(s) we are considering.
A transition s
a, 
→ s′ is non-probabilistic if  (s′) = 1 (otherwise we describe a transition as
probabilistic). A transition s
a, 
→ s′ stutters if and only if L(s) = L(s′).
An action a ∈ Act is non-probabilistic if and only if, for every s ∈ S, ∀(a, ) ∈ Steps(s),
 (s′) = 1 for some s′ ∈ S. We describe M as non-deterministic if every action in Act is33
non-probabilistic. Action a ∈ Act is a stutter action if and only if, for all s ∈ S, for every
(a, ) ∈ Steps(s),  (s′) > 0 =⇒ L(s) = L(s′).
An inﬁnite path, ω in M is a non-empty sequence s0,a0, 0,s1,a1, 1,... where for i ≥ 0,
si ∈ S, (ai, i) ∈ Steps(si),  (si+1) > 0. We write this as,
s0
a0, 0 −→ s1
a1, 1 −→ ...
Similarly, a ﬁnite path, ωﬁn, is a non-empty sequence, s0,a0, 0,s1,a1, 1,...,an−1, n−1,sn
for some n ≥ 0 which we write as,
s0
a0, 0 −→ s1
a1, 1 −→ ...
an−1, n−1 −→ sn.
The set of all inﬁnite paths starting at state s is given by Path(s) and the set of all ﬁnite
paths starting at s by Pathfin(s).
Let ωﬁn(i) = ω(i) = si denote the ith state of a path and let last(ωﬁn) = sn. Let
|ωfin| denote the length (the number of actions) of a path (with |ω| = ∞). By an abuse
of notation, let P(ωﬁn) = P(s0,s1) × P(s1,s2) × ... × P(sn−1,sn) (with P(ωﬁn) = 1 if
ωﬁn = s0).
Let traceAP′
(ω) denote the sequence given by the labelling of the states in ω restricted to
the set of propositions in AP′ ⊆ AP and let actAct′
(ω) denote the action sequence for ω
restricted to the actions in Act′ ⊆ Act.
For two paths, ωﬁn and ω′ with ωﬁn ﬁnite, if ω is a preﬁx of ω′ we write ω ≤ ω′ (and
ω < ω′ if it is a strict preﬁx). For states s,t ∈ S we say that t is reachable from s if and
only if there exists a path ω = s → s1 → ... → t such that ω ∈ Pathﬁn(s).
Furthermore, for (a, ) ∈ Steps(last(ω)), t ∈ S we let ω
a, 
−→ t denote the ﬁnite path,
s0
a0, 0 −→ s1
a1, 1 −→ ...
an−1, n−1 −→ sn
a, 
−→ t.
Note that we generally consider MDPs with a single initial state, s0. In this instance, in-
stead of writing M = (S,S0,Steps,Act,L), we write M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L). Similarly,
we will sometimes consider an empty action set Act = ∅. In this instance, instead of writing
M = (S,S0,Steps,Act,L), we write M = (S,s0,Steps,L) and let Steps : S → Dist(S).34
Adversaries
In order to analyse a MDP we need to resolve the non-determinism. This is done by
considering adversaries, constructs that make a choice over the set Steps(s) for each state
s of a MDP, based on the history of choices.
Deﬁnition 3.2.3. [55] A deterministic adversary A of a MDP M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L)
is a function mapping every ﬁnite path ω onto an element A(ω) of the set Steps(last(ω)).
In the sequel we let AdvM denote the set of all possible adversaries of the MDP M and, for
any adversary A and state s, we let PathA(s) denote the subset of Paths which corresponds
to A, and similarly PathA
fin(s) is the subset of Pathfin(s) that corresponds to A [55].
Each adversary of a MDP produces an inﬁnite-state DTMC, with each state in the DTMC
given by the history of states so far visited. The following deﬁnition is adapted from [55].
Deﬁnition 3.2.4. For a given adversary, A of a MDP M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and a
state s ∈ S, the behaviour from s under A is given by the inﬁnite state DTMC induced by
A, DA = (SA,sA
0 ,PA,LA) where,
• SA = PathA
ﬁn(s)
• sA
0 = s
• For ω,ω′ ∈ SA, PA(ω,ω′) =



 (s′) if ω′ ≡ ω
A(ω)
→ s′ and A(ω) = (a, )
0 otherwise
• For all ω ∈ SA, LA(ω) = L(last(ω)).
Since an adversary uniquely determines a DTMC of the form described above, in the sequel
it will be convenient to refer to an adversary of a MDP when referring to the inﬁnite state
DTMC induced by the adversary.
Example: Consider the MDP given in Figure 3.2 (taken from [55]). The ﬁgure shows a
four state MDP (note that the labelling of the states is omitted). The dotted lines represent
a nondeterministic transition from a state and the solid lines represent the probabilistic
distribution reached from a non-deterministic transition. Note that the only state from
which it is necessary to make a non-deterministic choice in this MDP is state 1. We denote35
Figure 3.2: A Markov Decision Process
the two probability distributions reachable from state 1 as  b and  c (where  b(0) = 0.7,
 b(1) = 0.3 and  c(2) =  c(3) = 0.5) and the trivial distributions reachable from states 0,
2 and 3 as  a, d and  e respectively. We can deﬁne two example adversaries as follows [55]:
• Adversary A1 : A1(0) = (a, a), A1(01) = (c, c), A1(012) = (d, d), A1(013) =
(e, e), ...etc.
• Adversary A2 : A2(0) = (a, a), A2(01) = (b, b), A2(011) = (c, c), A2(010) =
(a, a), A2(0101) = (c, c), A2(0112) = (d, d), A2(0113) = (e, e), A2(01012) =
(d, d), A2(01013) = (e, e), ...,etc.
Fragments of the inﬁnite state DTMCs, DA1 and DA2, that are derived from the MDP
given in Figure 3.2 under the adversaries, A1 and A2, described above, are shown in Figure
3.3 [55].
Randomised Adversaries
In the above we considered history-dependent deterministic adversaries that, for a given
ﬁnite path, select a single (action, distribution) pair from the set enabled from the last
state of the path. We now consider adversaries that make a choice according to some
distribution (see for example [57]).
Deﬁnition 3.2.5. A randomised adversary E of a MDP M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) is a
function mapping every ﬁnite path ω onto an element E(ω) of Dist(Steps(last(ω))).36
Figure 3.3: Portions of two inﬁnite state DTMCs resulting from the behaviour of a MDP
under adversaries, A1 (top) and A2 (bottom)
In the sequel we let RAdvM denote the set of all possible randomised adversaries of the
MDP M and, for any adversary E and state s, let PathE(s) denote the subset of Path(s)
which corresponds to E.
A Probability Measure for analysing MDPs
We can extend the deﬁnition of the probability measure over DTMCs from Section 3.2.1
to inﬁnite state DTMCs in a straightforward manner. Furthermore, there exists a one-
to-one mapping between the paths in the inﬁnite state DTMC generated by an adversary
of a MDP and the paths in a MDP. For a ﬁnite path, α, starting in state s of a MDP,
M = (S,S0,Steps,Act,L), the path cylinder C(α), under an adversary A of M, is deﬁned
by [55],
C(α) = {ω ∈ PathA(s)|α ≤ ω}.
Then we can deﬁne the probability measure, ProbA
s , on the smallest σ-ﬁeld that contains
all the sets C(α) for all α, such that, ProbA
s (C(α)) = P(α). For more detail see, for
example, [14,37].
Similarly, for a randomised adversary, E, of M, we can deﬁne the probability measure,37
ProbE
s , on the smallest σ-ﬁeld that contains all the sets C(α) for all ﬁnite paths α, such
that,
ProbE
s (s) = 1
and, for α = β
a, 
−→ t (for a ﬁnite path β, (a, ) ∈ Steps(last(β)) and t ∈ S),
ProbE
s (C(α)) = ProbE
s (C(β)) × E(β)((a, )) ×  (t).
For more detail see, for example, [57].
Cuts
It is often useful to consider a ﬁnite portion of the Markov chain induced by an adversary.
Intuitively, a cut, as deﬁned below, is a set of ﬁnite paths of an adversary of a MDP. Each
path in the cut starts from the initial state of the MDP, no path in the cut is the preﬁx of
another path in the cut and every ﬁnite path under the adversary is the suﬃx or preﬁx of
a path in the cut. Note that a cut is a simpliﬁcation of a fringe as deﬁned for probabilistic
automata by Segala [56].
Deﬁnition 3.2.6. Let M =(S,s0,Steps,Act,L) be a MDP and let A ∈ AdvM. Deﬁne
Cut(A) to be a family of sets s.t. for D ∈ Cut(A), D ⊆ PathA
fin(s0) where, for all ω ∈ D,
ω   ω′ and ω′   ω for any ω′ ∈ D, ω′  = ω and,
 
ω∈D
ProbA
s0(C(ω)) = 1.
Given an adversary A of a MDP, for n ≥ 0, let cutA(n) ∈ Cut(A) be deﬁned such that for
all ω ∈ cutA(n), |ω| = n. For D ∈ Cut(A) we say that D is a cut of A. Furthermore, we
describe cutA(n) as a cut of A at depth n.
Example: In Figure 3.3 we presented portions of two inﬁnite state DTMCs resulting from
the behaviour of the MDP in Figure 3.2, under adversaries A1 and A2. In Figure 3.4 we
repeat the inﬁnite state DTMC obtained under A2 and include two examples of cuts of
A2, D1 and D2. These are represented by dashed lines in the diagram. The cut D1 is a
cut of A2 at depth three, and is given by the set {010,011} whilst D2 is given by the set
{01012,01013,0112,0113}. It should be clear that D1 and D2 both satisfy the conditions
of Deﬁnition 3.2.6.38
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Figure 3.4: Examples of cuts, D1 and D2, of the adversary, A2 (see Figure 3.3)
3.3 Probabilistic Temporal Logics
There are several possible logics that can be employed in probabilistic model checking. The
two that are described here are based on the CTL and LTL temporal logics commonly
used in traditional model checking (see Section 2.3).
3.3.1 Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
PCTL (Probabilistic CTL) is a probabilistic extension of the temporal logic, CTL. It can
be used to specify properties to be veriﬁed for a DTMC or a MDP. It should be noted,
however, that the semantics of PCTL for a DTMC are slightly diﬀerent from that for a
MDP and hence these are dealt with separately below.
PCTL for DTMCs
PCTL formulae are deﬁned over states within a model. The formal syntax for PCTL state
formula (φ) are given by the following rules [55].
φ ::= true | a | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | P⊲⊳p[ψ]39
where a is an atomic proposition, ⊲⊳∈ {≤,<,>,≥},p ∈ [0,1] and ψ is a path formula given
by,
ψ ::= φ | Xφ | φU≤kφ | φUφ
such that k ∈ N.
The next-time (X) and until (U) operators are as for the CTL counterparts (X and U
respectively). For the time-bounded until operator (U≤k), a path satisﬁes φ1U≤kφ2 if φ1
is true along the path until φ2 is true and φ2 becomes true within k time steps. For a
DTMC, some state, s, satisﬁes P⊲⊳p[ψ], if the probability over the set of paths starting in
s that satisfy path formula ψ is within the bounds speciﬁed by ⊲⊳ p.
The formal semantics of PCTL for any DTMC, D = (S,s0,P,L), are given in terms of
paths and states. For any state s ∈ S and for any inﬁnite path, π, the formal semantics of
PCTL can be deﬁned inductively in terms of the satisfaction relation, |=, as follows [55].
1. s |= true,∀s ∈ S
2. s |= a ⇐⇒ a ∈ L(s)
3. s |= ¬φ ⇐⇒ s  |= φ
4. s |= φ1 ∧ φ2 ⇐⇒ s |= φ1 ∧ s |= φ2
5. s |= P⊲⊳p[ψ] ⇐⇒ Probs({π ∈ Path(s)|π |= ψ}) ⊲⊳ p
6. π |= φ ⇐⇒ π(1) |= φ
7. π |= φ1U≤kφ2 ⇐⇒ ∃i ≤ k. (π(i) |= φ2 ∧ π(j) |= φ1, ∀j < i)
8. π |= φ1Uφ2 ⇐⇒ ∃k ≥ 0 . π |= φ1U≤kφ2
The probability measure over paths in Path(s), Probs, is as deﬁned in Section 3.2.2. Note
that the set of paths deﬁned by a PCTL path formula is measurable [61]. For a PCTL
property, φ, in the remainder of the thesis, we let D |= φ if and only if s0 |= φ where s0 is
the initial state of D.
The eventually (♦) and always ( ) operators are not included in the syntax for PCTL but
we can use the following equivalences to deﬁne them. The ♦ operator can be deﬁned in40
terms of the until operator, since:
P⊲⊳p[♦φ] ≡ P⊲⊳p[true U φ].
Notice that  φ ≡ ¬♦¬φ. Since PCTL does not allow path formulae to be negated, this
equivalence cannot be used directly, but
Probs({ω ∈ Path(s)|ω |= ¬ψ}) = 1 − Probs({ω ∈ Path(s)|ω |= ψ}),
and so:
P⊲⊳p[ φ] ≡ P⊲⊳(1−p)[♦¬φ],
where ≤ ≡≥,< ≡>,≥ ≡≤,> ≡≤. Note that since the always and eventually operators
are deﬁned in terms of the until (U) operator, there are equivalent time-bounded always
and eventually operators that can be deﬁned by replacing U by U≤k in the above [55].
In CTL, the always and eventually operators cannot be used individually in a formula.
They must always be paired with a CTL* path quantiﬁer, for all paths (A) or there exists
a path (E). The equivalent restriction in PCTL is that path formulae can only be included
as a parameter of the P⊲⊳p operator. Therefore, in a loose sense, the P⊲⊳p operator can be
considered the analogue of the A and E CTL* operators. For example EF ≡ P>0[♦φ] but
note that not all CTL operators have direct equivalences [55].
In the subsequent chapters, in order to establish results for parameterised probabilistic
systems, it is necessary to restrict the set of properties that we verify. We consider two
such restrictions: PCTL-liveness and PCTL-reachability.
Deﬁnition 3.3.1. [9] A PCTL-liveness formula, φ is deﬁned to be a PCTL formula
that contains only the operator, P>p, and for which negation (¬) is only applied to atomic
propositions.
Deﬁnition 3.3.2. A PCTL-reachability formula, φ, is deﬁned to be a PCTL formula
of the form P⊲⊳p[♦ψ], for ⊲⊳ ∈ {≥,≤} and ψ ::= true | a | ψ ∧ ψ where a is an atomic
proposition.
Consider the set of atomic propositons, {x = 0,x = 1,y = 1,y = 2}. The property,
P>0[x = 0 U (¬y = 1)],41
is a PCTL-liveness property whereas,
P≤0.5[♦(x = 1 ∧ y = 1)],
is a PCTL-reachability property.
PCTL for MDPs
As mentioned earlier, the deﬁnition of PCTL for DTMCs and MDPs is slightly diﬀerent.
The syntax is identical for both types of models and the semantics for the path operators
is the same but the P⊲⊳p operator is deﬁned diﬀerently. In order to analyse the probability
of some property holding we must ﬁrst resolve the non-determinism by means of the
adversaries. Therefore, we must consider the probability over the set of all adversaries.
Speciﬁcally, P⊲⊳p[ψ] holds for some state of a MDP if the probability of ψ being satisﬁed
meets the bound ⊲⊳ p for all resolutions of non-determinism. Formally we can specify the
syntax and semantics of PCTL for a MDP, M, as per the deﬁnition in the previous section
but replacing the deﬁnition of |= for P⊲⊳p by:
s |= P⊲⊳p[ψ] ⇐⇒ ProbA
s ({ω ∈ PathA(s)|ω |= ψ}) ⊲⊳ p, ∀A ∈ AdvM.
As for a DTMC, the set of paths under an adversary of a MDP, deﬁned by a PCTL path
formula, is measurable [61]. For a PCTL property φ, we let M |= φ if and only if s0 |= φ
where s0 is the initial state of M.
3.3.2 Quantitative Linear Time Logic
In Section 2.3 we introduced the logic LTL for reasoning about non-probabilistic models.
Recall that a LTL property is deﬁned over paths of a (non-probabilistic) model and, in
particular, we reason over every path. It is straightforward to adapt the deﬁnition of a
LTL path formula to paths in a MDP. We now consider a probabilistic variant of LTL
which we describe as quantitative Linear Time Logic (QLTL).
A QLTL (QLTL\X) formula φ is deﬁned over states of a MDP with syntax given by
φ ::= P⊲⊳p[ψ], where ⊲⊳∈ {≤,<,>,≥},p ∈ [0,1] and ψ is a LTL (LTL\X) path formula.
For a MDP, M, a state s of M, and a quantitative LTL property, φ = P⊲⊳p[ψ], we say42
that s satisﬁes φ, denoted s |= φ, if, for every adversary A of M,
ProbA
s ({ω ∈ PathA
s |ω |= ψ}) ⊲⊳ p.
We say that M satisﬁes φ, denoted M |= φ if and only if s0 |= φ where s0 is the initial
state of M. The set of paths of a MDP under an adversary that satisfy a LTL path
formula are measurable by ProbA
s [61].
3.3.3 Randomised Adversaries and Probabilistic Temporal Logics
Above we considered the deﬁnition of the semantics of QLTL and PCTL with respect
to deterministic adversaries. Observe that the randomised adversaries of a MDP are, in
a sense, probabilistic combinations of their deterministic counterparts. When reasoning
about a PCTL or QLTL property it is suﬃcient to consider the maximum or minimum
probability with which some property is satisﬁed. These probabilities can be observed by
considering the deterministic adversaries of a MDP. Equivalently, they can be observed
over the randomised adversaries since probabilistic combination cannot increase (decrease)
the maximum (minimum) probability. Speciﬁcally, for a MDP M and a PCTL property
φ, it has been shown that φ is satisﬁed by M under the set of deterministic adversaries
of M if and only if M satisﬁes φ under the set of randomised adversaries of M [56,58].
From this we can also conclude that,
Lemma 3.3.3. For a MDP M and a QLTL property φ, φ is satisﬁed by M under AdvM
if and only if M satisﬁes φ under RAdvM.
From [56,58], we also have that,
Lemma 3.3.4. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) be a MDP. Given a LTL path formula ψ,
for every randomised adversary E of M, there exist deterministic adversaries ¯ A and A of
M such that,
ProbE
s0({ω ∈ PathE
s0|ω |= φ}) ≥ ProbA
s0({ω′ ∈ PathA
s0|ω′ |= φ}) and,
ProbE
s0({ω ∈ PathE
s0|ω |= φ}) ≤ Prob
¯ A
s0({ω′ ∈ Path
¯ A
s0|ω′ |= φ}).43
3.4 The PRISM Probabilistic Model Checking Tool
The Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker (PRISM) is, as its name implies, a probabilistic
model checking tool that uses symbolic veriﬁcation techniques. PRISM provides a modular
speciﬁcation language (based on the reactive modules language of [2]) in which to deﬁne
a system. Henceforth, we use the term PRISM to describe both the model checking tool
and the modelling language.
PRISM can generate a representation of a model from the high-level speciﬁcation. Support
is provided for reasoning over three types of models: DTMCs, MDPs and continuous time
Markov chains (CTMCs). The ﬁrst two have been discussed previously. We do not
consider the latter.
Properties can also be speciﬁed in the PCTL (for DTMCs and MDPs) or CSL (for CTMCs)
probabilistic temporal logics, which it can then automatically verify. Note that the def-
inition of PCTL only allows a formula to be veriﬁed against a probability bound, but
PRISM must calculate the probability of a formula being satisﬁed in order to compare it
to the given bound. It is therefore straightforward to return the probability rather than
a true or false answer. The PRISM model checker allows a property to be speciﬁed in
this way. Note that, in the case of a MDP, it is only possible to return the minimum or
maximum probability of a property being satisﬁed as it must be resolved across all possible
non-deterministic choices.
For veriﬁcation, PRISM provides explicit-state, symbolic and hybrid engines. The explicit-
state engine employs a sparse matrix to store the transition matrix of a DTMC or transition
function of a MDP. These structures generally contain a large number of zero entries and
sparse matrices can exploit this redundancy.
An alternative to sparse matrices, employed by the symbolic veriﬁcation engine, is the
Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagram (MTBDD) data structure. MTBDDs are a
generalisation of BDDs (described in Section 2.4.2). Whereas a BDD represents a function
that maps boolean variables to a boolean value, an MTBDD represents a function that
maps boolean variables to a value from an arbitrary domain (in this case the domain is
always taken to be R). Note that, as for a BDD, the variables of an MTBDD must be
given an ordering and that this will signiﬁcantly aﬀect the the size of the MTBDD. An44
MTBDD must also be reduced to its most compact form, using the same techniques as for
a BDD, resulting in a canonical MTBDD.
Once an MTBDD or sparse matrix representation of a model (DTMC or MDP) is created,
it can then be used for probabilistic model checking of PCTL properties. Qualitative
properties (those that hold with probability 0 or 1) can be computed eﬃciently using
BDDs.
Quantitative properties, on the other hand, require numerical calculation, which can be
carried out using a number of diﬀerent iterative techniques (e.g. Jacobi, Gauss-Seidel)
[55]. Iterative methods work by maintaining a vector of solutions that initially contains
some approximation to the actual result. A series of iterations takes place with a new
solution vector being computed at each step, based on the old value of the vector and the
matrix representing the model. The iterations normally terminate whenever the diﬀerence
between the old and new solution vectors is less than some threshold value. Computation
of the new vector mainly consists of a matrix-vector multiplication operation.
MTBDDs can be used to represent the matrix and the solution vector and eﬃcient algo-
rithms to perform the matrix-vector multiplication exist. However, in practice the numer-
ical computation required to verify quantitative properties is often slow when performed
on an MTBDD, due mainly to the growth of the MTBDD representation of the vector as
the computation proceeds. Sparse matrices on the other hand store the vector in arrays,
which remain constant in size, and so tend to perform much better than MTBDDs but
have the disadvantage of having much greater memory requirements.
PRISM includes a hybrid engine that combines the MTBDD and sparse matrix approaches
to provide a veriﬁcation engine that is comparable in terms of speed to a sparse matrix
implementation but also gives considerable savings in space. The hybrid technique uses
an MTBDD to represent the model and a sparse matrix to represent the solution vector.
Note that PRISM also provides an option to apply fairness to the veriﬁcation of MDPs
based on the following deﬁnition, which is taken from [10].
Deﬁnition 3.4.1. A path ω of an MDP M is fair if, for states s occurring inﬁnitely often
in ω, each choice   ∈ Steps(s) is taken inﬁnitely often. An adversary A ∈ AdvM is fair
if, for any state s in M, ProbA
s ({ω ∈ PathA
s |ω is fair}) = 1.45
Note the diﬀerence between this deﬁnition of fairness and that used by SPIN which only
provides a notion of fairness between processes.
For any MDP M, let Adv
fair
M ⊆ AdvM denote the set of fair adversaries of M. The
fair satisfaction relation is denoted by |=fair. The semantics for this are deﬁned as for
the satisfaction relation, |=, for all PCTL operators with the exception of P⊲⊳[ψ]. The
semantics for this are deﬁned formally as follows,
s |=fair P⊲⊳[ψ] ⇔ ProbA
s ({ω ∈ PathA(s)|ω |= ψ}) ⊲⊳ p for all A ∈ Adv
fair
M ,
where M is a MDP and s a state in M.
3.4.1 The PRISM Modelling Language
The main features of the PRISM speciﬁcation language are model type speciﬁcation,
process speciﬁcation, synchronisation and probabilistic (and, in the case of MDPs, non-
deterministic) choice. This section provides an outline of each of these, but note that a
more thorough explanation can be found elsewhere in the literature [1].
The underlying model that is created from the code of a PRISM speciﬁcation can be one
of a DTMC, MDP or CTMC. To distinguish between these models in the speciﬁcation it
is necessary to include the keyword probabilistic, nondeterministic or stochastic,
respectively. We consider only the two former model types.
Processes are deﬁned using the module keyword followed by the name of the process.
Multiple instantiations of any process can be declared by textual renaming. This is done
by declaring the process using module as before followed by the process name (which must
diﬀer from the name of any other process). Each of the variables from the original process
speciﬁcation must then be renamed. As an example assume that we have a module, module
Site1 with variable state1. A new ‘Site’ process is created by writing:
module Site2=Site1 [state2=state1] endmodule.
Processes do not take any parameters and do not need to do so because all variables are
visible globally. A process can have associated local variables which can either be declared
as integers or booleans. For example,46
an int : [0..4] init 0;
declares a variable that can be an integer in the range zero to four, with initial value zero,
whereas,
a bool : bool init false;
declares a boolean variable initialised to false.
Note that it is also possible to declare global variables and constants, outside of a process
speciﬁcation. Global variables are declared in the same way as local variables but the
declaration must be preﬁxed by the term global. Constants, like variables, can be integers
or booleans but may also be declared as ﬂoating point doubles. As an example, const
int N = 10; declares a global integer constant, N, with value ten.
In order for a process to update a variable, the conditions under which that variable are to
be updated must ﬁrst be satisﬁed. For example, given an integer variable x and a boolean
y then,
[] (x=1 & y=true) -> (y’=false & x’=2);
updates y to false and x to two when x is one and y is true. Note the use of the dash (’)
notation to indicate the updated variable. It should also be pointed out that the variables
referenced in the guard may be any program variable (including another processes local
variables) but the variables to be updated must be global or local to that particular process.
In PRISM, probability is introduced in diﬀerent ways depending on the type of Markov
chain that is being used. Consider the case of DTMCs. Here probabilistic choice is
introduced on the right hand side of the variable updates by using the ’+’ operator to
indicate choice between a set of updates and then by labelling each separate update rule
with a probability. For example, given x and y as above, given the statement,
[] (x=1 & y=true) -> 0.5 :(y’=false & x’=2) + 0.5 :(x’=0);
with equal probability, either an update is made to y and x is set to two or x is set to zero
and y is unchanged (assuming that the guard condition holds). Note that the probabilities
in a single update must sum to one.
In DTMCs if there is more than one update rule with a guard that evaluates to true47
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of a DTMC and a MDP
then the choice between these is made probabilistically, so that each update has an equal
probability of being executed. In a MDP, however, such a choice is always made non-
deterministically. To clarify, consider the PRISM speciﬁcation given below.
module coin
state : [0..3] init 0;
[] state=0 -> 1.0 : state’=1;
[] state=1 -> 0.8 : (state’=state) + 0.2 : (state’=0);
[] state=1 -> 0.5 : (state’=2) + 0.5 : (state’=3);
[] (state=2 | state=3) -> 1.0 : (state’=state);
endmodule
Note that we omit the declaration of the type of model from the speciﬁcation. Suppose
that we do so, using probabilistic or nondeterministic, deﬁning a DTMC or MDP
model respectively. These models are given in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.5 (a) shows the DTMC
for the speciﬁcation using the declaration probabilistic and Figure 3.5 (b) shows the
MDP derived from speciﬁcation using the declaration nondeterministic. Note that for
the MDP model, the dashed lines indicate the nondeterministic transitions and the solid
lines the probabilistic ones.
The important point to note is that, in the DTMC model, the outgoing transitions from
the state in which state=1 are all probabilistic, whereas in the MDP there are two non-
deterministic transitions. This is as a result of the two statements in the speciﬁcation48
which can both be executed if state=1. In the DTMC model the probabilities are all
divided by two (the number of executable statements) to give transitions probabilities
of 0.4,0.1,0.25 and 0.25. On the other hand, in the speciﬁcation of the MDP the two
statements will be chosen non-deterministically.
One feature of the PRISM language that has not yet been discussed is synchronisation. In
PRISM synchronisation between modules can be used as an alternative to global variables
to enable processes to communicate (synchronously). In order to synchronise on some
action, any update rules that are involved must be labelled with the same action name.
This action can only then occur when each of the update statements are enabled, in which
case the update in each statement is made simultaneously with probability given by the
multiplication of the probabilities of the individual updates.
For example, consider two separate modules, one that includes the statement,
[action1] (x=0) -> 0.5 : x’=1 + 0.5 : x’=2;
and another with the statement,
[action1] (y=0) -> 0.5 : y’=1 + 0.5 : y’=2;.
Whenever x and y equal zero then x and y are updated so that: with probability 0.25 x=y=1;
with probability 0.25 x=1 and y=2; with probability 0.25 x=2 and y=1; with probability
0.25 x=y=2.
In the case studies of randomised distributed protocols that we provide in later chapters we
consider communication to be asynchronous. PRISM does not provide explicit structures
for modelling asynchronous communication between components. However, it is relatively
straightforward to deﬁne modules that act as communication buﬀers. In the case where
we consider buﬀers of length one then we can in fact represent these with a global variable.
In doing so note that we must be careful about the use of these buﬀers since ideally we
want to restrict the type of operation that we can perform on them to reading and writing.
This cannot be checked automatically: we must manually ensure that this restriction is
maintained.49
3.5 Probabilistic Relations
In the following sections we consider the bisimulation, simulation and stuttering equiva-
lence relations for MDPs and the isomorphism relation for DTMCs. Note that the diﬀerent
relations preserve diﬀerent probabilistic temporal logic properties between related struc-
tures. In particular bisimulation between MDPs preserves PCTL properties whereas stut-
tering equivalence preserves QLTL properties. This is an important point as it inﬂuences
the probabilistic logic that we consider in the following chapters.
3.5.1 Strong Bisimulation and Simulation for MDPs
As for non-probabilistic structures, bisimulation and simulation can be deﬁned for proba-
bilistic models, though the deﬁnition must be lifted to probability distributions over states
rather than single states. Bisimulation and simulation over MDPs preserves properties
expressed in probabilistic temporal logic (e.g. PCTL). Note that we deﬁne the relations
on a single structure rather than between a pair of models. However, it is straightforward
to apply the deﬁnitions to two structures if we consider the disjoint union of the sets of
states of the Markov models.
Strong Bisimulation A strong bisimulation is an equivalence relation that preserves
the probability of transitions between equivalence classes. The formal deﬁnition of strong
bisimulation for MDPs is given below. This is adapted from the deﬁnition given in [58]
which deﬁnes strong bisimulation for probabilistic transition systems that are not state-
labelled.
Deﬁnition 3.5.1. Let M = (S,s0,Act,Steps,L) be a MDP and R an equivalence relation
on S. R is a strong bisimulation on M if, for s1Rs2:
1. L(s1) = L(s2)
2. For any (a, 1) ∈ Steps(s1), there exists (a, 2) ∈ Steps(s2) such that  1(C) =  2(C)
for all C in the set of equivalence classes S/R.
For states s1 and s2 in some MDP, M, s1 is said to be strongly bisimilar to s2, denoted
by s1 ≈ s2, if and only if there exists a strong bisimulation, R on M, with s1Rs2.50
Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act,L′) be MDPs with sets of
atomic propositions AP and AP′ respectively, let AP∗ = AP ∩ AP′ and let ⊎ denote dis-
joint union. Deﬁne the combination of M and M′ by M∗ = (S⊎S′,{s0,s′
0},Steps∗,Act,L∗),
where, for s ∈ S ⊎ S′,
L∗(s) =



L(s) ∩ AP∗ if s ∈ S
L′(s) ∩ AP∗ if s ∈ S′
and, for a ∈ Act,   ∈ Dist(S ⊎ S′), (a, ) ∈ Steps∗(s) if and only if s ∈ S and (a, ) ∈
Steps(s) or s ∈ S′ and (a, ) ∈ Steps′(s).
M is said to be strongly bisimilar to M′, denoted by M ≈ M′ if and only if there exists
a strong bisimulation, R, on M∗ and s0Rs′
0.
We now give a logical characterisation of bisimulation in terms of PCTL, establishing
which properties are preserved under the bisimulation relation. The following has been
proved in [58].
Lemma 3.5.2. Let M be a MDP with atomic propositions AP. If s1,s2 are states of M
and φ is a PCTL property with propositions from AP, then,
s1 ≈ s2 =⇒ (s1 |= φ ⇐⇒ s2 |= φ).
In other words two strongly bisimilar states satisfy the same PCTL properties. In addition,
if M ≈ M′, M |= φ ⇐⇒ M′ |= φ for any PCTL property φ with propositions in AP.
Strong Simulation Below we deﬁne a simulation relation similar to that of [58]. In
order to formalise a notion of strong simulation we ﬁrst deﬁne a weight function.
Deﬁnition 3.5.3. Let S, T be sets, R ⊆ S × T and   ∈ Dist(S) ,ν ∈ Dist(T). A weight
function for   and ν with respect to R is a function w : S × T → [0,1] such that:
• w(s,t) > 0 ⇒ sRt,
•  (s) =
 
t∈T w(s,t) for any s ∈ S,
• ν(t) =
 
s∈S w(s,t) for any t ∈ T.
We write   ⊑R ν (or simply   ⊑ ν if R is clear from the context) if and only if there exists
a weight function for   and ν with respect to R.51
Deﬁnition 3.5.4. Let M = (S,s0,Act,Steps,Act,L) and M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act,L′) be
MDPs with atomic propositions AP,AP′ respectively such that AP ⊆ AP′. Let R ⊆ S×S′.
R is a simulation if and only if,
• s0Rs′
0,
• ∀s ∈ S,s′ ∈ S′, if sRs′ then L′(s′) ∩ AP = L(s),
• ∀s ∈ S,s′ ∈ S′, if sRs′ then for any (a, ′) ∈ Steps’(s′), there exists (a, ) ∈ Steps(s)
such that   ⊑R  ′.
For states, s ∈ S,s′ ∈ S′, we say that s simulates s′, written s   s′, if and only if there
exists a simulation R, such that sRs′. Moreover, we say that M simulates M′, denoted
M   M′ if and only if s0   s′
0.
We subsequently give a logical characterisation of simulation with respect to PCTL. Strong
simulation does not preserve all PCTL formulae, only PCTL-liveness formulae (see Deﬁ-
nition 3.3.1). This result follows from a similar result [58] for probabilistic automata.
Lemma 3.5.5. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L), M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be MDPs
with atomic propositions AP,AP′ respectively such that AP ⊆ AP′. Let φ be a PCTL-
liveness formula that only includes propositions from AP. If s   s′ (s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S′) then
s |= φ ⇒ s′ |= φ.
3.5.2 Stuttering Equivalence
For any (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) word v in some language L, the stuttering removal operator, #,
applied to v replaces every maximal ﬁnite subsequence of identical elements by a single
copy of this element. Two words v and w (that are both either ﬁnite or inﬁnite) in L are
said to be stuttering equivalent if and only if #v = #w [49]. More detail in respect of
stuttering equivalence is provided in [44].
We can apply the concept of stuttering equivalence to paths in MDPs if we consider the
trace of each path as a word in the language given by sequences over the sets of atomic
propositions. Formally, let M and M′ be MDPs with atomic propositions AP and AP′
respectively. An inﬁnite (respectively ﬁnite) path ω of M is said to be stuttering equivalent52
to an inﬁnite (respectively ﬁnite) path ω′ of M′ with respect to some common set of atomic
propositions AP′′ ⊆ AP ∩ AP′ if and only if #traceAP′′
(γ) = #traceAP′′
(β). We denote
this by ω ≃ ω′.
We can extend stuttering equivalence of paths of MDPs to adversaries. To do so we need
to deﬁne a trace cylinder over sequences of sets of atomic propositions [8].
Deﬁnition 3.5.6. Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. The trace cylinder
C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n )
(for l0,l1,...,ln ∈ 2AP pairwise distinct) is deﬁned by
C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n) = {t ∈ (2AP)ω)|t = l
k0
0 ,l
k1
1 ,...,lkn
n ,... for some k0,k1,...,kn ≥ 1}.
where lk = l,l,...,l       
k
for l ∈ 2AP and k ≥ 1.
For an adversary A of a MDP M over propositions AP with initial state s0, and AP′, a
subset of the atomic propositions AP, by abuse of notation let,
ProbA
s0(C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n )) = ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|traceAP′
(ω) ∈ C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n )}),
where l0,l1,...,ln ∈ 2AP′
.
Deﬁnition 3.5.7. [8] A stutter-invariant language over a set of atomic propositions, AP,
is a set L ⊆ (2AP)ω of inﬁnite words over 2AP such that, for any word θ ∈ L, all words
θ′ that are stutter equivalent to θ are also contained in L. In order for L to be measurable
it must also be an element of the σ-ﬁeld generated by the trace-cylinders C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n )
where l0,l1,...,ln are pairwise distinct subsets of AP.
Given an adversary A for a MDP M with atomic propositions AP and a set of atomic
propositions AP′, a subset of AP and a state s, we abuse notation and henceforth let,
ProbA
s (L) = ProbA
s ({α ∈ PathA
s |traceAP′
(α) ∈ L}),
denote the probability measure over the set of paths induced by A that start in state s
and give a trace in a stutter-invariant language L over AP′.53
Deﬁnition 3.5.8. [8] Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L), M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′), be
MDPs with atomic propositions AP and AP′ respectively. Two adversaries A ∈ AdvM,
A′ ∈ AdvM′ are probabilistic stuttering equivalent w.r.t. AP′′ ⊆ AP ∩ AP′ if and only if,
ProbA
s0(L) = ProbA′
s0(L),
for all stutter-invariant measurable languages L over AP′′.
By standard arguments of measure theory, it is suﬃcient, when determining probabilistic
stuttering equivalence between adversaries, to consider only the trace cylinders over the
sets of atomic propositions [8].
Proposition 3.5.9. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′),
be two MDPs, with atomic propositions AP and AP′ respectively. Two adversaries A ∈
AdvM, A′ ∈ AdvM′ are probabilistic stuttering equivalent w.r.t. AP′′ ⊆ AP ∩ AP′ if and
only if,
ProbA
s0(C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n )) = ProbA′
s′
0(C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n ))
for all pairwise distinct l0,l1,...,ln ∈ 2AP′′
for n ≥ 0.
Deﬁnition 3.5.10. [8] Two MDPs, M and M′, with atomic propositions, AP and AP′,
respectively, are said to be probabilistic stutter equivalent w.r.t. AP′′ ⊆ AP ∩ AP′ if and
only if every adversary of M is probabilistic stuttering equivalent to some adversary of M′
w.r.t AP′′, and vice versa.
In the remainder of this thesis, when it is clear from the context, we will use the term
stuttering equivalence to refer to probabilistic stuttering equivalence between MDPs and
adversaries and stuttering equivalence between paths. Furthermore, we overload the ≃
operator and denote stuttering equivalence between two adversaries A and A′ with respect
to some set of atomic propositions, AP, by A ≃ A′ with respect to AP. Similarly, stut-
tering equivalent MDPs, M and M′, with respect to AP, are denoted by M ≃ M′ with
respect to AP.
Stuttering equivalent paths satisfy the same set of LTL\X properties [44]. It has also
been shown that the languages induced by LTL properties are measurable [61]. Therefore,
LTL\X properties induce stutter-invariant measurable languages. From Deﬁnition 3.5.8,
it therefore follows that stuttering equivalent adversaries preserve the probability measure
over paths satisfying LTL\X properties, a fact we state formally in Proposition 3.5.11.54
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Figure 3.6: Two MDPs with stuttering equivalent adversaries
Proposition 3.5.11. [8] If M and M′ are MDPs with atomic propositions AP and AP′,
respectively, and adversaries A and A′, respectively, then for any LTL\X path formula ψ
with atomic propositions in AP′′ ⊆ AP ∩ AP′, if A is stuttering equivalent to A′ w.r.t.
AP′′ then
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ψ}) = ProbA′
s′
0({ω′ ∈ PathA′
s′
0|ω′ |= ψ}).
It follows that the supremum and inﬁmum probability measures (with respect to the set of
adversaries) over the set of paths, under an adversary, that satisfy some LTL\X property
must be equal for two stuttering equivalent MDPs. Thus,
Lemma 3.5.12. [8] If M and M′ are MDPs with atomic propositions AP and AP′,
then for any QLTL\X property φ with atomic propositions in AP′′ ⊆ AP ∩ AP′, if M is
stuttering equivalent to M′ w.r.t. AP′′ then,
M |= φ ⇔ M′ |= φ.
Example: To illustrate some of the concepts described thus far, in Figure 3.6 we give
an example of two MDPs, M and M′, with initial states s0 and s′
0 respectively. The
MDP M, has action set Act = {a,b,c} and M′ has action set Act′ = {b,c}. Note that
in both MDPs there is only one action enabled from every state and hence there is only
one adversary associated with each MDP. Let these adversaries be A and A′. We show a
fragment of the DTMCs obtained under these adversaries in Figure 3.7.55
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Figure 3.7: The DTMCs obtained under the (unique) adversaries of the MDPs in Figure
3.6
The adversaries A and A′ are stuttering equivalent w.r.t. AP = {x = 0,x = 1} since,
ProbA
s0(C({x = 0}+)) = ProbA′
s′
0(C({x = 0}+)) = 1 and,
ProbA
s0(C({x = 0}+,{x = 1}+)) = ProbA′
s′
0(C({x = 0}+,{x = 1}+)) = 1,
and the probability measure over all other trace-cylinders is zero. Since A and A′ are
unique for M and M′ respectively, M ≃ M′ w.r.t. AP.
Let ψ be the LTL\X path formula true U x = 1. Then,
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ψ}) = ProbA′
s′
0({ω′ ∈ PathA′
s′
0|ω′ |= ψ}) = 1.
Thus, M and M′ both satisfy the QLTL\X property P≥1[ψ].
The proof of the following result is given in [56] for a more general case. For the sake of
completeness we provide the proof for the special case we consider here.
Lemma 3.5.13. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be
MDPs with sets of atomic propositions AP and AP′ respectively. Let A and A′ be ad-
versaries of M and M′ respectively, and let AP′′ ⊆ AP ∩ AP′. Suppose that there exists
cuts D0,D1,... with, for all i ≥ 0, Di ∈ Cut(A′), such that56
1. ∀i ≥ 0, ∀α ∈ Di+1, α ∈ Di or for some β ≤ α, β ∈ Di,
2. For every α ∈ PathA
ﬁn(s0), limi→∞
 
β∈Di,α≤β P(β) = ProbA
s0(C(α)),
3. For each i ≥ 0, deﬁne  i : cutA
i → [0,1],  ′
i : Di → [0,1] such that for α ∈ cutA,
α′ ∈ Di,  i(α) = P(α),  ′
i(α′) = P(α′). Then  i ⊑R  ′
i where for α ∈ cutA
i , α′ ∈ Di,
R(α,α′) iﬀ α ≃ α′ w.r.t. AP′′,
then, A is stuttering equivalent to A′.
Proof. Let l0,l1,...,ln ∈ AP′′ be pairwise distinct. Notice that,
ProbA
s0(C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n)) =
 
α∈TA
l0,l1,...,ln
ProbA
s0(C(α)),
where
TA
l0,l1,...,ln = {α ∈ PathA
ﬁn(s0)|traceAP′′
(α) ≃ l0,l1,...,ln∧∀β < α,traceAP′′
(β)  ≃ l0,l1,...,ln}.
Alternatively,
ProbA
s0(C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n)) = lim
i→∞
 
α∈cutA(i),∃β≤α.β∈TA
l0,l1,...,ln
ProbA
s0(C(α)).
Similarly,
ProbA′
s′
0(C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n )) = lim
i→∞
 
α′∈Di,∃β′≤α′.β′∈TA′
l0,l1,...,ln
ProbA′
s′
0(C(α′)).
Let i ≥ 0 and let w be the weight function such that  i ⊑R  ′
i. Then,
 
α∈cutA(i),∃β≤α.β∈TA
l0,l1,...,ln
ProbA
s0(C(α))
=
 
α∈cutA(i),∃β≤α.β∈TA
l0,l1,...,ln
 i(α),
=
 
α∈cutA(i),∃β≤α.β∈TA
l0,l1,...,ln
 
α′∈Di
w(α,α′),
=
 
α′∈Di,∃β′≤α′.β′∈TA′
l0,l1,...,ln
 
α∈cutA(i)
w(α,α′),
=
 
α′∈Di,∃β′≤α′.β′∈TA′
l0,l1,...,ln
 ′
i(α′),
=
 
α′∈Di,∃β′≤α′.β′∈TA′
l0,l1,...,ln
ProbA′
s′
0(C(α′)).57
Thus we have that,
ProbA
s0(C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n)) = ProbA′
s′
0(C(l+
0 ,l+
1 ,...,l+
n)).
Stuttering Equivalent Sets of Paths
We now extend our deﬁnition of stuttering equivalence between adversaries to a subset of
paths under some adversary. It is necessary to consider this for our results in Chapter 6.
Deﬁnition 3.5.14. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L), M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be MDPs
and let AP and AP′ be the sets of atomic propositions over M and M′ respectively. Given
(randomised) adversaries A ∈ AdvM(∈ RAdvM), A′ ∈ AdvM′(∈ RAdvM′) and a set of
paths Π ⊆ PathA
s0 (measurable under ProbA
s0), then, Π is stuttering equivalent to A′ with
respect to AP′′ ⊆ AP ∩ AP′ if and only if,
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|traceAP′′
(ω) ∈ L} ∩ Π)
ProbA
s0(Π)
= ProbA′
s′
0(L)
for all stutter-invariant measurable languages L.
If Π is stuttering equivalent to A we denote this by Π ≃ A. Arguing in a similar manner
as for Proposition 3.5.11 we can establish Lemma 3.5.15.
Lemma 3.5.15. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L), M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be MDPs
and let AP and AP′ be the sets of atomic propositions over M and M′ respectively.
Given two (randomised) adversaries A ∈ AdvM(∈ RAdvM), A′ ∈ AdvM′(∈ RAdvM′), let
Π ⊆ PathA
s0 be a set of paths measurable under ProbA
s0 such that Π is stuttering equivalent
to A′ with respect to AP′′ ⊆ AP ∩ AP′. Then, for a LTL path formula ψ with atomic
propositions in AP′′,
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ψ} ∩ Π)
ProbA
s0(Π)
= ProbA′
s′
0({ω′ ∈ PathA′
s′
0|ω′ |= ψ}).
3.5.3 Isomorphism
Isomorphic DTMCs must have exactly the same structural behaviour (up to the labelling
of states). Deﬁnition 3.5.16 is taken from [26] (adapted from [42]).58
Deﬁnition 3.5.16. Let D = (S,s0,P,L) and D′ = (S′,s′
0,P′,L′) be DTMCs and let
ς : S → S′ be a bijection. Suppose that for all s,t ∈ S, P(s,t) = P′(ς(s),ς(t)). Then ς is
an isomorphism from D to D′, and D and D′ are said to be isomorphic.
The following result is adapted from [26].
Lemma 3.5.17. Let D = (S,s0,P,L) and D′ = (S′,s′
0,P′,L′) be DTMCs with atomic
propositions AP and AP′, respectively, and let Σ : AP → AP′ be a bijection. For a QLTL
formula φ with atomic propositions taken from AP, Σ(ψ) is the QLTL formula obtained
from φ by replacing every atomic proposition a in AP with Σ(a). Let ς : S → S′ be an
isomorphism from D to D′ such that, for all s ∈ S and a ∈ AP, a ∈ L(s) ⇐⇒ Σ(a) ∈
L′(ς(s)). Then for any QLTL formula φ with atomic propositions from AP and s ∈ S,
D,s |= φ ⇐⇒ D′,ς(s) |= Σ(φ).
3.5.4 Isomorphism between Adversaries
Isomorphic adversaries must have exactly the same structural behaviour (up to labelling
of states). Deﬁnition 3.5.18 and Lemma 3.5.19 are adapted from [26].
Deﬁnition 3.5.18. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be
MDPs with adversaries A and A′ respectively. Let ρ : PathA
fin(s0) → PathA′
fin(s′
0) be
a bijection with ρ(s0) = s′
0. Suppose, for all α ∈ PathA
fin(s0), if A(α) = (a, ) and
ρ(α
(a, )
−→ t) = α′ (a′, ′)
−→ t′ then A′(α′) = (a′, ′) and  (t) =  ′(t′) for all t such that
 (t) > 0. Then ς is an isomorphism from A to A′, and A and A′ are isomorphic (denoted
A = A′).
Lemma 3.5.19. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be
MDPs with propositions AP and AP′, respectively and let Σ : AP → AP′ be a bijec-
tion. For LTL property ψ with propositions in AP, Σ(ψ) is the LTL formula obtained
from ψ by replacing every proposition a with Σ(a). Let ς be an isomorphism between
adversaries A (of M) and A′ (of M′) such that, for all α ∈ PathA
ﬁn(s0) and a ∈ AP,
a ∈ L(last(α)) ⇐⇒ Σ(a) ∈ L′(last(ς(α))). Then for any LTL formula ψ with proposi-
tions from AP, ProbA
s0(ψ) = ProbA′
s′
0(Σ(ψ)).
Let M = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and M′ = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be MDPs and let A and
A′ be adversaries of M and M′ respectively. For a measurable set of paths Π ⊆ PathA(s0),59
if ς is an isomorphism between A and A′ then we say Π is isomorphic to Π′ ⊆ PathA′
(s′
0)
(denoted Π = Π′) if and only if Π′ = ς(Π) where ς(Π) = {ς(π)|π ∈ Π}. If ς and Σ are as
deﬁned in Lemma 3.5.19 then it should be clear that for a LTL formula ψ,
ProbA
s0({π ∈ Π|π |= ψ) = ProbA′
s′
0({π′ ∈ Π′|π′ |= Σ(ψ)).
Summary We have reviewed some aspects of the ﬁeld of model checking. In particular
we have deﬁned Discrete Time Markov Chains and Markov Decision Processes, adver-
saries of MDPs, the PCTL and QLTL probabilistic temporal logics and the PRISM model
checking tool. We have also deﬁned the bisimulation, simulation, stuttering equivalence
and isomorphism relations for Markov decision processes.Chapter 4
Parameterised Veriﬁcation of
Non-degenerative Distributed
Systems
Outline In this chapter we construct a network invariant for a simple token ring pro-
tocol using a methodology based on data abstraction that has previously been applied to
a number of non-probabilistic distributed systems. We extend the deﬁnition of data ab-
straction to probabilistic models so that we can construct an invariant for a probabilistic
variant of the token ring protocol. Using probabilistic and non-probabilistic relations we
show that proving the invariants satisfy a property is equivalent to verifying the property
is satisﬁed for the token ring protocol, for any size of ring.
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, the construction of a ﬁnite-state network invariant is a com-
monly employed technique when verifying parameterised distributed systems. Although
it has been shown that a ﬁnite-state invariant does not always exist [62], this is often
a useful method, particularly when considering distributed systems that have a regular
topology (e.g. a star or a ring). The method of construction can vary depending on the
type of system under consideration and the formalism used to specify the system. One
such method is by abstraction (initially described in [21]). For example, an abstraction
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mapping is deﬁned on the states of a concrete model, and on a property. Application
of the map results in an abstract (or reduced) model (and property). Proving that the
abstract model satisﬁes any ‘abstracted’ property implies that the property holds in the
concrete model [38].
Abstraction in the construction of a network invariant for a variety of systems has been
considered in [17,49]. Finite-state network invariants are constructed for a fully connected
email system, a client-server system and a leader election protocol for star topologies. The
network invariants are speciﬁed in Promela by deﬁning an abstract process that captures
the behaviour of an arbitrary number of concrete processes, and composing this process
in parallel with some ﬁxed number of ‘concrete’ processes.
Rather than employing the invariant rule [62], a relationship is established between the
underlying models of the invariant speciﬁcations and the underlying models of the ﬁxed size
system speciﬁcations. However, instead of showing a direct relationship, an intermediate
step is employed, based on data abstraction (see Section 4.2) of the models of the ﬁxed size
system speciﬁcations. This simpliﬁes the proof and provides a guide for the construction
of the invariant. The data abstracted models are shown to satisfy any properties satisﬁed
by the model of the invariant speciﬁcation. Properties of the concrete model of a system
of any size can then be inferred from properties of the invariant (which are established by
model checking).
To illustrate the approach, we construct a network invariant for a simple counter token ring
protocol (CTRP) described in Section 4.3. Concrete models for the token ring protocol are
deﬁned in terms of Promela speciﬁcations that are generated from a script program. The
invariant model is also described by a Promela speciﬁcation, as outlined in Section 4.4.
The SPIN model checker is used to model check various LTL properties for the invariant.
In section 4.5 we prove that any property that holds in the model of the invariant of
the token ring system will hold for a concrete model of the CTRP with any number of
processes.
We then proceed in Section 4.6 to introduce probabilistic choice to the model of the CTRP
and specify concrete probabilistic models using PRISM (Section 4.8). In Section 4.10 we
extend the parameterised veriﬁcation proof employed for the CTRP to these probabilistic
models. To do this we construct an invariant model from a PRISM speciﬁcation and62
show (through the use of an adaptation of data abstraction to probabilistic models) that
properties of the invariant hold for the concrete models.
4.2 Data Abstraction
As discussed in the previous section, in this chapter we extend the approach, based on
data abstraction [18]. Data abstraction is employed to create an abstract model for models
described by a set of variables, e.g. the models derived from a Promela speciﬁcation.
Deﬁnition 4.2.1. Let X = {x0,x2,...,xn−1} be a set of variables where xi has domain
D(xi), ∀i, 0 ≤ i < n. We deﬁne the set of atomic propositions over X by AP = {x = d|x ∈
X,d ∈ D(x)}. The domain of X is deﬁned as D(X) = D(x0) × D(x1) × ... × D(xn−1).
Deﬁnition 4.2.2. Let X be a set of variables with domain D(X) and let init(X) be the
tuple of initial values for the variables in X. A (labelled) Kripke structure K over X is a
tuple (D(X),init(X),R,L), where L labels each state with atomic propositions from the
set AP over X.
To deﬁne an abstract model of a system, surjective mappings are deﬁned from the domains
of the variables that describe a model to a set of values in an abstract domain. In doing
so, the set of possible values that the variables can take is restricted to a smaller set. This
can then be used to deﬁne a reduced Kripke structure. This has the obvious advantage of
reducing the size of the model, while preserving the behaviour of the system (see Lemma
4.2.5, below).
Deﬁnition 4.2.3. Let X = {x0,x1,...,xn−1} denote a set of variables such that each
variable xi ranges over a set D(xi). A set of abstract values D′(X) = D′(x0) × D′(x1) ×
...×D′(xn−1) is called an abstract domain of X if there exist surjections h0,h1,...,hn−1
such that hi : D(xi) → D′(xi) for all 0 ≤ i < n. If such surjections exist they induce a
surjection h : D → D′ deﬁned by h((x0,x1,...,xn−1)) = (h0(x0),h1(x1),...,hn−1(xn−1)).
Note that the states of the reduced Kripke structure are represented by sets of propositions
whereas the states of the original structure are represented by a tuple of values. The
labelling of the states are still given as sets of propositions, however.63
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Figure 4.1: Example of a Kripke structure and a reduced structure under data abstraction
Deﬁnition 4.2.4. [18] Let K = (S,R,s0,L) be a Kripke structure over variable set X
with the set of atomic propositions AP over X. If D′(X) is an abstract domain of X and
h the corresponding surjection from D(X) to D′(X) then h determines a set of abstract
atomic propositions AP′. Let K′ denote the structure identical to K but with the set of
labels L′ where L′ labels each state with a set of abstract atomic propositions from AP′.
Suppose that for all s ∈ S, s  = s0, h(s0)  = h(s) then the structure K′ can be collapsed into
a reduced structure Kr = (Sr,Rr,s0
r,L′) where
1. Sr = {L′(s)|s ∈ S}, the set of abstract labels.
2. APr = AP′
3. As each sr ∈ Sr is a set of atomic propositions, L′(sr) = sr.
4. For sr,tr ∈ Sr, Rr(sr,tr) if and only if there exists s ∈ S and t ∈ S such that
sr = L′(s),tr = L′(t) and R(s,t).
Intuitively, under data abstraction, groups of states of a model that were diﬀerentiated
become equivalent. Equivalent states are then be represented as a single state in the
reduced model. Any transitions to and from states in the original Kripke structure that
have been data abstracted, must be preserved between the corresponding representative
states in the reduced structure.
Example: Figure 4.1 shows how data abstraction is applied to a simple mutual ex-64
clusion protocol. In this case the model in Figure 4.1(a) consists of a single variable
state which represents the state of a single process and can take any of the values in the
domain {working,idle,trying,critical,failed}. Given the surjective mapping such that
working  → working, idle  → working, trying  → trying, failed  → trying, critical  →
critical, the abstract domain of the variable state is given by the set {working, trying ,
critical}. The reduced structure is shown in Figure 4.1(b).
An important point to note from this example is that, in the reduced structure, the state
labelled by the proposition state = trying has a self-looping transition. This is because,
in the original structure, the state with state = trying can make a transition to state =
failed. In the reduced structure state = failed is data abstracted to state = trying and
so this state is ‘merged’ with the original state, state = trying. However, the transition
in the original structure must be preserved and hence the self-loop must be included.
The following lemma is a restriction of a result in [20], which considered CTL* properties
that only contain the A quantiﬁer. The lemma states that any LTL properties that hold in
a reduced (under data abstraction) structure of a system will also hold in the original [49].
Lemma 4.2.5. If K is a Kripke structure with atomic propositions AP and Kr a re-
duced Kripke structure under h (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4.2.4) with set of abstract atomic
propositions AP′ then for any LTL property φ with atomic propositions in AP, Kr |= h(φ)
implies that K |= φ (where h(φ) maps the atomic propositions in φ to their abstract coun-
terparts).
Note that, in practice, we choose properties φ such that h(φ) = φ.
4.3 Specifying the Counter Token Ring Protocol (CTRP)
In this section we consider a counter token ring protocol (CTRP), in which processes
pass a single token around a ring in one direction. If a process is ready to perform some
operation (e.g. to transmit a message or to access some shared resource), it waits until it
receives the token, performs its operation and then passes the token on. We include in the
token a counter. Each time a process acquires the token and performs some operation, the
counter is decremented by one. Once the counter reaches zero, the protocol terminates.65
The counter could be used, for example, as a means to limit the number of operations that
can be performed (see for example [59]).
We specify models of the CTRP using Promela; speciﬁcations for any ﬁxed number of
processes can be generated from a script program. Note that, in modelling the protocol,
we use an arbiter process to decide when the processes should perform some operation
(and therefore decrement the counter). An example of the Promela code for the concrete
speciﬁcation of the CTRP with four processes and one arbiter is given in Appendix A. We
informally outline the behaviour of each process, below.
A process deﬁnition is given for a process and for the arbiter. The arbiter updates one
global boolean variable, work. Once the arbiter has changed the value of work, it must wait
for a process to set the global boolean variable done to the appropriate value so that work
can be changed again. For example, if work is true then once done is set to true, arbiter
can set work to false. Note that the arbiter process is always at the location labelled
change, and therefore the program counter for arbiter can be considered a constant and
thus ignored.
A process has three parameters: an in channel, an out channel and an index, id. Several
process components are instantiated, with the in channel of each process being the out
channel of its left ‘neighbour’ and the id of each one being unique. Note that channels
are stored in a global array, ch, with each element being indexed by the id of the process
which has that channel as its in channel. If a channel holds value k we denote this by [k];
if a channel is empty we denote this by [].
Initially, each process is at the location labelled idle and it polls its in channel for receipt
of a counter token. If the channel is not empty, its value is read and stored in token, a
local integer variable, process moves to the location labelled rcvd and a check is made to
establish whether work is true or false. If work is false then process sends the value of
token to its neighbour via its out channel and returns to idle. If work is true, token is
decremented and a check is made to see if token equals zero. If token==0, then end is
set to true and the process moves to ﬁnish. Otherwise process sets done to true, moves to
location label pass and waits for work to be set to false before sending the new value of
token to its neighbour and moving to label idle.
The speciﬁcation also includes a number of variables which are only used for veriﬁcation66
purposes. For example, each process has a local variable possess, which is set to true when
the process receives the token and is reset to false when token is passed on. This can then
be used to verify that no two processes ever have the token at the same time. Another
local process variable, working is set to true whenever token is decremented and is reset
to false when token has been passed on. This can be used, for example, to verify that
an operation can be performed by process. Also, the global integer variable ﬁnished is
incremented by one whenever a process sets the token value to zero.
At initialisation, ch[0] is set to some positive non-zero value, all other channels are ini-
tialised empty and work and done are set to false. At this point, the processes must also
be instantiated: a ﬁxed number of processes are run in parallel with one arbiter process.
For N > 1 and c ≥ 1, we let S(N,c) denote the speciﬁcation:
init{
atomic{
run process(ch[0],ch[1],0);
run process(ch[1],ch[2],1);
. . .
run process(ch[N],ch[0],N);
run arbiter();
ch[0]!c; // always start with process 0
}
}//init
Note that there are two parameters to our veriﬁcation problem: the number of processes
and the initial value of the counter. However, in constructing an invariant we only consider
the former. The latter remains a parameter for the invariant.
To distinguish between the local variables of each process, we use vari to denote the local
variable var associated with the instantiation of process with id equal i. Similarly we
refer to processi.
4.3.1 Properties of the CTRP
A description of the properties of the CTRP that capture correct behaviour of the system
are given below. The properties are formalised using LTL and have been veriﬁed using67
SPIN for two, three, four and ﬁve processes (and one arbiter process) and the initial value
of the counter between one and ten.
Safety
S1. Only one process at a time can hold the token.
 ((!possess0&&!possess1&&...&&!possessN−1)
||(possess0&&!possess1&&!possess2&&...&&!possessN−1)
||(!possess0&&possess1&&!possess2&&!possess3&&...&&!possessN−1)
. . .
||(!possess0&&!possess1&&...&&!possessN−2&&possessN−1))
S2. At most one process can ﬁnish.
•  (finished == 0||finished == 1)
Liveness
L1. Eventually a process will ﬁnish.
• (finished == 0)U(finished == 1)
L2. If process i (for each 0 ≤ i ≤ N −1) receives the token it will always eventually pass
the token to its neighbour, unless the protocol has terminated.
•  (possessi → (♦(!possessi||end)))
L3. Eventually the arbiter will schedule an operation.
• ♦(work)
L4. An operation can be performed inﬁnitely often.
•  ♦(work)
L5. Once ﬁnished, every process must have a token with zero value.
• ♦(end&&(token0 == 0)&&(token1 == 0)&&...&&(tokenN−1 == 0))
L6. Process i (for each 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1) can perform an operation.68
•  (workingi) (show to be false)
L7. It is possible for process i (for each 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1) to never perform an operation.
• ♦(workingi) (show to be false)
L8. Eventually the protocol will end and will not restart.
• ♦ (end)
It should be observed that under normal circumstances properties L1, L3, L4, L5 and
L8 do not hold because there exist paths along which the arbiter process never executes,
so that work is false forever and the counter never decremented. As discussed in Section
2.4.1, SPIN provides an option to apply weak fairness during veriﬁcation to ensure that
any process that has an enabled transition will eventually execute it. In this case, by
applying weak fairness during veriﬁcation of properties L1, L3, L4, L5 and L8, the
arbiter process must eventually be executed, so that work is always eventually set to true,
hence these properties hold. Note also that L7 will hold without any fairness constraints,
but weak fairness should still be applied to avoid searching inﬁnite paths for which the
property would (trivially) hold.
4.4 Speciﬁcation of an Invariant for the CTRP
To describe an invariant model that captures the behaviour of every concrete model we
specify in Promela an abstract process that captures the behaviour of an arbitrary number
of process processes. Intuitively, this process behaves the same as a process: it can receive
the token from its neighbour and then either pass the token on or decrement the token
and then either terminate or pass the token on. However, when passing the token, the
abstract process can non-deterministically choose to either send it to its neighbour or send
the token back to itself. In this way the abstract process behaves like an arbitrary number
of processes.
The Promela code for the invariant speciﬁcation of the CTRP with two concrete process
components, an arbiter and an abstract process is provided in Appendix B. Note that we
can run any number of process components in parallel with the abstract process. We assume
that there are m such processes. We describe below the operation of abstract process.69
The abstract process has the same local parameters as for a process, with id always being
given the highest possible value (m), out aways being channel ch[0] and in always being
ch[m]. As for process, in location idle, abstract process will accept the token when it has
been sent on its in channel, move to location rcvd and then check whether work is true
or false.
However, once it has determined the status of work, the behaviour of abstract process
deviates from that of process. If work is false, it can still send the token to its neighbour
but it may also non-deterministically choose to send the token to itself via its in channel,
before returning to the idle location. In the latter case, execution will then continue with
abstract process reading the token from channel in and moving to rcvd. Note that if work
is false forever, then it is possible for abstract process to do this an inﬁnite number of
times.
On the other hand, if work is true, abstract process must decrement token. Either token
is zero, end is set to true, ﬁnished is incremented by one and execution jumps to ﬁnish
or token is non-zero and done is set to true. In the latter case, execution then blocks
at the location labelled pass until work is false, after which done is set to false. The
abstract process can then non-deterministically choose to send token to its neighbour or
to itself before moving to location idle.
It should be apparent from the above description of abstract process that the possess and
working variables are not included in the process speciﬁcation. This is a result of the data
abstraction step which will be described in Section 4.5.
As described above, abstract process is always given the highest id value (m say). It
receives token from processm−1 and passes it to process0 (or to itself). Hence, the topology
(of the ring) consists of m neighbouring concrete processes with a single abstract process
between process0 and processm−1 (see Figure 4.2). It should be noted, however, that
it is also possible to deﬁne alternative topologies where the concrete processes may not
be adjacent e.g. where an abstract process is inserted between all neighbouring concrete
processes.
Note that, as discussed earlier, the initial value of the counter remains a parameter in the
invariant speciﬁcation, and the number of concrete processes is also a parameter. There-
fore, rather than specifying a single invariant we are in fact describing a parameterised70
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Figure 4.2: Topology for the abstract token ring speciﬁcation (excluding the arbiter pro-
cess) with m concrete processes
family of invariants. For m > 1 and c > 1, we let I(m,c) denote the invariant speciﬁcation:
init{
atomic{
run process(ch[0],ch[1],0);
run process(ch[1],ch[2],1);
. . .
run process(ch[m− 1],ch[m],m− 1);
run abstract process(ch[m],ch[0],m);
run arbiter();
ch[0]!c; // always start with process 0
}
}//init
where each process and arbiter are as deﬁned previously and abstract process is as de-
scribed above and deﬁned in Appendix B.
4.4.1 Properties of the Invariant
A number of LTL properties were described in Section 4.3.1 for the concrete Promela
speciﬁcation of the CTRP. Some LTL properties for the invariant speciﬁcation are given
below, again divided into the classes of safety and liveness. It is important to note that71
some of the properties below are diﬀerent from those given for the concrete speciﬁcation.
As we will see in the following sections, the abstraction of the concrete models inhibits
the set of variables that we can refer to when specifying our properties. Speciﬁcally we
cannot make reference to any local variable of an abstract process in any property of the
invariant that we wish to verify.
Safety
IS1. Only one concrete process at a time can hold the token.
 ((!possess0&&!possess1&&...&&!possessm−1)
||(possess0&&!possess1&&!possess2&&...&&!possessm−1)
||(!possess0&&possess1&&!possess2&&!possess3&&...&&!possessm−1)
. . .
||(!possess0&&!possess1&&...&&!possessm−2&&possessm−1))
IS2. No more than one process can ﬁnish.
 (finished == 0||finished == 1)
Liveness
IL1. Eventually one process will ﬁnish.
((finished == 0)U(finished == 1))
IL2. If concrete process i (for each 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1) receives the token it will always
eventually pass the token to its neighbour, unless the process has ﬁnished.
 (possessi → (♦(!possessi||end)))
IL3. Eventually the arbiter will schedule an operation.
♦(work)
IL4. An operation can be performed inﬁnitely often.
 ♦(work)72
IL5. Once ﬁnished every concrete process must have a zero token.
♦(end&&(token0 == 0)&&(token1 == 0)&&...(tokenm−1 = 0))
IL6. Each process can perform an operation. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1,
 !workingi (show to be false)
IL7. It is possible for a process to never perform an operation. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1,
♦(workingi) (show to be false)
IL8. Eventually the protocol will end and will not restart.
♦ (end)
The properties IS1, IS2, IL2, IL3, IL4, IL6 and IL7 have been veriﬁed against the
invariant speciﬁcation of the CTRP with two process components and one abstract process
process, and with the initial value of the counter between one and ten. Note, though, that
weak fairness had to be applied to verify properties IL3 and IL4.
However, the remaining properties (IL1, IL5) do not hold even under the application
of weak fairness. This is due to the introduction of cycles into the abstract process as
described in Section 4.4: intuitively it is possible for the abstract process to pass the token
to itself forever. We return to this point at the end of the chapter.
It should also be pointed out that properties IS1, IL2, IL6 and IL7 may not refer to the
possess or working variables associated with the abstract process components. This is an
example of the restriction that is given later in Theorem 4.5.1, which states that a property
can only hold under abstraction if it does not index any abstract process components. This
stipulation is necessary, and limits the type of property that can be veriﬁed. For example,
it should be apparent that, in the abstract speciﬁcation, IS1 only shows that the concrete
processes will never possess the token simultaneously, and does not give any information
on whether any abstract process can hold the token at the same time as another process.
4.5 Parameterised Veriﬁcation Proof for the CTRP
We prove that the model of the invariant speciﬁcation captures the behaviour of the models
of the concrete speciﬁcations i.e. we show that if any property (satisfying a given set of73
restrictions) holds in the invariant model then it will hold in the concrete model for any
number of processes. We do this using a proof similar to those of [17,49]. We give this
proof in some detail here since it provides a basis for our proof for the probabilistic case
in Section 4.6.
For N > 1 and c > 1, given a CTRP speciﬁcation, S(N,c), let the concrete (Kripke
structure) model of the CTRP be MN. Given an invariant speciﬁcation I(m,c), for
m > 1, let Mm
I be deﬁned as the invariant model of the CTRP.
The processes with id between 0 and m−1 in both the invariant and concrete speciﬁcations
will be referred to as the concrete processes while those with id between m and N − 1 in
the concrete speciﬁcation will be described as the abstract processes.
We aim to prove the following:
Theorem 4.5.1. Let m > 1 and let φ be an LTL property that does not contain any index
greater than or equal to m in its atomic propositions. Then, for all N > m, c ≥ 1, if
Mm
I |= φ then MN |= φ.
Proof Overview The proof is in two stages: creation of a reduced model from MN (for
each N) by data abstraction, followed by deﬁnition of a simulation relation between each
reduced model and Mm
I .
The construction of a reduced set of models proceeds as follows. For each concrete
model MN of the system with a ﬁxed number of N > m processes, and property φ,
the processes are divided into concrete processes p0,p1,...,pm−1 and abstract processes
pm,pm+1,...,pN−1. We assume property, φ, only refers to the concrete processes (i.e. the
atomic propositions in φ include only the local and channel variables with index 0 ≤ i < m)
and not to the abstract processes.
An abstract model Mm
N is constructed by data abstraction on the variables of the abstract
processes (and possibly some of the variables of the concrete processes). From Deﬁnitions
4.2.3 and 4.2.4, this is done by deﬁning a set of surjections that map the values of the
variables in MN to values in an abstract domain (in this case we assume the abstract
domain is a subset of the concrete domain). From Lemma 4.2.5, any properties that hold
in a reduced structure of a system will also hold in the original, and so, for all N > m, if
Mm
N |= φ for some suitable property φ, then MN |= φ.74
The invariant model Mm
I is speciﬁed in such a way that it captures the behaviour of an
arbitrary number of the abstract processes. For each N > m, we establish a simulation
relation between Mm
N and Mm
I , thereby showing that the latter simulates the former.
From Lemma 2.5.4, any property that holds in a structure will also hold in any structure
that it simulates. So if Mm
I simulates Mm
N and Mm
I |= φ for a suitable property φ, then
Mm
N |= φ. It then follows that MN |= φ, for any value of N.
4.5.1 Creating Reduced Models by Data Abstraction
Let m > 1, N > 1. A requirement of the proof is to deﬁne a reduced structure based on
the concrete model, by data abstraction. This is done by deﬁning a set of surjections that
map the values from the domain of variables of every concrete model, MN, to values in
an abstract domain.
From the speciﬁcation S(N), we know that the set of variables in the concrete model MN
is given by X = XG ∪ XV ∪ XC, where XG = {ready,work,end,ﬁnished} is the set of
global variables, XV = {loc,token,possess,working} is the set of all local variables and
XC = {ch} is the set of channel variables with,
loc = (loc0,...,locN−1)
token = (token0,token1,...,tokenN−1)
possess = (possess0,...,possessN−1)
working = (working0,...,workingN−1)
ch = (ch[0],ch[1],...,ch[N − 1]).
Note the inclusion of the local variables loci. These represent the program counter variables
for each process. The only execution points that a process can visit are those labelled by
idle, rcvd, pass and ﬁnish in the speciﬁcation and so, below, we give the domain for each
of the loci variables as this set of labels.
For every variable in XG, the surjective mapping is the identity map on the respective75
domains. The domains of XV and XC are given by,
D(loc) = D(loc0) × D(loc1) × ... × D(locN−1),
D(token) = D(token0) × D(token1) × ... × D(tokenN−1),
D(possess) = D(possess0) × D(possess1) × ... × D(possessN−1),
D(working) = D(working0) × D(working1) × ... × D(workingN−1),
D(ch) = D(ch[0]) × D(ch[1]) × ... × D(ch[N − 1]),
where ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
D(loci) = {idle,rcvd,pass,finish},
D(tokeni) = {0,1,... ,c},
D(possessi) = D(workingi) = {true,false},
D(ch[i]) = {[],[1],... ,[c]}.
For m > 1, N > m the abstract domains are given below. Note that we consider the loc
and token variables, associated with the abstract processes, diﬀerently from the others.
We consider a tuple of these values. This enables the variables to be data abstracted to
a single value, which is necessary since we need to include a loc and possess variable in
the invariant speciﬁcation. The local variable, possess, for example, does not need to be
considered in this way since we do not refer to it in the invariant speciﬁcation.
D′(loc) = D′(loc0) × D′(loc1) × ... × D′((locm,locm+1,...,locN−1)),
D′(token) = D′(token0) × D′(token1) × ... × D′((tokenm,...,tokenN−1)),
D′(possess) = D′(possess0) × D′(possess1) × ... × D′(possessN−1),
D′(working) = D′(working0) × D′(working1) × ... × D′(workingN−1)),
D′(ch) = D′(ch[0]) × D′(ch[1]) × ... × D′((ch[m],...,ch[N − 1])),
where, ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1,
D′(loci) = {idle,rcvd,pass,finish},
D′(tokeni) = {0,1,...,c},
D′(possessi) = D′(workingi) = {true,false},
D′(ch[i]) = {[],[1],...,[c]},76
and ∀i, m ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
D′(possessi) = D′(workingi) = {true},
and,
D′((locm,locm+1,...,locN−1)) = {idle,rcvd,pass,finish},
D′((tokenm,tokenm+1,...,tokenN−1)) = {0,1,...,c},
D′((ch[m],ch[m + 1],...,ch[N − 1])) = {[],[1],... ,[c]}.
Then for all 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, the corresponding surjections can be deﬁned as follows
d : D(loc) → D′(loc)
e : D(token) → D′(token)
f : D(possess) → D′(possess)
g : D(working) → D′(working)
h : D(ch) → D′(ch)
d(loc) = (d0(loc0),...,dm−1(locm−1),dm((locm,...,locN−1)))
e(token) = (e0(token0),...,em−1(tokenm−1),em((tokenm,...,tokenN−1))),
f(possess) = (f0(possess0),f1(possess1),...,fN−1(possessN−1)),
g(working) = (g0(working0),g1(working1),...,gN−1(workingN−1)),
h(ch) = (h0(ch[0]),...,hm−1(ch[m − 1]),hm((ch[m],...,ch[N − 1]))),
where ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
fi : D(possessi) → D′(possessi)
gi : D(workingi) → D′(workingi)
and ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1,
di : D(loci) → D′(loci)
ei : D(tokeni) → D′(tokeni)
hi : D(ch[i]) → D′(ch[i])
and,
dm : D((locm,...,locN−1)) → D′((locm,...,locN−1))
em : D((tokenm,tokenm+1,...,tokenN−1)) → D′((tokenm,tokenm+1,...,tokenN−1))
hm : D((ch[m],...,ch[N − 1])) → D′((ch[m],...,ch[N − 1]))77
For all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1, di,ei,fi,gi and hi are just the identity mappings on the appropriate
domains. For all i, m ≤ i ≤ N − 1, fi(possessi) = gi(workingi) = false. Also,
dm((locm,locm+1,...,locN−1)) =

   
   
locj if ∃m ≤ j ≤ N − 1.locj  = idle
∧∀m ≤ i  = j ≤ N − 1,loci = idle
idle otherwise
em((tokenm,tokenm+1,...,tokenN−1)) =

   
   
tokenj if ∃m ≤ j ≤ N − 1.tokenj > 0
∧∀m ≤ i  = j ≤ N − 1,tokeni = 0
0 otherwise
hm((ch[m],ch[m + 1],...,ch[N − 1])) =

   
   
[t] if ∃m ≤ j ≤ N − 1.ch[j] = [t]
∧∀m ≤ i  = j ≤ N − 1,ch[i] = []
[] otherwise
The reduced model Mm
N is induced as described in Deﬁnition 4.2.4. Therefore, from
Lemma 4.2.5,
Lemma 4.5.2. For any LTL property φ with atomic propositions that only refer to vari-
ables with indices less than m, for m ≥ 1 if N > m + 1 then Mm
N |= φ implies MN |= φ.
In the following section we establish that the reduced model simulates the invariant
model. However, notice that in the reduced model any local variable with an index
greater than m does not correspond to a variable in the invariant model (and therefore the
atomic propositions are not comparable). We resolve this issue by replacing the variables
with index greater than or equal to m with a single variable (for example, by replacing
(tokenm,...,tokenN−1) by tokenm).
Formally, for m > 1, N > m, let ¯ Mm
N denote the model obtained from Mm
N by replacing
every occurrence of
(locm,locm+1,...,locN−1),
(tokenm,tokenm+1,...,tokenN−1),
and (ch[m],ch[m + 1]...,ch[N − 1])
with the variables locm, tokenm and ch[m] respectively. Then from Lemma 4.5.2 and
variable renaming [49],
Lemma 4.5.3. For any LTL property φ that refers only to the set of global variables,
the local variables associated with the concrete processes and/or the channel variables,
ch[0],ch[1],... ,ch[m − 1], then for m ≥ 1 and N > m + 1, if ¯ Mm
N |= φ then MN |= φ.78
4.5.2 Simulation between the Reduced Model and the Invariant Model
We now show that a simulation relation exists between ¯ Mm
N and Mm
I . Let ¯ Mm
N =
(¯ Sm
N, ¯ sm
N, ¯ Rm
N, ¯ Lm
N) and Mm
I = (Sm
I ,sm
I ,Rm
I ,Lm
I ) with atomic propositions ¯ AP
m
N and APm
I ,
respectively. Note that ¯ AP
m
N ⊇ ¯ AP
m
I . We deﬁne a relation H as follows,
For all s ∈ ¯ Sm
N,s′ ∈ Sm
I ,H(s,s′) ⇐⇒ ¯ Lm
N(s) ∩ APm
I = Lm
I (s′).
We show that ¯ Mm
N   Mm
I by establishing that H satisﬁes Deﬁnition 2.5.3. Immediately,
condition 1 of Deﬁnition 2.5.3 holds by deﬁnition of the relation H. It remains to establish
condition 2, i.e. to show that every transition in the reduced model is ‘matched’ by a
transition in the invariant model. We establish the transitions that can be made in both
the reduced and invariant models, by analysing the concrete and invariant speciﬁcations,
respectively.
Note that it is only necessary to consider transitions in the concrete model that correspond
to atomic sequences in the Promela code. Statements that are embedded in these are
considered to be a single executable statement. Once an atomic sequence has been entered
it will be executed completely unless one of the statements inside it blocks, in which case
control can be passed to another process. In the CTRP example the only statements
that can block are conditionals (i.e. propositions), channel read/writes or poll operations.
Blocking statements are always put at the beginning of an atomic sequence so that it
cannot be entered until the guard becomes true. Any atomic sequences that contain
channel read/writes are also accompanied by an extra guard condition at the start of the
atomic sequence to check that the appropriate channels are full/empty. Therefore, it is
only ever necessary to consider the system state before an atomic sequence and after it.
Hence, by examining the atomic statements in the concrete Promela speciﬁcation of the
CTRP, the transitions that can be made in the underlying model, MN, can be determined.
By considering the eﬀect of the mapping h on the states of MN we can therefore derive
the transitions that can occur in ¯ Mm
N and we can then check whether these transitions
are matched by transitions in the invariant model. It is also necessary to establish the
transitions that can be made in Mm
I by analysis of the atomic statements given in the
invariant speciﬁcation. Intuitively, each statement in the concrete speciﬁcation of the
arbiter process and of processi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 corresponds to the same statement
in the invariant speciﬁcation of the arbiter process and processi respectively. Also, each79
statement in the concrete speciﬁcation of processi, for m ≤ i ≤ N − 1, corresponds to
a statement in the invariant speciﬁcation of abstract processm. We describe matching
transitions in more detail below. Note that the atomic statements in the Promela code
in Appendix A have been labelled with a number corresponding to each statement given
below. We assume MN = (SN,sN
0 ,RN,LN) with atomic propositions APN.
Statement 0. From the declaration of variables in the concrete speciﬁcation we know that,
in sN
0 , the initial state of MN, LN(sN
0 ) = {loci==idle,tokeni==0, possessi==false,
workingi==false, end==false, done==false, work==false, ch[i]=[] |0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1}.
Note that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, loci is actually initially undeﬁned, but we assume,
for simplicity, that it has initial value idle. The process, init, declared in every
speciﬁcation, is the ﬁrst process to be executed, executing atomic statement 0 and
setting ch[0] to c for c ≥ 1 and instantiating N processes, and one arbiter process.
In the model MN this will correspond to the transition sN
0 → t where t ∈ SN is
labelled identically to sN
0 but with the proposition ch[0]==[] replaced by ch[0]==[c].
Let ¯ sm
0 be the state in ¯ Mm
N induced from the initial state of MN under the surjec-
tive map h. Then we have, ¯ Lm
N(sN
0 ) = { loci==idle, tokeni==0, possessj==false,
workingj==false, end==false, done==false, work==false, ch[i]=[] |0 ≤ i ≤ m,0 ≤
j ≤ m − 1}. Similarly, let ¯ t = Lm
N(t) be the state induced from t, so the labelling of
¯ t will be identical to s′ but with the proposition ch[0]==[] replaced by ch[0]==[c].
Note that ¯ Rm
N(sm
0 ,¯ t).
From the invariant speciﬁcation, it is apparent that in the initial state sI
0 of the invari-
ant model, Lm
I (sI
0) = {loci==idle, tokeni==0, possessj==false, workingj==false,
end==false, done==false, work==false, ch[i]=[] |0 ≤ i ≤ m,0 ≤ j ≤ m−1}. Hence,
H(¯ sm
0 ,sI
0). The init process in the invariant speciﬁcation runs m process processes,
one abstract process process and one arbiter process and sends c on ch[0]. This cor-
responds to the transition, sI
0 → t′ in the model Mm
I where t′ is labelled with the
same propositions as sI
0 but with the proposition ch[0]==[] replaced by ch[0]==[c].
Clearly, ¯ Lm
N(¯ t) = Lm
I (t′) and therefore H(¯ t,t′).
Statement 1. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, atomic statement 1 in the concrete speciﬁcation
corresponds to processi, with loci==idle, reading in a value, k say, for tokeni from
its in channel (ch[i]), moving to rcvd and setting possessi to true. Note that this can
only be executed if ch[i] is full. Thus, for any state s in MN, such that loci==idle,80
ch[i]==k∈ LN(s), there exists a transition s → t such that tokeni==k, ch[i]==[],
loci==rcvd, possessi==true∈ LN(t).
For 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1, the surjective mappings (Section 4.5.1) on the variables mentioned
are just the identity mappings. Thus, there exists a transition ¯ s → ¯ t in ¯ Mm
N where ¯ s
and ¯ t are induced under h from s and t, respectively, such that loci==idle, ch[i]==k∈
LN(s) and tokeni==k, ch[i]==[], loci==rcvd, possessi==true∈ LN(t).
Let s′ be a state in the invariant model and suppose H(¯ s,s′). The labelling of ¯ s and s′
is therefore identical and hence loci==idle and ch[i]==k∈ Lm
I (s′). From statement
4 of the process speciﬁcation in I(N,c), there must be a transition in Mm
I from s′
to a state t′ such that tokeni==k, ch[i]==[], loci==rcvd, possessi==true∈ Lm
I (t′)
(and loci==idle and ch[i]==k / ∈ Lm
I (t′)). Otherwise the labelling for t′ is the same
as for s′. Hence Lm
I (t′) = Lm
N(¯ t) and so H(¯ t,t′).
Suppose now that m ≤ i ≤ N − 1. Note that in any state v of MN, if ch[i]==[k],
tokeni==k or loci==rcvd∈ LN(v) then for all j  = i, m ≤ j ≤ N − 1, ch[j]==[],
tokeni==k, loci==rcvd∈ LN(v) respectively (since there is only one token). Let
¯ s ∈ ¯ Sm
N be the state induced by s under h. Then locm==idle∈ Lm
N(s′). The set of
propositions ch[m]==[], ..., ch[i − 1]==[], ch[i]==[k], ch[i + 1]==[], ..., ch[N −
1]==[]) belong to the labelling of s, and so (by the deﬁnition of h) the proposition
ch[m]==[k]∈ Lm
N(s′). If ¯ t is the state in ¯ Mm
N induced by t under h we can show
in a similar way that tokenm==k, ch[m]==[], locm==rcvd∈ ¯ Lm
N(¯ t). Note that a
proposition corresponding to the tuple (possessm, ..., possessN−1) also belongs to
¯ Lm
N(¯ t) but because every value of the tuple is mapped to false, the atomic proposition
will be the same in every state of ¯ Mm
N and thus for the purposes of our analysis can
be ignored. We have that ¯ s → ¯ t.
Let s′ be a state in the invariant model and suppose H(¯ s,s′). The labelling of ¯ s and
s′ is therefore identical with respect to APm
I and hence locm==idle, ch[m]==k∈
Lm
I (s′). From statement 4 of the abstract process speciﬁcation in I(N,c), we have
that abstract processm reads a value from its in channel ch[m] and sets possessm
to true. Thus, there must be a transition in Mm
I from s′ to a state t′ such that
tokenm==k, ch[m]==[], locm==rcvd ∈ Lm
I (t′) (and locm==idle and ch[i]==k / ∈
Lm
I (t′)). Otherwise the labelling for t′ is the same as for s′. Hence Lm
I (t′) = Lm
N(¯ t)
and so H(¯ t,t′).81
Statements 2 to 6. For each of the atomic statements 2 to 6 of processi (0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1)
we can argue in a similar way as for statement 1 and show that, for a transition
s → t in MN that corresponds to a statement, the transition s′ → t′ in ¯ Mm
N induced
by h is matched to a transition in Mm
I that corresponds to a statement of processi
if 0 ≤ i ≤ m, or to a statement of abstract processm if m ≤ i ≤ N − 1.
Statement 7. Consider atomic statement 7 in the speciﬁcation of the arbiter process.
From the conditions of the statement, this can only be executed if done is true and
work is true, in which case work is set to false. This corresponds to a transition s → t
in MN, for any state s ∈ SN for which work==true∈ LN(s) and done==true∈
LN(s) and for a state t ∈ SN such that work==false∈ LN(t), and otherwise the
labelling is the same as for s.
Every value in the domains of work and done are mapped to the same values under
the associated surjective mappings. Therefore, in the state, ¯ s induced by the mapping
h, work==true∈ ¯ Lm
N(¯ s), and done==true∈ Lm
N(¯ s). Similarly, for ¯ t, the state induced
by h, work==false∈ Lm
N(¯ t) and otherwise the labelling is as for ¯ s. By the deﬁnition
of the transition relation of ¯ Mm
N , there exists a transition ¯ s → ¯ t.
Let s′ be a state in the invariant model and suppose H(¯ s,s′). The labelling of ¯ s
and s′ is therefore identical and therefore done==true and work==true∈ Lm
I (s′).
From statement 5 of the arbiter process in the invariant speciﬁcation, there must
be a transition in Mm
I from s′ to a state t′ such that work==false∈ Lm
I (t′) and,
otherwise the labelling for t′ is the same as for s′. Hence Lm
I (t′) = ¯ Lm
N(¯ t) and so
H(¯ t,t′).
Statement 8. We can argue in a similar manner as for statement 7 to show that any
transition in the reduced model induced by statement 8 (given in the speciﬁcation of
the arbiter process) is matched by a transition in Mm
I corresponding to statement
8 of arbiter in the invariant speciﬁcation.
In Table 4.5.2 we give a summary of the transitions in MN (in column two) that are
derived from the atomic statements of process in the concrete speciﬁcation (note that we
do not consider transitions corresponding to the arbiter or init process in the table). The
numbering in the leftmost column identiﬁes each transition in the concrete model with a
statement in process in the concrete speciﬁcation. Each transition is described in the table82
by the value of the variables of a state for the transition to be enabled, a down arrow, and
the value of some of the variables that belong to the state resulting from the transition.
Note that we only consider the variables relevant to a transition.
In the table we also give the transitions in ¯ Mm
N that correspond to transitions in the
concrete model. We present these in the same manner as the transitions for MN. However,
we split them into three columns depending on the value of i, where the concrete transition
corresponds to the execution of a statement with respect to processi. In the ﬁrst column
we describe the transition in ¯ Mm
N if processi is a concrete process i.e. 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. In
the second column we describe the transition in ¯ Mm
N if m ≤ i < N − 1, and in the third
column we describe the transition for i = N − 1.
For the transitions in the reduced model, ¯ Mm
N, we do not include the values corresponding
to the possess or working variables since these will be the same in every state of the reduced
model. Excluding these values, the set of values are the same in ¯ Mm
N and Mm
I (and
therefore so are the sets of corresponding atomic propositions). Therefore, the transitions
described for the reduced models correspond to the matching transitions in the invariant
model.
Therefore, we have matched every transition in ¯ Mm
N to a transition in Mm
I i.e. we have
established condition 2 of Deﬁnition 2.5.3. Therefore for all N > m + 1, ¯ Mm
N   Mm
I and
thus by Lemma 2.5.4 it follows that,
Lemma 4.5.4. For m > 1, given a LTL property φ with atomic propositions in APm
I ,
Mm
I |= φ =⇒ ¯ Mm
N |= φ, for all N > m + 1.
Note that we can, in fact, prove a stronger result, showing that the relation H is a bisim-
ulation relation. In general, when constructing an invariant in this manner, this is not the
case.
Proof of Theorem 4.5.1
Proof. Let m > 1, c ≥ 1, and let φ be an LTL property that does not contain any index
greater than or equal to m in its atomic propositions. Suppose Mm
I |= φ. By Lemma
4.5.4, for all N > m + 1, ¯ Mm
N |= φ. By Lemma 4.5.3, MN |= φ for all N > m + 1.83
Table 4.1: Transitions in MN, for process i, 0 ≤ i ≤ N −1, and corresponding transitions
in ¯ Mm
N, and, Mm
I , (c ≥ t ≥ 1).
MN ¯ Mm
N \ Mm
I ¯ Mm
N \ Mm
I ¯ Mm
N \ Mm
I
0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 m ≤ i < N − 1 i = N − 1
1 (idle,0,F,F) (idle,0,F,F)i (idle,0,F,F)m (idle,0,F,F)N−1
[t]i [t]i [t]m [t]N−1
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
(rcvd,t,T,F)i (rcvd,t,T,F)i (rcvd,t,T,F)m (rcvd,t,T,F)N−1
[]i []i []m []m
2 (rcvd,t,T,F)i (rcvd,t,T,F)i (rcvd,t,T,F)m (rcvd,t,T,F)N−1
!work,[]i+1 !work,[]i+1 !work,[]m !work,[]N−1
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
(idle,0,F,F)i (idle,0,F,F)i (idle,0,F,F)m (idle,0,F,F)N−1
[t]i+1 [t]i+1 [t]m [t]m
3 (rcvd,1,T,F)i (rcvd,1,T,F)i (rcvd,1,T,F)m (rcvd,1,T,F)N−1
work,[]i+1 work,[]i+1 work,[]m work,[]N−1
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
(finish,0,T,T)i (finish,0,T,T)i (finish,0,T,T)m (finish,0,T,T)N−1
end,finished+1 end,finished + 1 end,finished + 1 end,finished+1
4 (rcvd,t,T,F)i (rcvd,t,T,F)i (rcvd,t,T,F)m (rcvd,t,T,F)N−1
work,[]i+1 work,[]i+1 work,[]m work,[]
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
(pass,t−1,T,T)i (pass,t−1,T,T)i (pass,t−1,T,T)m (pass,t−1,T,T)N − 1
ready ready ready ready
5 (pass,t−1,T,T)i (pass,t−1,T,T)i (pass,t−1,T,T)m (pass,t−1,T,T)m
!work,ready,[]i+1 !work,ready,[]m !work,ready,[]i+1 !work,ready,[]m
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
(idle,0,F,F)i (idle,0,F,F)m (idle,0,F,F)i (idle,0,F,F)m
!ready,[t−1]i+1 !ready,[t−1]m !ready,[t−1]i+1 !ready,[t−1]m
6 (finish,0,T,T)i (finish,0,T,T)m (finish,0,T,T)i (finish,0,T,T)m
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
(finish,0,T,T)i (finish,0,T,T)m (finish,0,T,T)i (finish,0,T,T)m
Table 4.2: Description of variables corresponding to entries in Table 4.5.2
Decription Variables Example table entries
Local state of process i (loci,tokeni,possessi,workingi) (idle,0,F,F)i
Channel i ch[i] [t]i, []i
Global boolean variables end,work,ready end,!work
Global integer variables finished finished+184
4.6 A Probabilistic Model of the CTRP
In Section 4.3 we introduced the CTRP, a token ring protocol that limits the number of
operations performed by processes using a counter. We modelled the CTRP using a central
arbiter process that non-deterministically determines whether a process can perform an
operation or not when it receives the token. This could, for example, correspond to
intermittent process failure or to whether the ‘queue’ of operations at a process is empty
or not when it receives the token. We now consider an example where we have some
additional knowledge about the protocol, namely the probability of whether a process can
perform an operation or not. For example, we might know the probability of a processes
queue being empty or the probability of a process having failed, when it receives the
token. Therefore, we model the protocol probabilistically, allowing each process to make
a probabilistic choice whenever it receives the token.
Note that in the non-probabilistic model of the CTRP there exists an execution path such
that the token can be passed around the ring forever without being decremented. However,
if the choice is made probabilistically, the probability that the token is never decremented
is equal to zero, and therefore we do not need to apply fairness conditions.
We assume that the scheduling of the processes is still non-deterministic and therefore we
model the protocol as a MDP, which we specify using PRISM. An example of a PRISM
speciﬁcation of the probabilistic CTRP is given in Appendix C and described in Section
4.8.
4.7 Data Abstraction for MDPs by Partitioning
We now deﬁne data abstraction for MDPs, starting with a deﬁnition of a MDP over a
variable set.
Deﬁnition 4.7.1. Let X be a set of variables with domain D(X) where the tuple of initial
values for the variables is given by init(X). A (labelled) MDP M over X is a tuple
(D(X),init(X),Steps,L), where L labels each state with atomic propositions from the set
AP over X.
We give a deﬁnition of a reduced MDP under ‘data abstraction’, based on the deﬁnition85
of a quotient MDP of D’Argenio et al. [24]. A quotient MDP partitions the state space.
Deﬁnition 4.7.2. [24] Let M = (S,s0,Steps,L) be a MDP and let Q = (Ak)k∈K be a
partition of S. The quotient MDP according to Q is the MDP M\Q = (Q,Q0,Steps′,L′)
where
1. Q0 ∈ Q is such that s0 ∈ Q0,
2. For Q ∈ Q,  ′ ∈ Steps′(Q) ⇔ ∃s ∈ Q :   ∈ Steps(s) ∧ ∀Q′ ∈ Q,  ′(Q′) =
 
s′∈Q′  (s′),
3. For all Q ∈ Q, L′(Q) = ∪s∈QL(s).
A reduced MDP under data abstraction is a quotient MDP, where the partitioning is given
according to the states for which the variables have the same abstract values. Note that
each state of a MDP over a variable set X is a tuple from D(X) and therefore we can
apply a mapping on D(X) directly to the state.
Deﬁnition 4.7.3. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,L) be a MDP over set of variables X. Let AP
be the set of atomic propositions over X. If D′(X) is an abstract domain of X and h
a surjection from D to D′ then let H be the equivalence relation deﬁned by (s,t) ∈ H if
and only if h(s) = h(t). Let Q denote the partition deﬁned by H. Then the reduced MDP
under h is the quotient MDP M \ Q.
For any two partitions Q and T of the same set, let Q ≤ T ⇔ ∀Q ∈ Q,∃T ∈ T ,Q ⊆ T.
Furthermore, for a MDP M = (S,s0,Steps,L) with atomic propositions AP, a state s ∈ S
and φ ∈ 2AP let,
pinf
s (φ)   inf
A∈AdvM
{ProbA
s ({ω ∈ PathA(s)|ω |= ♦φ})} and,
psup
s (φ)   sup
A∈AdvM
{ProbA
s ({ω ∈ PathA(s)|ω |= ♦φ})}.
Lemma 4.7.4 is a restriction of a result given in [24]. Speciﬁcally, we do not deﬁne an
initial condition on states, as is the case in [24], but consider just the initial state.
Lemma 4.7.4. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,L) be a MDP with set of atomic propositions AP.
Let φ ∈ 2AP and let Cφ be the equivalence relation on S deﬁned by:
(s,t) ∈ Cφ ⇔ ((s  |= φ ∧ s = s0 ⇔ t  |= φ ∧ t = s0) ∧ (s |= φ ⇔ t |= φ)).86
Let C denote the partition deﬁned by Cφ, then for any two partitions of S, Q and T , such
that Q ≤ T ≤ C,
p
sup
Q0 (φ) ≤ p
sup
T0 (φ) and p
inf
Q0 (φ) ≥ p
inf
T0 (φ),
where Q0, T0 are the initial states of M \ Q and M \ T respectively.
Note that we can partition a set of states into singleton sets, in which case the quotient
MDP is isomorphic to the original MDP [24]. We will use this result in the proof of Lemma
4.7.5.
Lemma 4.7.5. Let M = (S,s0,Steps,L) be a MDP over variable set X with set of
atomic propositions AP over X. Let h be a surjective mapping on D(X) such that for
all s ∈ S, s  = s0, h(s)  = h(s0). Let Mr denote the reduced MDP under h. Let φ be
a PCTL-reachability property that only contains propositions of the form (xi = v) where
xi a variable in X, v belongs to the abstract domain of x and h−1
i (v) = {v} (for hi, the
surjection on the domain of xi) then Mr |= φ ⇒ M |= φ.
Proof. Let T denote the partition that partitions S into singleton sets and let H denote
the equivalence relation deﬁned by h as H(s,t) ⇔ h(s) = h(t). Let Q be the partition
deﬁned by H. The property φ has the form P⊲⊳=p[♦ψ]. By deﬁnition of PCTL-reachability,
ψ ∈ 2AP. Let Cψ denote the equivalence relation deﬁned as for Lemma 4.7.4 and C the
partition deﬁned by Cψ. Clearly T ≤ Q.
We establish that Q ≤ C. It should be apparent that either C = {C0,Cn,Cy} if s0  |= ψ
or C = {Cn,Cy ∪ C0} if s0 |= ψ where C0 = {s0}, Cn = {s ∈ S|s  = s0 ∧ s  |= ψ},
Cy = {s ∈ S|s  = s0 ∧ s |= ψ}.
Let Q ∈ Q. Suppose Q = Q0, the initial state of Mr. Since for all s ∈ S, s  = s0,
h(s)  = h(s0) then Q0 = {s0}. If C0 ∈ C then Q0 ⊆ C0, otherwise Q0 ⊆ Cy ∪ C0.
Suppose Q  = Q0 and let s ∈ Q. If s |= ψ then for all t ∈ Q, t |= ψ since h(s) = h(t)
and φ only contains propositions of the form (xi = v) where h−1
i (v) = {v}. Thus Q ⊆ Cy.
Similarly if s  |= ψ then for all t ∈ Q, t  |= ψ and hence Q ⊆ Cn.
Thus T ≤ Q ≤ C and by Lemma 4.7.4 it follows that if Q0 = {s0} |= φ then T0 = {s0} |= φ.
Since M \ T is isomorphic to M, we have that if Mr |= φ then M |= φ.87
4.8 Speciﬁcation of a Randomised CTRP
We specify concrete probabilistic models of the CTRP in PRISM that are similar to
the models of the CTRP speciﬁed in Promela. Each PRISM speciﬁcation consists of
N ‘process’ modules, process1, process2, ..., processN but because we model a process’
behaviour by probabilistic choice we do not require an arbiter process. An example of a
PRISM speciﬁcation for the protocol for N = 4 and c = 5 is shown in Appendix C. Note
that for a process, processi, we use the notation processi. Similarly for any variable, vari,
we use the notation vari.
Consider ﬁrst module process0. The local variables declared in the body of this module
are loc0, token0, possess0 and working0, which are similar to the those described in the
Promela speciﬁcations. Note that we have to declare loc0 as a variable since PRISM uses
a guarded command style language and thus does not include program counters. We
declare constants idle, rcvd, pass, ﬁnish and declare loc0 to have domain in the range of
these constants. The variables possess0 and working0 are booleans.
The global variables are end and ﬁnished. Although PRISM does not provide explicit
support for the speciﬁcation of channels, because we only consider channels of length one,
we can declare a set of global variables to represent the channels. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne
the variables ch0, ch1, ..., chN−1. Each of these has domain {0,1,...,c}. Notice that once
the counter equals zero the game ends and therefore a channel will never take the value 0.
We can therefore use 0 to represent the empty channel.
Although speciﬁed diﬀerently, the behaviour of process0 is similar to that of process0 from
the Promela speciﬁcation. For process0, initially loc0=idle. In this state, if ch0!=0, then
process0 can store the value of ch0 in token0, setting ch0 to be 0 (i.e. empty) and setting
the variable possess0 to be true and loc0 to be rcvd.
The main diﬀerence between the behaviour of the Promela speciﬁcation and the PRISM
speciﬁcation is when loc0=rcvd. From this state the (PRISM) process will make a proba-
bilistic choice, decrementing the counter with probability 1
2 or simply passing the counter
to process1 (setting ch0=token0) with probability 1
2. If process0 chooses to decrement the
counter it will set loc0=pass if the result of decrementing token0 is 0. Otherwise it will set
loc0=ﬁnish, in which state the process will loop. From the state loc0=pass, the process88
will then set ch0=token0 and loc0=idle.
Note that the choice of the probabilities is arbitrary. However, (in order for us to be able to
construct an invariant in the manner described in the subsequent section) the probabilities
must be identical and must not depend on the number of processes.
Modules process1, process2, ..., processN−1 can be constructed by renaming the variables
of process0. We let S(N,c) denote the PRISM speciﬁcation with ch0 initialised to c and
N − 2 renamed ‘process’ modules.
4.9 Constructing an Invariant for a Randomised Model of
the CTRP
The PRISM speciﬁcation of an invariant model for the CTRP with two concrete pro-
cesses process0, process1 and an invariant process abstract process2 is given in Appendix
D. The invariant process is constructed in a similar manner to that of the invariant pro-
cess described for the Promela speciﬁcation of the CTRP, except that we need to take into
account the probabilistic choices made by the concrete processes. We let I(N,c) denote
the PRISM speciﬁcation with ch0 initialised to c, m − 1 renamed ‘process’ modules and
one abstract processm module.
4.9.1 Properties of the Randomised CTRP
All of the properties given below are speciﬁed in the PCTL temporal logic deﬁned in
Section 3.3 and have been veriﬁed for models of the protocol for rings of size two to ﬁve,
with a counter with initial value of one to ten. These properties have also been veriﬁed for
the invariant speciﬁcation of the CTRP using PRISM. This has been done for a counter
with initial value between one to ten and with two concrete processes. Note that these
properties are PCTL-reachability properties.
M1. With probability 1 some process will ﬁnish.
P≥1[trueU(end)]89
M2. With probability at most 0.7, process 1 will ﬁnish.
P≤0.7[trueU(loc1=ﬁnish)]
M3. With probability at least 0.5 eventually process 1 will receive the token.
P≥0.5[trueU(possess1)]
4.10 Parameterised Veriﬁcation of the Randomised Model
of the CTRP
We give a theorem (and proof) similar to Theorem 4.5.1. For N > 1 and c > 1, given a
PRISM speciﬁcation, S(N,c), of the CTRP, the concrete model of the CTRP, with N > 1
process instantiations, is given by MN = M(S(N,c)) where MN is derived from S(N,c)
according to the semantics of PRISM with respect to MDPs [1]. Given a PRISM invariant
speciﬁcation I(m,c), for m > 1, let Mm
I = M(I(m,c)) be deﬁned as the invariant model
of the CTRP.
Theorem 4.10.1. Let m > 1 and let φ be a PCTL-reachability property that does not
contain any index greater than or equal to m in its atomic propositions. Then, for all
N > m, c ≥ 1, if Mm
I |= φ then MN |= φ.
4.10.1 Creating Reduced Models by Data Abstraction
Let m > 1 and N > m. As for the proof of Theorem 4.5.1, in order to show Theorem
4.10.1 we deﬁne a reduced structure based on the concrete model constructed by data
abstraction. This is done by deﬁning a set of surjections that map the values from the
domain of variables of every concrete model, MN, to values in an abstract domain. From
the speciﬁcation S(N,c), we know that the set of variables in the concrete model MN is
identical to the set of variables deﬁned for the Promela speciﬁcation of the CTRP. These
surjections are deﬁned to be identical to those in Section 4.5.1. The reduced model Mm
N
is then induced as described in Deﬁnition 4.7.3, and from Lemma 4.7.5,
Lemma 4.10.2. For any PCTL-reachability property φ, for m ≥ 1 and N > m + 1, if
Mm
N |= φ then MN |= φ.90
For m > 1, N > m, let ¯ Mm
N denote the model obtained from Mm
N by substituting variables
in an identical manner as in Section 4.5.1. Then by Lemma 4.10.2,
Lemma 4.10.3. For any PCTL-reachability property φ that refers only to the set of global
variables, the local variables associated with the concrete processes and/or the channel
variables ch[0],ch[1],... ,ch[m−1], for m ≥ 1 and N > m+1, if ¯ Mm
N |= φ then MN |= φ.
4.10.2 Bisimulation between the Reduced Models and the Invariant
Model
In Section 4.5.2 we established a simulation relation between the (non-probabilistic) re-
duced models and the (non-probabilistic) invariant model for the CTRP. In this section we
prove a stronger result showing that there exists a bisimulation between the probabilistic
invariant model and the probabilistic reduced models.
Let ¯ Mm
N = (¯ Sm
N, ¯ sm
N, ¯ Steps
m
N, ¯ Lm
N) and Mm
I = (Sm
I ,sm
I ,Stepsm
I ,Lm
I ) have atomic proposi-
tions ¯ AP
m
N and APm
I , respectively. Note that ¯ AP
m
N ⊇ ¯ AP
m
I . Let M∗
N = (S∗,S∗
0,Steps∗,L∗)
be the combination of Mm
N and Mm
I We can deﬁne a relation H as follows,
For all s,s′ ∈ S∗,H(s,s′) ⇐⇒ L∗(s) = L∗(s′)
We show that ¯ Mm
N ≈ Mm
I by establishing that H satisﬁes Deﬁnition 3.5.1 for M∗
N.
Immediately, condition 1 of Deﬁnition 3.5.1 holds by deﬁnition of the relation H. It
remains to establish condition 2, i.e. to show that every transition in the reduced model is
‘equivalent’ to a transition in the invariant model. We establish the transitions that can be
made in both the reduced and invariant models, by analysing the concrete and invariant
speciﬁcations, respectively. We assume MN = (SN,sN
0 ,RN,LN) has atomic propositions
APN.
Note that the majority of transitions in the concrete, invariant and reduced MDP models
are non-probabilistic i.e. occur with probability 1. To illustrate how we can establish that
H is a bisimulation we consider just one of the probabilistic transitions. Note that the
statements of the PRISM concrete speciﬁcations and invariant speciﬁcations are numbered
in Appendices C and D respectively.
Statement 3. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ N−1, statement 3. in the concrete speciﬁcation corresponds
to processi, with loci=rcvd, choosing with equal probability whether to decrement the91
token counter, moving to pass and setting workingi to true or to pass on the counter
directly, moving to a state with loci =idle. Note that this statement can only be
executed if chi+1 is empty and the value of tokeni is greater than one. Thus, for any
state s in MN, such that loci=rcvd, chi=0, tokeni=k ∈ LN(s) (for k > 1), there
exists transitions s
 
→ t1 and s
 
→ t2 such that for t1,t2 ∈ S,  (t1) =  (t2) = 0.5
with tokeni=k-1, chi=0, loci=pass, workingi=true∈ LN(t1) and chi=k, loci=idle,
possessi=false and tokeni=0∈ LN(t2).
For 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, the surjective mappings deﬁned on the variables mentioned are
just the identity mappings. Thus, there exists transitions ¯ s
 ′
→ ¯ t1 and ¯ s
 ′
→ ¯ t2 in
¯ Mm
N where ¯ s, ¯ t1 and ¯ t2 are induced under h from s, t1 and t2 respectively such that
 ′(¯ t1) =  ′(¯ t2) = 0.5. It should be clear that loci=rcvd, chi=0, tokeni=k ∈ Lm
N(¯ s)
and tokeni=k-1, chi=0, loci=pass, workingi=true∈ Lm
N(¯ t1) and chi=k, loci=idle,
possessi=false and tokeni=0∈ Lm
N(¯ t2).
Let s′ be a state in the invariant model and suppose H(¯ s,s′). The labelling of ¯ s and s′
with respect to APm
I is therefore identical and hence loci=rcvd, tokeni=k and chi=0∈
Lm
I (s′). From statement 3. of the process speciﬁcation in I(N,c), there must be a
transition in Mm
I from s′ to states t′
1 and t′
2 under distribution  ′′ such that  ′′(t′
1) =
 (t′
2) = 0.5. We have that tokeni=k-1, chi=0, loci=pass, workingi=true∈ Lm
I (t′
1) and
chi=k, loci=idle, possessi=false and tokeni=0∈ Lm
I (t′
2). Otherwise the labelling for
t′
1 and t′
2 is the same as for s′. Hence Lm
I (t′
1) = Lm
N(¯ t1) ∩ APm
I and Lm
I (t′
2) =
Lm
N(¯ t2) ∩ APm
I and so H(¯ t1,t′
1) and H(¯ t2,t′
2). Let [s]H denote the equivalence class
of state s under H then  ′([t′
1]H) =  ′′([t′
1]H = 0.5 and  ′([t′
2]H) =  ′′([t′
2]H) = 0.5.
Suppose now that m ≤ i ≤ N − 1. Note that in any state v of MN, if loci=rcvd,
chi=0, tokeni=k ∈ LN(v) then for all j  = i, m ≤ j ≤ N − 1, chj=0, tokenj=0,
locj=idle∈ LN(v) respectively (since there is only one token). Let ¯ s ∈ ¯ Sm
N be the
state induced by s under h. The set of propositions (locm=idle, ..., loci−1=idle,
loci=rcvd, loci+1=idle, ..., locN−1=idle) belong to the labelling of s, and so (by the
deﬁnition of h) the proposition locm=rcvd∈ Lm
N(s′). Similarly tokenm=k∈ Lm
N(s′).
If ¯ t1 and ¯ t2 are the states in ¯ Mm
N induced by t1 and t2 under h respectively we can
show in a similar way that tokenm=k − 1, chm=0, locm=pass∈ ¯ Lm
N(¯ t1) and chm=k,
locm=idle and tokenm=0∈ Lm
N(t′
2). Note that a proposition corresponding to the
tuple (possessm, ..., possessN−1) also belongs to ¯ Lm
N(¯ t1) and ¯ Lm
N(¯ t1) but because
every value of the tuple is mapped to false, the atomic proposition will be the same92
in every state of ¯ Mm
N and thus for the purposes of our analysis can be ignored. We
have that ¯ s
 ′
→ ¯ t1 and ¯ s
 ′
→ ¯ t2 where  ′(¯ t1) =  ′(¯ t2) = 0.5.
Let s′ be a state in the invariant model and suppose H(¯ s,s′). The labelling of ¯ s and s′
is therefore identical with respect to APm
I and hence locm=rcvd, ch[m]==0∈ Lm
I (s′).
Suppose that m < N − 1. From statement 3.1 of the abstract process speciﬁcation
in I(N,c), abstract processm can probabilistically choose to send a value on channel
chm or decrement the counter. Thus, there must be transitions in Mm
I from s′
1 to
states t′
1 and t′
2 such that tokenm=k-1, chm=0, locm=pass ∈ Lm
I (t′
1) and locm=idle
and chm=k∈ Lm
I (t′
2)). Otherwise the labelling for t′
1 and t′
2 are the same as for
s′. Hence Lm
I (t′
1) = Lm
N(¯ t) and Lm
I (t′
2) = Lm
N(¯ t) and so H(¯ t,t′
1) and H(¯ t,t′
2). Thus
 ′([t′
1]H) =  ′′([t′
1]H = 0.5 and  ′([t′
2]H) =  ′′([t′
2]H = 0.5.
Similarly, if m = N − 1 we can show that, from statement 3.2 of the deﬁnition of
abstract processm, there exists transitions that are equivalent to those in the reduced
model.
By considering each of the transitions in the reduced and invariant models and arguing in
a similar manner to the above we can establish that condition 2 of Deﬁnition 3.5.1 holds
for H and therefore that ¯ Mm
N and Mm
I are bisimilar. Notice that ¯ s0 ≈ sI
0 and hence, from
Lemma 3.5.2 it follows that,
Lemma 4.10.4. For m > 1, given a PCTL property φ with atomic propositions in APm
I ,
Mm
I |= φ =⇒ ¯ Mm
N |= φ, for all N > m + 1.
Proof of Theorem 4.10.1
Proof. Let m > 1, c ≥ 1, and let φ be a PCTL-reachability property that does not contain
any index greater than or equal to m in its atomic propositions. Suppose Mm
I |= φ. By
Lemma 4.10.4, for all N > m + 1, ¯ Mm
N |= φ. By Lemma 4.10.3, therefore MN |= φ for all
N > m + 1.93
4.11 Discussion
Proving properties of the CTRP for arbitrary counter values The focus of our
work on parameterised veriﬁcation is on the analysis of distributed systems parameterised
by the number of processes. However, sometimes it is necessary to consider other data
values that are parameterised. For example, in the CTRP the initial value of the token
is a parameter for the models. In particular, the counter is a parameter in the invariant
speciﬁcation, thus we have established a parameterised family of invariants over a ‘lattice’
of models. If we ﬁx a value for m (the number of concrete processes), then we can
consider the parameterised family of models M = {M(c) = M(I(m,c))|c > 1}. We
could use one of two approaches to parameterised veriﬁcation of this family. One, by data
abstraction, we deﬁne a surjective mapping for every token variable and every channel
variable such that any value greater than two is mapped to the value two and thus provides
a simulation relation. As we will discuss in further detail, below, this introduces additional
non-determinism to the model. In particular, the counter value can now remain at two
forever, even in the presence of weak fairness, so we would need to introduce some extra
fairness constraints. Two, by induction on the models: we show that M(c) is equivalent
to M(c + 1), ignoring the variables with counter value greater than 1. This approach is
explored in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Veriﬁcation of Liveness Properties One of the limitations of the construction of an
invariant via the data abstraction approach is that it is not guaranteed to preserve liveness
properties. Intuitively, this is due to the additional non-determinism introduced by the
abstraction process. For example, the application of abstraction to the CTRP leads to a
cycle in the underlying model in which the abstract process passes the counter to itself an
inﬁnite number of times. This can lead to certain liveness properties failing to hold. The
introduction of this cycle is necessary to represent the behaviour of an arbitrary number
of processes passing the counter to each other, but it should be apparent that it should
only represent a ﬁnite number of processes.
We should therefore only need to consider paths in the invariant model in which the
abstract process will eventually pass the token to process0. That is, we should add fairness
constraints to the model. However, because the non-deterministic choice is made within the
abstract process, the weak fairness option of SPIN is not strong enough to guarantee that94
the token will eventually be passed to process0. (Note, though, that it does guarantee that
the arbiter process will eventually schedule an operation and, therefore, the counter will be
guaranteed to eventually equal zero even if it is always retained by the abstract process).
Hence, we have to derive additional fairness constraints for the models, using LTL. For
example, we can express the requirement that abstract processm eventually passes the
counter to process0 as the LTL path formula, ϕ ≡  (ch[m] > 0 =⇒ ♦(ch[0] > 0||end)),
and then, when verifying a property φ, preﬁx the property with the above requirement as
follows, ϕ =⇒ φ. In this manner we can establish properties of the invariant model of
the CTRP that otherwise would not hold. For example, we can show that the invariant
model M2
I with c < 10 satisﬁes ϕ =⇒ φ.
However, simulation does not guarantee preservation of properties under the assumption
of fairness. Therefore, we cannot draw conclusions about whether or not properties are
satisﬁed in the concrete or reduced models under fairness by showing that they are satisﬁed
in the invariant model under fairness. A solution to this is to show that there exists a
fair simulation between the invariant model under fairness and the reduced model, under
the same fairness constraints. The diﬃculty in establishing this is that, since fairness
relates to inﬁnite executions, we cannot just consider transitions, we must consider paths.
Speciﬁcally, we must show that for every fair path of a model there exists a fair path in
the model that simulates it.
Note that we would also have to prove that data abstraction preserves fairness, i.e. that if
a reduced model satisﬁes a property under fairness then the original model also satisﬁes the
property under fairness. Work has already been carried out on this problem. For example,
in [20], an abstraction method based on the  -calculus temporal logic is described for which
it has been proved that liveness certain liveness properties still hold under abstraction.
In the case of the randomised model of the CTRP note that, for the set of paths along
which the abstract process only passes the counter to itself, we reach a state where the
counter is zero and the protocol ﬁnishes with probability one. Therefore, the probability
of the abstract process passing the counter to itself forever equals zero. However, in other
examples we might still need to employ fairness in a similar manner to that described above.
Fairness for MDPs is deﬁned, for example, in [10]. To our knowledge, fair simulation for
MDPs has not been deﬁned.95
Game-based Abstraction In Section 4.7 we considered data abstraction for MDPs
based on the partitioning of a MDP [24]. It may be possible to extend this approach,
using the game-based abstraction approach of Kwiatkowska et al. [41]. They consider a
partition of the state space but represent the quotient MDP by a two-player stochastic
game, where one player resolves the non-determinism of the concrete model and the other
player resolves the non-determinism introduced by the abstraction. By considering the
players in co-operation, a lower bound for the minimum probability of some reachability
property being satisﬁed and an upper bound for the maximum probability of a reachability
property being satisﬁed can be determined. Note that these could equally be achieved by
considering the quotient MDP directly. However, they also derive an upper bound for
the minimum probability and a lower bound for the maximum probability by considering
the players in competition. This approach therefore gives a better approximation of the
probability of some property holding in a concrete model. A prototype model checking
tool has been implemented for this type of analysis. By using this tool to distinguish
between the non-determinism in the concrete models and the non-determinism introduced
by the data abstraction step, it would be possible to establish bounds on the minimum
and maximum probabilities of some property holding of an invariant. This would provide
more information on the probability of properties holding in the concrete models.
An SMV Speciﬁcation of the Parameterised Token Ring Protocol We have
also created a set of SMV speciﬁcations of the token ring system. The SMV versions
are as close to the Promela coding as possible, but the diﬀerences between the modelling
languages means that they are not identical. For example, it is not possible to deﬁne
channels in SMV. Nonetheless, the behaviour of the SMV models are nearly identical to
that of the Promela models. If an invariant speciﬁcation is constructed that is similar to
the Promela invariant speciﬁcation, the proof described above can be modiﬁed in a simple
manner to prove a similar result for the SMV concrete and invariant speciﬁcations. Thus,
the methodology described above is not restricted to a particular modelling language. This
means that we can employ features of diﬀerent model-checking tools for proving properties
of the invariant speciﬁcation. For example, SMV allows CTL properties to be checked and
a variety of fairness constraints to be speciﬁed.96
Related Work A solution to the parameterised model checking problem for token ring
protocols is presented in [29]. By establishing an equivalence relation between rings of
diﬀerent size, it is shown that, for certain forms of indexed CTL*\X properties, if a
property holds for a ring of size equal to some cutoﬀ value then it will hold for any size
of ring. Model checking can be used to verify the property for a ring of a given size and
it can then be deduced that the property holds for an arbitrary sized ring. Token ring
protocols are only considered in which the counter consists of a single value. In fact, it
is proven that the parameterised model checking problem for token rings where the token
can have more than one value is undecidable. Therefore, the approach they describe is
not applicable to the CTRP described here.
In a further approach to parameterised veriﬁcation based on abstraction [53], a counter
abstraction is used: counting the number of processes in each local state and limiting the
counter values to a maximum value of two. The method is used for proving properties of
non-probabilistic systems and for proving qualitative properties of probabilistic systems.
A method is also described for deriving fairness requirements. Proving properties of the
abstracted model under a set of derived ‘abstract’ fairness constraints ensures that the
property holds in the concrete model, thus enabling veriﬁcation of liveness properties.
The approach has the advantage of being fully automated but is applicable only to fully
symmetric systems and therefore would not be applicable in the case of systems with a
ring topology as for the CTRP.
Summary In this chapter we have constructed network invariants for a parameterised
family of models, through the use of data abstraction. We have applied this method
to a simple counter token ring protocol, specifying a parameterised family of models for
the protocol and an invariant model for the family using Promela. We have established
that any LTL property that is satisﬁed by the invariant is satisﬁed by any model in the
parameterised family of models. This result was then extended for a parameterised family
of probabilistic models of the protocol using previous results on abstraction for probabilistic
models. The family of models and the invariant model in this case were speciﬁed using
PRISM.Chapter 5
Probabilistic Parameterised
Veriﬁcation of Deterministically
Degenerative Systems
Outline We present an inductive proof schema for establishing properties of randomised
distributed systems that are deterministically degenerative. We deﬁne a deterministically
degenerative family of MDP models parameterised by a communication topology and show
that, for a certain class of QLTL properties, if a property is satisﬁed by a ‘base’ subset of
the family of models then it is true for every model in the family. We demonstrate our
approach by considering the IEEE 1394 Firewire Tree Identify Protocol.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter and Chapter 6 we provide a technique for reasoning about the parameterised
model checking problem that is sound and complete for a class of parameterised proba-
bilistic system. In particular, we tackle the PMCP for randomised distributed systems
by extending an inductive proof that was introduced for a non-probabilistic parameterised
distributed system (the IEEE 1394 Firewire tree identify protocol) [49]. In [49] it is demon-
strated that any conﬁguration of the Firewire system will eventually behave like a smaller
system, describing this behaviour as degenerative. Thereby, it is proved, by induction over
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the size of the topology, that any property that holds for a model of a system with a star
topology will hold for a model of any system size and conﬁguration. The proof relies on
showing that any path in a model of the system of a given size is ‘equivalent’ to a path in a
model of a smaller system. Thus, a relationship is established between any system model
and a set of models of smaller systems. Hence, by induction the proof goes through.
We extend this approach to randomised distributed systems and generalise the proof for
any probabilistic system that can be shown to be degenerative. Informally, a distributed
system is degenerative if it is guaranteed that, for some subset of the processes, each
process degenerates. Processes degenerate if they reach a degenerate state such that the
execution of the process from that point onwards does not inﬂuence the global execution of
the system. For example, a group of processes might terminate or may become quiescent,
remaining active but only re-transmitting received messages. Thus the observed behaviour
of the system will be equivalent in some sense to that of a smaller system and so we can
analyse the smaller system to determine properties of the larger one. In fact, due to the
scheduling of processes, we cannot be sure which processes will degenerate and therefore
we have to reason about a set of smaller systems in order to determine properties of the
larger one.
We formalise this idea, presenting a deﬁnition of a degenerative family of models param-
eterised by a communication topology (represented by a family of graphs) with a base set
of models. The deﬁnition is based on establishing equivalence between any behaviour of a
model of the system of a given size and behaviours in a model of a smaller system. We then
show, by induction over the topology of a system, that if a QLTL property of a certain
form holds for all the base models then it will hold for any model in the family. This forms
the basis of an induction proof schema for reasoning about degenerative parameterised
models of a system over a communication topology.
Note that, rather than introduce all the aspects of our technique simultaneously, we present
a series of theorems, each extending the next, using two case studies to demonstrate some
facets of the problem that we are considering. In particular, in this chapter we consider de-
terministically degenerative systems. Intuitively, a system degenerates deterministically if,
under some scheduling of the processes a particular set of processes degenerate with prob-
ability 1. Thus the probabilistic element does not inﬂuence the degenerative behaviour of
the system in question. We extend this deﬁnition to probabilistically degenerative systems99
in Chapter 6. Whereas for a deterministically degenerative system, under some scheduling,
we know exactly which set of processes will degenerate, for a probabilistically degenerative
system we only know that with probability 1 some set of processes will degenerate. There-
fore, we could have diﬀerent sets of processes degenerating with diﬀerent probabilities but
the sum of these probabilities equals 1.
For our case study of deterministically degenerative systems we consider a family of models
of the IEEE 1394 Firewire tree identify protocol [33] and provide an inductive proof over
the system topology (trees) that a certain class of probabilistic temporal logic properties
that are satisﬁed by a model of a system with a star topology are satisﬁed by a model of a
system with any acyclic topology. In Chapter 6 we consider a probabilistically degenerative
system, namely the Itai Rodeh leader election protocol for rings and prove a similar result,
this time over the set of rings. The examples we consider are well-understood protocols
that have been analysed and veriﬁed using a variety of methods, including model-checking.
We can therefore compare the results of applying our technique to these methods and
demonstrate the advantages and weaknesses of our approach. In achieving the same results
as these other methods, we can also have a greater degree of conﬁdence in the correctness
and applicability of our technique.
5.2 Communication Topologies and Graph Reductions
As for our approach detailed in Chapter 4, much of the work on parameterised veriﬁcation
of distributed systems assumes a regular topology (e.g. a star or a ring), so that the system
is parameterised by the number of processes (but not always, see Balaban et al. [12]). In
this chapter we do not make this presumption, but instead consider irregular topologies
(although we do assume that the topology satisﬁes certain properties). In order to describe
our systems we therefore need to formalise the notion of a topology, which we do using
graphs.
For a detailed account of graph theoretic terms and notation see, for example, [15]. We
give a brief outline of those necessary for our deﬁnition of a topology. A vertex-labelled
graph, G = (E,V,I), is a tuple where V is a set of vertices, E is a set of edges between
pairs of vertices and I is a labelling of vertices with each vertex v ∈ V uniquely labelled
by a value I(v) ∈ {0,1,...,|G| − 1} (where |G| = |V | is the size of the graph). A directed100
graph is a graph such that the pairs of edges are ordered i.e. we distinguish between the
edge (v,w) and the edge (w,v). A simple directed graph does not have any multiple edges
(two or more edges connecting the same two vertices) or loops (edges from a vertex to
itself). A non-trivial graph is a graph with at least two vertices and one edge. A connected
graph is a graph where every pair of vertices is connected by a path (a sequential set of
set of edges). A graph is ﬁnite if the set of vertices is ﬁnite.
Deﬁnition 5.2.1. A communication graph is a vertex-labelled, non-trivial, directed, ﬁnite,
simple, connected graph.
Since we do not consider any other type of graph, in this chapter we will often refer to a
communication graph simply as a graph. Also, for a communication graph G = (E,V,I)
we let i denote the vertex v with I(v) = i and we refer to v as process i. If an edge
(v,w) ∈ E, with I(v) = i and I(w) = j we say that process i and process j communicate.
We can now deﬁne a communication topology in a straightforward manner.
Deﬁnition 5.2.2. A communication topology (or simply a topology) is a set of communi-
cation graphs.
In the introduction we informally described a system as degenerative if it eventually be-
haves as a ‘smaller’ system. We formalise the notion of ‘smaller’ in terms of the commu-
nication topology of a system. Before doing so we give some standard deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 5.2.3. For a communication graph, G = (E,V,I) and V ′ ⊆ V , G[V ′] =
(E′,V ′,I′) is the subgraph induced by V ′ where (v,w) ∈ E′ iﬀ (v,w) ∈ E and v,w ∈ V ′
and I′ is the labelling I restricted to the vertices in V ′.
Deﬁnition 5.2.4. Let G = (E,V,I) be a communication graph with, for all v ∈ V , I(v)
unique from {0,1,...,|G|−1}. Given a permutation σ on {0,1,... ,|G|−1}, the permuted
graph under σ is deﬁned as σ(G) = (E,V,I′) where I′(v) = σ(I(v)). Furthermore, σ is a
permutation on G.
Based on these two deﬁnitions, we can now deﬁne a reduced graph.
Deﬁnition 5.2.5. Let Γ be a communication topology and let G = (E,V,I) ∈ Γ. Let σ
be a permutation of the set of vertex labels of G and let W ⊂ V . Then R = (W,σ) is a
complete reduction of G in Γ if and only if the graph R(G) = σ(G)[W] belongs to Γ. We101
describe R(G) as the reduced communication graph of G in Γ under R or simply a reduced
communication graph of G.
In the remainder of this chapter, since we only consider reductions that are complete we
often refer to complete reductions simply as reductions.
Complete reductions relate communication graphs within a topology in such a way that
we can consider a communication graph G to be larger than a reduced graph of G. We also
want to establish a set of ‘least’ elements of a communication topology. We can do this by
showing that we can reduce a graph (under some sequence of reductions) in the topology
until we have a graph that belongs to some subset of the communication topology.
Deﬁnition 5.2.6. Let Φ and Γ be communication topologies such that Φ ⊂ Γ and let
QΓ = {QG|G ∈ Γ} be a family of sets of complete reductions for communication graphs in
Γ such that for all G ∈ Φ, QG = ∅. Then Γ is reducible to Φ under QΓ if and only if, for
all G ∈ Γ\Φ, there exists a sequence of reductions, R1,R2,...,Rn (for some n ≥ 1) such
that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Ri ∈ QRi−1(Ri−2(...(R1(G)))) and,
Rn(Rn−1(...(R1(G))...)) ∈ Φ.
5.3 Specifying Parameterised Sets of Models
Our technique is geared towards the use of model checking tools as a means for modelling
and understanding (and verifying, for small instances) the behaviour of parameterised
probabilistic concurrent systems. Therefore we consider (MDP) models of distributed
systems derived from speciﬁcations given in high-level modular modelling languages (e.g.
Probmela [7] or PRISM [40]) whereby each process in a system is deﬁned as a module,
and is isomorphic to every other process, up to communication and process index.
We assume that the speciﬁcations are described in terms of variable sets that are parti-
tioned according to local, global and channel variables, where the local variables, deﬁned
within a module, are the same (up to indexing) for each process and can only be examined/
updated by commands in that module. The global variables are common to all processes
and the channel variables are used to send messages between a pair of processes. Actions
are local to a process, and are therefore indexed (by processes).102
Since we are considering models parameterised by a communication topology, we need to
consider speciﬁcations deﬁned over communication graphs. We assume that a module is
deﬁned for every process of a communication graph and that the channel variables are
deﬁned according to the processes that can communicate. Formally,
Deﬁnition 5.3.1. Given a communication graph, G = (E,V,I) (|G| = N), S(G) is a
speciﬁcation over G if it has variable set, X(S(G)) = ∪N−1
i=0 Xi ∪ G ∪ C and action set
Act(S(G)) = ∪N−1
i=0 such that for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
• Xi = {xi
1,xi
2,...,xi
m} is a set of local variables associated with process i, with
domains D(xi
j) (1 ≤ j ≤ m),
• G = {g1,g2,...,gn} is a set of global variables with domains D(gj) (1 ≤ j ≤ n),
• C = {cj,k|(j,k) ∈ E} is a set of channel variables with domains D(cj,k) where
∀cj,k,cj′,k′ ∈ C, D(cj,k) = D(cj′,k′),
• Acti = {ai
1,ai
2,...,ai
l} is a (possibly empty) set of local actions associated with
process i.
Deﬁnition 5.3.2. Given a communication topology, Γ, a parameterised speciﬁcation,
S(Γ) = {S(G)|G ∈ Γ}, over Γ is a set of speciﬁcations over the communication graphs
of Γ.
Speciﬁcations are given in a high-level modelling language. However, in order to deﬁne a
degenerative system we need to reason at the level of MDPs, and so we need to consider
the models derived from a speciﬁcation. Note that this is dependent on the semantics of
the modelling language employed: we give a generic deﬁnition below.
Deﬁnition 5.3.3. Let G = (E,V,I) (|G| = N) be a communication graph and let S(G)
be a speciﬁcation over G. Let the initial value of the variables in X(S(G)) be given by
init(X(S(G))) and let the model of S(G) be a MDP,
M(S(G)) = (D(X(S(G))),init(X(S(G))),Steps(S(G)),Act(S(G)),L)
such that L labels states with subsets of the set of atomic propositions AP deﬁned over
X(S(G)) and Steps(S(G)) is deﬁned over the set of updates of the speciﬁcation according
to the semantics of the speciﬁcation language.103
Note that in the models we consider the set of states as tuples over the possible values
of the variables of the speciﬁcation that the model is derived from. For a graph G and
a speciﬁcation S(G) over G let X(S(G)) = ∪N−1
i=0 Xi ∪ G ∪ C be the corresponding set of
variables. Then if Xi = {xi
1,xi
2,...,xi
m}, we let ¯ Xi denote the tuple (xi
1,xi
2,...,xi
m), and
similarly for ¯ G and ¯ C. Then the tuple ¯ X(S(G)) is given by ( ¯ X0, ¯ X1,..., ¯ XN−1, ¯ G, ¯ C).
Deﬁnition 5.3.4. For a communication topology, Γ, let S(Γ) be a parameterised speciﬁ-
cation over Γ. Then M(S(Γ)) = {M(S(G))|S(G) ∈ S(Γ)} is the parameterised family of
models over S(Γ).
We will often abbreviate a model M(S(G)) to MG and a parameterised family of models,
M(S(Γ)) to MΓ.
5.3.1 Indexed Variables
When establishing properties of a set of models that are degenerative we will need to
consider reductions of graphs and so we will need to deﬁne permutations of process indices.
Hence, the properties that we analyse cannot refer to the indices of a process. We therefore
distinguish between indexed and unindexed variables and variable domains. Note that this
is an imposed distinction. In general speciﬁcations do not explicitly consider these types
of variables separately.
Let G be a graph and S(G) a speciﬁcation over G = (E,V,I) (|G| = N) with variable set
X(S(G)) = ∪N−1
i=0 Xi ∪ G ∪ C. Let I(V ) = {I(v)|v ∈ V } denote the index set of S(G). For
i ∈ I(V ), we say that a variable xi
j ∈ Xi is indexed and has index i. If there is a set of
global variables g0,g1,...,gN−1 with identical domains we also say that gi is indexed and
has index i. Note also that all channel variables are indexed by two process indices. For
example, channel ci,j has indices i and j.
Furthermore, for a local or global variable x of X(S(G)), we say that the domain of x is
indexed if the domain is deﬁned by D(x) = I(V )∪{⊥}, where ⊥ represents an unassigned
value. If x has an indexed domain and x = i then x is indexed and has index value i. Note
that we assume that channels do not have indexed domains. A variable is unindexed if it
is not indexed and does not have an indexed domain.
We can extend the deﬁnition of indexed variables to indexed propositions. For the set104
of atomic propositions AP over X(S(G)), we say that a proposition x = v for x ∈ X,
v ∈ D(x) is indexed if x is indexed or x has an indexed domain and v  = ⊥, otherwise
x = v is an unindexed proposition. Furthermore, for a QLTL or PCTL property φ with
atomic propositions over AP, φ is an unindexed property if it contains only unindexed
propositions.
5.4 Mappings Induced by a Permutation of a Communica-
tion Graph
The reduction of a communication graph requires permutation of the graph as well as
removal of vertices. In order to show that a set of MDPs parameterised by a topology is
degenerative we establish that the model of the speciﬁcation of a communication graph
behaves in the same manner as the model of the speciﬁcation of the permuted graph. We
therefore give a series of deﬁnitions of mappings induced by a permutation that allows us
to establish isomorphism between adversaries of these models (see Section 3.5.3).
Given a speciﬁcation over a graph and a speciﬁcation over a permutation of the graph,
if the speciﬁcations are equivalent up to process indices i.e. the variables (excluding the
channel variables), variable domains and action sets are the same, then we can deﬁne a
mapping between the state spaces of the models of the speciﬁcations that permutes process
indices according to the graph permutation.
Deﬁnition 5.4.1. Let G (|G| = N) be a communication graph and S(G) a speciﬁcation
over G. Let σ : {⊥,0,...,N − 1} → {⊥,0,...,N − 1} be a permutation of G (such that
σ(⊥) = ⊥) and let S(σ(G)) be a speciﬁcation over σ(G) such that,
X(S(G)) \ CG = X(S(σ(G))) \ Cσ(G),
D(X(S(G))) = D(X(S(σ(G)))),
Act(S(G)) = Act(S(σ(G))).
Let MG = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and Mσ(G) = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be the MDPs over
S(G) and S(σ(G)), respectively.
The index map on S induced by σ, ς : S → S′, is deﬁned as follows. For any state
s = ( ¯ X0, ¯ X1,..., ¯ XN−1, ¯ G, ¯ C) ∈ S, deﬁne ς(s) = (ς( ¯ X0),ς( ¯ X1),...,ς( ¯ XN−1),ς( ¯ G),ς( ¯ C))105
such that,
∀0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,ς( ¯ Xi) = (ς(x1
i),ς(x2
i),...,ς(xm
i )), where for x
j
i ∈ Xi,
ς(x
j
i) =



σ(x
j
σ−1(i)) if x
j
i has an indexed domain
x
j
σ−1(i) otherwise
and ς( ¯ G) = (ς(g1),ς(g2),...,ς(gm)), where for gj ∈ G,
ς(gj) =

      
      
σ(g
j
σ−1(i)) if gj has an indexed domain and is indexed with gj = g
j
i
g
j
σ−1(i) if gj is indexed with gj = g
j
i
σ(gj) if gj has an indexed domain
gj otherwise
and ς( ¯ C) = σ−1( ¯ C) where we let σ−1( ¯ C) denote the set of channel values obtained such
that the value of ci,j in σ−1( ¯ C) is the value of channel cσ−1(i),σ−1(j) in C.
Similarly, we can deﬁne a mapping over the atomic propositions over the variable set of a
speciﬁcation.
Deﬁnition 5.4.2. Let G (|G| = N) be a communication graph and let S(G) be a speciﬁ-
cation over G. Let σ : {⊥,0,...,N − 1} → {⊥,0,...,N − 1} be a permutation of G (such
that σ(⊥) = ⊥) and let S(σ(G)) be a speciﬁcation over σ(G) such that
X(S(G)) = X(S(σ(G))),D(X(S(G))) = D(X(S(σ(G)))),Act(S(G)) = Act(S(σ(G))).
Let AP be the set of propositions over X(S(G)) and let AP′ be the set of propositions
over X(S(σ(G))). The index proposition map induced by σ, Σ : AP → AP′, is deﬁned as
follows.
For an unindexed proposition x = v, where x ∈ X(S(G)), v ∈ D(x) and x is unindexed,
Σ(x = v) = x = v.
For an indexed proposition xi = v, where x ∈ X(S(G)) is indexed by i, but D(x) is
unindexed,
Σ(xi = v) = xσ(i) = v.
For an indexed proposition xi = v, where x ∈ X(S(G)) is indexed by i, and D(x) is an
indexed domain,
Σ(xi = v) = xσ(i) = σ(v).106
For an indexed proposition x = v, where x ∈ X(S(G)) is unindexed, and D(x) is an
indexed domain,
Σ(x = v) = x = σ(v).
We deﬁne degenerative behaviour in terms of the adversaries of a model. Therefore, we
extend the index map induced by a permutation, deﬁned over states, to the path index
map induced by a permutation, which we deﬁne over ﬁnite paths of a model.
Deﬁnition 5.4.3. Let G (|G| = N) be a communication graph and let S(G) be a speciﬁ-
cation over G. Let σ : {⊥,0,...,N − 1} → {⊥,0,...,N − 1} be a permutation of G (such
that σ(⊥) = ⊥) and let S(σ(G)) be a speciﬁcation over σ(G) such that
X(S(G)) = X(S(σ(G))),D(X(S(G))) = D(X(S(σ(G)))),Act(S(G)) = Act(S(σ(G))).
Let MG = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and Mσ(G) = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be the MDPs over
S(Γ) and S(σ(Γ)) respectively and let AP, AP′ be the atomic propositions over X(S(G)),
X(S(σ(G))) respectively.
Let ς be the index map on S induced by σ and A and A′ adversaries of M and M′
respectively. The path index map induced by σ is deﬁned by ρ : PathA
ﬁn(s0) → PathA′
ﬁn(s′
0)
such that, for n ≥ 0,
ρ(ω) = ς(s0)
(a
σ(i0)
0 , ′
0)
−→ ς(s1)
(a
σ(i1)
1 , ′
1)
−→ ...
(a
σ(in−1)
n−1 , ′
n−1)
−→ ς(sn),
where,
ω = s0
(a
i0
0 , 0)
−→ s1
(a
i1
1 , 1)
−→ ...
(a
in−1
n−1 , n−1)
−→ sn ∈ PathA
ﬁn(s0).
If this mapping induces an isomorphism between models then the probabilities over LTL
path formula are preserved.
Lemma 5.4.4. Let G (|G| = N) be a communication graph and let S(G) be a speciﬁcation
over G. Let σ : {⊥,0,...,N − 1} → {⊥,0,...,N − 1} be a permutation of G (such that
σ(⊥) = ⊥) and let S(σ(G)) be a speciﬁcation over σ(G) such that
X(S(G)) = X(S(σ(G))),D(X(S(G))) = D(X(S(σ(G)))),Act(S(G)) = Act(S(σ(G))).
Let MG = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and Mσ(G) = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′) be the MDPs associ-
ated with S(Γ) and S(σ(Γ)) respectively and let AP and AP′ be the atomic propositions
over X(S(G)), X(S(σ(G))) respectively.107
Let ς be the index map on S induced by σ, Σ the proposition index map induced by σ and
A and A′ adversaries of M and M′ respectively and let ρ be the path index map on A
induced by σ. Suppose that ρ is an isomorphism between DA and DA′
, the DTMCs induced
by A and A′ respectively such that ρ(s0) = s′
0. Then, for s ∈ S, and LTL path formula, ψ,
ProbA
s ({ω ∈ PathA(s)|ω |= ψ}) = ProbA′
ς(s)({ω′ ∈ PathA′
(ς(s))|ω′ |= Σ(ψ)})
Proof. Let s ∈ S. For ω ∈ PathA(s) and atomic proposition a ∈ AP, a ∈ L(last(ω)) if and
only if Σ(a) ∈ L′(last(ρ(ω))). Hence, since ρ is an isomorphism it follows from Lemma
3.5.17 that,
ProbA
s ({ω ∈ PathA(s)|ω |= ψ}) = ProbA′
ς(s)({ω′ ∈ PathA′
(ς(s))|ω′ |= Σ(ψ)}).
5.5 Deterministically Degenerative Parameterised Sets of
Models
We now turn to our main deﬁnition that gives conditions for a parameterised family of
models (over a parameterised speciﬁcation for some topology) to be degenerative. The
key condition is that the communication graphs of the topology are reduced such that
every adversary of a model of a speciﬁcation of some graph is stuttering equivalent to an
adversary of a model of a speciﬁcation over a reduced graph.
Deﬁnition 5.5.1. Let Γ be a communication topology that is reducible under a family of
reductions QΓ = {QG|G ∈ Γ}. Furthermore, suppose S(Γ) is a parameterised speciﬁcation
over Γ, and let
MΓ = {MG = (SG,sG
0,StepsG,ActG,LG)|G ∈ Γ},
be the parameterised family of models over S(Γ).
For each G ∈ Γ let XG be the set of variables of S(G) (with CG ⊆ XG the set of channel
variables) and let APG be the atomic propositions over XG. For each G ∈ Γ and each
R ∈ QG, deﬁne a set of variables X′
R(G) ⊆ XR(G) (with AP′
R(G) ⊆ APR(G), the set of
atomic propositions over X′
R(G)). Then MΓ is deterministically degenerative with base Φ
under QΓ if and only if,108
1. (Reduced Variables and Actions:) For G ∈ Γ and a reduction R = (W,σ) ∈ QG,
Xσ(G) \ CG = XG \ CG,D(Xσ(G)) = D(XG),Actσ(G) = ActG,
XR(G) ⊆ Xσ(G),D(XR(G)) ⊆ D(Xσ(G)),ActR(G) ⊆ Actσ(G),
2. (Matching Adversaries:) For G ∈ Γ \ Φ, there exists R = (W,σ) ∈ QG such
that, for every adversary A of MG, there exists an adversary A′ of Mσ(G) that is
isomorphic to A under the path index map induced by σ, with A′ stuttering equivalent
to some adversary A′′ of MR(G) with respect to AP′
R(G).
The establishment of a set of models, parameterised by a set of topologies, that is de-
generative provides an inductive basis (over the set of topologies) with which to establish
properties of the models. The proof of Theorem 5.5.2 is a generalisation of a proof for a
speciﬁc instance of a degenerative non-probabilistic system [49].
Theorem 5.5.2. Let Γ be a set of communication topologies that is reducible to Φ under
the family of sets of reductions, QΓ, and let S(Γ) be a set of speciﬁcations over Γ. Suppose
that for each G ∈ Γ, R ∈ QG, there is a set of variables X′
R(G) ⊆ XR(G) (with AP′
R(G) ⊆
APR(G), the set of atomic propositions over X′
R(G)) such that the family of models over
S(Γ), MΓ, is deterministically degenerative with base Φ under QΓ. Then for any unindexed
QLTL\X property φ with atomic propositions in
 
G∈Γ
 
(W,σ)∈QG AP′
R(G), if MF |= φ for
all F ∈ Φ, MG |= φ for all G ∈ Γ.
Proof. Let S(Γ) be a parameterised speciﬁcation over Γ, a communication topology. Sup-
pose that there exists a parameterised set of models over S(Γ),
MΓ = {MG|G ∈ Γ},
that is deterministically degenerative with base Φ, under QΓ = {QG}, a family of sets
of reductions such that Γ is reducible to Φ under QΓ. For each G ∈ Γ, let the atomic
propositions APG be deﬁned over XG = X(S(G)).
For each G ∈ Γ \ Φ and R = (W,σ) ∈ QG, let X′
R(G) ⊆ XR(G) be a set of variables such
that Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 5.5.1 holds. Let AP′
R(G) ⊆ APR(G), be the set of atomic
propositions over X′
R(G).109
Let G ∈ Γ and suppose that φ is an unindexed QLTL\X property with atomic propositions
in
 
R∈QG AP′
R(G). Assume that MR(G) |= φ, for every R ∈ QG. Then we can show that
MG |= φ as follows.
Let A ∈ AdvMG. Choose R = (W,σ) ∈ QG such that A is isomorphic to some adversary
A′ ∈ AdvMσ(G) under the path index map induced by σ, ρ, with A′ stuttering equivalent
to some adversary A′′ ∈ AdvMR(G) w.r.t. AP′
R(G).
The property φ has the form P⊲⊳p[ψ]. If Σ is the proposition index map induced by σ then
Σ(ψ) = ψ since φ is unindexed. For every adversary B of MR(G),
ProbB
s′′
0({ω′′ ∈ PathB
s′′
0|ω′′ |= ψ}) ⊲⊳ p. (5.1)
If MG, Mσ(G) and MR(G) have initial states s0, s′
0 and s′′
0 respectively then,
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ψ})
= ProbA′
s′
0({ω′ ∈ PathA′
s′
0|ω′ |= ψ})by Lemma 5.4.4 since A = A′ under ρ
= ProbA′′
s′′
0 ({ω′′ ∈ PathA′′
s′′
0 |ω′′ |= ψ}) since A′ ≃ A′′ w.r.t. AP′
R(G)
⊲⊳ p by 5.1.
Since the above is true for every adversary of MG, MG |= φ.
Let φ be an unindexed QLTL\X formula with atomic propositions in
 
G∈Γ
 
R∈QG AP′
R(G)
and let G ∈ Γ. If G ∈ Φ then, by the statement of the theorem, MG |= φ.
Assume that G ∈ Γ \ Φ. Since φ has atomic propositions in
 
G∈Γ
 
(W,σ)∈QG AP′
R(G),
φ is deﬁned over ∩R∈QGAP′
R(G). Since φ is also unindexed, by the above, MG |= φ if
MR(G) |= φ for all R ∈ QG. For each R ∈ QG, either R(G) is in Φ or it can be reduced
further. Since Γ is reducible to Φ under QΓ, continuing in this way, we can construct a
tree of graphs in which every terminal node is a graph in Φ. Finally, by the statement of
the theorem, each of the models associated with the graphs at these terminal nodes satisfy
φ and, by propagation up the tree of graphs, it follows that MG |= φ.110
Figure 5.1: Acyclic topologies for 2, 3, 4 and 5 processes.
5.6 Case Study: The IEEE 1394 (Firewire) Tree Identify
Protocol
5.6.1 Introduction
We illustrate our technique with a case study. The IEEE 1394 (Firewire) Tree Identify
Protocol (TIP), as described in the IEEE standard [33], is designed to elect a leader from a
set of processes arranged in an acyclic topology (Figure 5.1 shows all acyclic communication
graphs for systems of N processes for 2 ≤ N ≤ 5, up to the labelling of the vertices). A
process may send one of three messages to a neighbouring process: be my parent (bmp),
be my child (bmc) or acknowledge (ack). Any process that has received bmp messages
from at least all but one of its neighbours responds with bmc messages and, if necessary,
sends a bmp to the remaining neighbour. The neighbouring processes will send an ack
upon receiving a bmc, from which point they play no further part in the protocol (and
hence the protocol is degenerative). In this manner the protocol builds a spanning tree
with the root process elected as leader.
Note that it is possible for two neighbouring processes to attempt to become leader by
sending bmp requests to each other simultaneously. In order to resolve this contention,
each process probabilistically chooses to wait for a long or short amount of time, before
attempting to send a request again. If a process then receives a request before it has
sent one, it will be elected leader. Otherwise, another contention situation ensues and the
“back-oﬀ” procedure must be repeated.
Much work has been done on proving correctness of root contention in the TIP by the
modelling of two contending processes [60]. Appealing to these results, in [16] the resolu-
tion of contention is modelled by a non-deterministic choice, allowing the full protocol to
be modelled non-probabilistically. Non-probabilistic properties of these models for ﬁxed111
Table 5.1: Transitions in MG made by process j when it receives requests from all of its
neighbours
1. Process j (start,[0,...,0],k,0,0)
receives bmp [bmp]i1,j,...,[bmp]ik,j
from all its 1 ↓ aj
neighbours. (child,[i1,i2,...,ik,0,...,0],k,0,k)
[]i1,j,...,[]ik,j
2. Process j (child,[i1,i2,...,ik,0,...,0],k,0,k)
responds to its []i1,j,...,[]ik,j
neighbours with 1 ↓ bj
bmc requests. (parent,[i1,i2,...,ik,0,...,0],k,0,k)
[bmc]i1,j,...,[bmc]ik,j
3. Process j (parent,[i1,i2,...,ik,0,...,0],k,0,k)
receives ack [ack]i1,j,...,[ack]ik,j
from all its 1 ↓ cj
neighbours and (finish,[0,...,0],k,0,0)
becomes leader. []1,0,...,[]N−1,0,elected = j
conﬁgurations are veriﬁed using the SPIN model checker.
We consider models for the TIP in which contention is resolved probabilistically. We do
not consider the real-time aspects but instead model contention with a contending process
(the one with the smallest index) making a simple probabilistic choice as follows. With
probability 1
4, the process loses allowing the other process to send its bmp. With probability
1
4, the process wins and transmits its request to the other contending process. With
probability 1
2 contention is not resolved and the process must make the probabilistic choice
again. This is an abstract representation of contention with two contending processes
ﬂipping a fair coin and choosing again if they ﬂip the same values, or deciding on a leader
if they ﬂip diﬀerent values.
5.6.2 Parameterised Speciﬁcations of the TIP
We have deﬁned a script for automatically generating PRISM speciﬁcations of the TIP for
any communication graph, based on the Promela speciﬁcations of [49]. We can view this
script as generating a parameterised set of speciﬁcations for the TIP system, S(Γ), over
the communication topology Γ, deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.6.1. Let Γ be the communication topology such that for G = (E,V,I) ∈ Γ,112
(v,w) ∈ E if and only if (w,v) ∈ E and G does not contain any cycles.
In other words, Γ is the set of acyclic communication graphs such that communication
between processes is bi-directional. In the sequel, we let MΓ = {MG|G ∈ Γ} be the
parameterised family of models over S(Γ). We give a PRISM speciﬁcation of the TIP
over a star topology with three processes in Appendix E and we give a description of the
speciﬁcations and the models below.
Given G ∈ Γ, with |G| = N, for the speciﬁcation S(G) ∈ S(Γ) then XG = ∪N−1
i=0 Xi
G ∪ GG ∪
CG is the set of variables for S(G). For a variable vari of the PRISM speciﬁcation for
convenience we use the notation vari. So, for i ∈ {0,...,N − 1},
GG = {elected,toss0,toss1,...,tossN−1},
CG = {cg,h|(g,h) ∈ E},
Xi
G = {statei,childi,0,...,childi,N−1,adji,remaining partneri,no of requestsi},
For i,j ∈ {0,1,... ,N − 1},cg,h ∈ CG the variable domains are,
D(statei) = {start,child,parent,conten,response,
complete,winner,loser,b child,ﬁnish}
D(cg,h) = {empty,bmp,bmc,ack},
D(no of requestsi) = D(adj i) = {0,1,... ,N−1},
D(remaining partneri) = D(childi,j) = D(elected) = {0,1,...,N},
D(tossi) = {0,1,2}.
Note that since the channels have length one, they can be represented in PRISM by
global variables. The set of actions for S(G) is given by ActG = ∪N−1
i=0 Act
j
G where, for
j = 0,1,...,N − 1, Act
j
G is the set of actions for a given process, j.
We let MΓ denote the parameterised set of models over S(Γ). From S(Γ) we can derive
the set of possible transitions in a model MG ∈ MΓ. We give a representation of these
transitions (for a process, j) in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. The sole probabilistic transition
(that of resolving contention) is represented in Figure 5.2. Note that the entries in the
tables and the ﬁgure represent a set of transitions since we only give the values of some of
the global variables, the local variables of process j and the channel variables of process j.
The remaining variables take a variety of values and thus the transition could take place113
0.25 0.25
0.5
(winner,[i2,...,ik,0,...,0],k,i1,k)
tossj = 1
(loser,[i2,...,ik,0,...,0],k,i1,k)
tossj = 2
tossj = 0
(conten,[i2,...,ik,0,...,0],k,i1,k)
Figure 5.2: The transition in MG corresponding to root contention resolution between
process j and process im (j < im).
between a number of diﬀerent states. Each entry in the table corresponds to an update
in the speciﬁcation and is labelled by a number. We have labelled the speciﬁcation in
Appendix E with corresponding numbers.
The ﬁrst column in the tables give an informal description of the speciﬁcation update.
The second column shows values of the local variables of process j along with some of
the channel and global variables’ values. These represent the necessary conditions for an
action to occur and the result of that action. The current values of the local variables are
presented as the tuple, ¯ Xi
G = (s,[ch0,...,chN−1],a,r,n), representing the values of statej,
childj,0,...,childj,N−1, adj j, remaining partnerj, no of requestsj respectively. The value
of the channel variable ch,i is represented by [msg]h,i (where msg is bmp, bmc or ack)
or []h,i if ch,i = empty. If a variable is not presented then its value is of no importance
for that action. We assume for each table that process j has k neighbours, with indices,
i1,i2,...,ik, and, for Tables 5.2 and 5.3 and Figure 5.2, that i1 is the neighbour that does
not initially send a bmp to j.
5.6.3 Model Checking the TIP
We have veriﬁed the following suite of properties for models of small, ﬁxed conﬁgurations of
the TIP system using PRISM. Note that these properties are expressed as QLTL properties
with the exception of Property 4, which is negated outside of the P operator. We can still
verify this by establishing that the negation of this property does not hold. Note also
that Property 1 is an unindexed QLTL\X property. In order to verify our properties using
PRISM it was necessary to translate them into equivalent PCTL properties. Results for114
Table 5.2: Transitions in MG made by process j when it receives requests from all but
one of its neighbours (process im) – before entering contention.
4. Process j (start,[0,...,0],k,0,0)
receives bmp [bmp]i1,j,...,[bmp]im−1,j,[]im,j,[bmp]im+1,j,...,[bmp]ik,j
from all its 1 ↓ a
j
m
neighbours (child,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
except im. []i1,j,[]i2,j,...,[]ik,j
5. Process j (child,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
responds with []j,i1,[]j,i2,...,[]j,ik
bmc and sends 1 ↓ b
j
m
bmp to im. (parent,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
[bmc]j,i1,...,[bmc]im−1,j,[bmp]im,j,[bmc]im+1,j,...,[bmc]j,ik
6. Process j (parent,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
receives ack [ack]i1,j,...,[ack]im−1,j,[ack]im+1,j,...,[ack]ik,j
from all its child 1 ↓ c
j
m
neighbours (complete,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
(not im). []i1,j,...,[]im−1,j,[]im+1,j,...,[]ik,j
7. Process j (complete,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
moves into the 1 ↓ dj
response state. (response,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
8. Process j (response,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
receives bmc [bmc]im,j
from its non-child 1 ↓ e
j
m
neighbour (im). (b child,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,0,k)
[]im,j
9. Process j (b child,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,0,k)
sends ack to its []j,im
non-child neighbour (im) 1 ↓ f
j
m
and terminates without (finish,[0,0,...,0],k,0,0)
becoming leader. [ack]j,im
10. Process j (response,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
receives bmp [bmp]im,j
from im, its non-child 1 ↓ g
j
m
neighbour and (conten,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
enters contention. []im,j115
Table 5.3: Transitions in MG made by process j when it receives requests from all but
one of its neighbours (process im) – during and after contention.
11. Root See Figure 5.2.
contention (im > j)
12. im < j and (conten,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
process j has tossj = 1
won contention. 1 ↓ u
j
m
(winner,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
tossj = 0
13. im < j and (conten,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
process j has tossj = 2
lost contention. 1 ↓ v
j
m
(loser,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
tossj = 0
14. Process j has (winner,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
won contention []j,im
and so sends bmp 1 ↓ w
j
m
to im and returns (response,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
to response state. [bmp]j,im
15. Process j has lost (loser,[i1,...,im−1,im+1,...,ik,0,...,0],k,im,k)
contention and receives [bmp]im,j
bmp from winning 1 ↓ x
j
m
process, im and (child,[im,0,...,0],1,0,1)
returns to child state. []im,j
16. Process j has lost (child,[im,0,...,0],1,0,1)
contention and sends []j,im
bmc to winning 1 ↓ yj
process, im. (parent,[im,0,...,0],1,0,1)
[bmc]j,im
17. Process j has (parent,[im,0,...,0],1,0,1)
lost contention [ack]im,j
and receives ack 1 ↓ z
j
m
from im and (finish,[0,...,0],1,0,0)
becomes leader. []im,j,elected = j116
Table 5.4: Statistics for PRISM models of the TIP with N processes, arranged in a star
topology
N States Transitions Nodes Build time (s) Property 1 (s)
2 63 108 1639 0.202 0.122
3 258 496 6997 2.118 0.156
4 1181 3040 31242 3.260 0.981
5 6032 20036 204825 14.293 6.600
veriﬁcation of Property 1 against models of the TIP with a star topology (with 2, 3, 4 and
5 processes) are given in Table 5.4 together with some statistics for these models.
Property 1: A leader will be elected almost surely.
P≥1[true U ¬(elected = 0)]
Property 2: Only one process will be elected leader almost surely.
∀0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1.P≤0[ (elected = i ⇒ (true U (elected! = i)))]
Property 3: For all 0 ≤ i ≤ N−1, process i will not remain in the start state indeﬁnitely.
P≥1[ (statei = start ⇒ (true U (statei! = start)))]
Property 4: For 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, it is possible for process i to be elected leader.
¬P≤0[true U (elected = i)]
Property 5: If process i enters contention then it will be elected leader with probability
at least a half (0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1).
P≥0.5[ (statei = conten ⇒ (true U (elected = i)))]
5.6.4 Parameterised Veriﬁcation of the TIP
In [49] several properties of the IEEE 1394 Firewire leader election protocol are proved
for the non-probabilistic case. The proof involves identifying processes of a system as117
level-1 processes (processes with only one neighbouring node that is not a leaf) and using
a reduction approach to compare properties of the associated model with one for a smaller
system which is identical except that the leaf nodes associated with some of the level 1
nodes have been removed. More precisely, it is established that every path in the model
of a system is stuttering equivalent (i.e. is equivalent up to sequences of repeated states)
to a path in a model for a smaller system of this form. Smaller systems are produced in
an inductive fashion until a star topology is reached.
We extend this proof to the parameterised family of probabilistic models based on our
inductive proof schema. The probabilistic component of our model makes the proof more
complex than in the non-probabilistic case. Instead of showing stuttering equivalence
between paths we must establish (a probabilistic form of) stuttering equivalence (see Def-
inition 3.5.8) between adversaries of MDPs. In this way we show that:
Theorem 5.6.2. Let φ be Property 1. Then MG |= φ for all G ∈ Γ.
In order to prove Theorem 5.6.2 we ﬁrst show that Property 1, described above, is satisﬁed
by all models in MΦ, where Φ ⊆ Γ is the set of all star topologies. Note that MΦ is a
parameterised set of models. Therefore, in order to show that all models in MΦ satisfy
Property 1, we have to tackle another instance of the PMCP. However, the topology for
this parameterised family is regular, making the problem easier. We can prove Lemma
5.6.3 using our technique for degenerative sets of models. We outline the proof below.
Lemma 5.6.3. For all G ∈ Φ, MG |= φ, where φ is Property 1.
Proof. (Sketch) Let G = (E,V,I) ∈ Φ and suppose that |G| = N > 2. Assume that
the central process of the star has index i. For j  = i, 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, let σ
j
N be a
permutation on the labelling of vertices such that if i > j then σ
j
N(i) = 1 and σ
j
N(j) = 0,
otherwise σ
j
N(i) = 0 and σ
j
N(j) = 1. Let W
j
N = {i,j} ⊂ V . Deﬁne a set of reductions
QG = {(W
j
N,σ
j
N)|j  = i,0 ≤ j ≤ N −1} on G and let QΦ = {QG|G ∈ Φ,|G| > 2}. We show
that QG(2) = ∅ if G(2) is the star of size two and Φ is reducible to {G(2)} under QΦ.
Given MG ∈ MΦ with variable set XG and a reduction, R
j
N = (W
j
N,σN
j ), for, j  = i,
1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, (with i′ = σN
j (i)) deﬁne,
Xi′
R
j
N(G) = XR
j
N(G) \ Y i′118
Figure 5.3: Acyclic topologies for 2, 3, 4 and 5 processes. Level-1 vertices are shaded.
where Y i′
= {childi′,0, childi′,1, ..., childi′,N−1, adj i′, no of requestsi′}.
Suppose that process i moves into the child handshake state having received bmp requests
from all leaf processes except some process, j. This is matched by an adversary of MG(2)
in which process σ
j
N(i) moves directly into the child handshake state.
Assume that process i moves into the child handshake state having received bmp requests
from all leaf processes and then sends bmc requests to all its neighbours before receiving
an ack from all the leaves, becoming leader. It should be clear that this is ‘matched’ by
an adversary of MG(2) in which process σ
j
N(i) receives a bmp from σ
j
N(j) and moves into
the child handshake state before sending bmc to σ
j
N(j), receiving an ack in response and
becoming leader (note that we can choose j arbitrarily in this instance).
Therefore, every adversary of MG is matched to an adversary of MG(2) and so MΦ is
deterministically degenerative under QΦ with base {G(2)}. It can be shown that MG(2) |=
φ, where φ is Property 1, using model checking (see Table 5.4) and hence by Theorem
5.5.2, MG |= φ for all G ∈ Φ.
We can now tackle Theorem 5.6.2 by showing that MΓ is degenerative with base Φ under
some family of sets of reductions. We do so by considering each of the conditions given
in Deﬁnition 5.5.1 in turn, having deﬁned an appropriate set of complete reductions and
corresponding set of ‘reduced’ variables for each model in MΓ.
Clipping Reductions
The main decision in deﬁning a set of reductions is how vertices are removed from commu-
nication graphs. In the TIP example we deﬁne clipping reductions where we remove sets
of leaf vertices that are connected to a particular kind of non-leaf vertex. These non-leaf
vertices, termed level-1 vertices, are guaranteed to exist in acyclic communication graphs119
that are not stars. See Figure 5.3 for examples of level-1 vertices for some acyclic graphs.
The following deﬁnition of level-1 vertices is taken from [49].
Deﬁnition 5.6.4. For any graph G = (E,V,I), let leaf (v) denote the set of vertices,
w ∈ V , such that w is a leaf and there exists an edge from v to w. A non-leaf vertex j is
a level-1 vertex if all but one of its neighbouring vertices are in leaf (j). If j is a level-1
vertex its non-leaf neighbour is called its inner-vertex, denoted inner(j).
Deﬁnition 5.6.6 and the proof of Lemma 5.6.5 are given in [49].
Lemma 5.6.5. If G is an acyclic ﬁnite graph that is not a star, then G has at least two
level-1 vertices.
Deﬁnition 5.6.6. Given G = (E,V,I) and level-1 vertex j, let clipj(G) = V \ leaf (j) be
the set of vertices of G excluding leaf vertices of j.
In deﬁning a set of complete reductions, coincident to the identiﬁcation of vertices for
removal, is the identiﬁcation of a permutation of the vertex labels that ensures the reduced
graph is labelled correctly. We deﬁne a permutation for G ∈ Γ and level-1 vertex j, on the
vertex labels of G, which permutes the indices such that the leaves of j have the largest
indices and the order of the indices of the remaining vertices is preserved. The following
deﬁnition is taken from [49]
Deﬁnition 5.6.7. Let G ∈ Γ be a graph with a level-1 vertex j, with |G| = N. Suppose
that vertex j has w leaves with ids belonging to Hj = {h0,h1,...,hw−1} where hu < hu+1
for all 0 ≤ u ≤ w − 2. The remaining N − w nodes have ids in {0,1,...,N − 1} \ Hj
which we denote by m0,m1,...,mN−1−w where mt < mt+1 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ N −1−w. We
deﬁne the bijective mapping σG
j on the set {−1,0,1,... ,N − 1} such that σG
j (−1) = −1,
σG
j (mt) = t for all 0 ≤ t ≤ N − 1 − w and σG
j (hu) = u + N − w for all 0 ≤ u ≤ N − w.
We can now deﬁne a set of reductions on a graph G ∈ Γ.
Deﬁnition 5.6.8. For G ∈ Γ, let JG = {j1,j2,...,jm} be the set of all level-1 vertices in
G. Let Clip
j
G = (clipj(G),σG
j ) and deﬁne the set of clipping reductions of G as ClipG =
{Clip
j
G|j ∈ JG}. Furthermore, deﬁne the family of sets of clipping reductions, ClipΓ =
{ClipG|G ∈ |Γ}.120
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Figure 5.4: An example of graph G (top) and the graphs obtained under a clipping reduc-
tion, with respect to level-1 vertices, vertex 2 and vertex 3.
An example of a graph obtained under clipping reductions for the level-1 vertices, 2 and
3, is shown in Figure 5.4.
We can now show that we can reduce any communication graph in Γ to a star topology
under a sequence of clipping reductions.
Lemma 5.6.9. The set of acyclic topologies, Γ is reducible to the set of stars, Φ under
ClipΓ.
Proof. Let G ∈ Φ, then by deﬁnition ClipG(G) = ∅.
We prove that for every G ∈ Γ\Φ there exists a sequence of clipping reductions such that
G is reduced to a graph in Φ, by induction on the number of level-1 vertices of a graph.
By 5.6.5 every graph that is in Γ but not a star has at least two level-1 vertices.
Assume that G has two level-1 vertices i and j. It should be apparent that any such graph
is a line of vertices with (possibly) additional leaf vertices connected to each of the vertices
in the line and with i and j at either end of the line. If the line has length two then the
two vertices in the line must be the level-1 vertices. Clearly, any clipping reduction on
either of these two vertices will result in a star. Suppose that every line with length n ≥ 2
is reducible to a star by a sequence of clipping reductions. Let G be a line of length n+1.121
Any clipping reduction on the level-1 vertices of G will result in a line of length n. Hence,
by induction, any graph with two level-1 nodes is reducible to a star under a sequence of
clipping reductions.
Assume that G has n ≥ 2 level-1 vertices and that it is reducible to a star by a sequence
of clipping reductions. Let G be a graph in Γ with n + 1 level-1 vertices. Let the inner
vertices of a graph G be the set of vertices excluding the leaf nodes and excluding the
level-1 vertices. Suppose that G has 1 inner vertex. Then since G has at least three level-
1 vertices, it must be a star with leaf vertices attached to the leaves of the star. Any
clipping reduction on G will remove a level-1 vertex, with the reduced graph having n
level-1 vertices and by the induction hypothesis there exists a sequence of reductions on
the reduced graph resulting in a star. For any graph G with n + 1 level-1 vertices and m
inner vertices, assume that G is reducible to a star by a sequence of clipping reductions.
Let G be a graph in Γ with n + 1 level-1 vertices and m + 1 inner vertices. A clipping
reduction will result in either a graph with n level-1 vertices, in which case by the ﬁrst
induction hypothesis we are done, or in a graph with n + 1 level-1 vertices and m inner
vertices, in which case by the second induction hypothesis we are done.
Hence, by induction on the number of level-1 vertices we have that every graph in Γ is
reducible to a star by a sequence of clipping reductions and therefore Γ is reducible to Φ
under ClipΓ.
Reduced Variable Sets
We deﬁne a subset of the variable set of a model of a clipping reduced graph (adapted
from [49]). Essentially we remove all variables associated with the leaf processes of a level-
1 vertex. This includes not just the variables of the leaf vertices but also a subset of the
variables of the level-1 process that may refer to the indices of the leaf processes.
Deﬁnition 5.6.10. Let G ∈ Γ. Given MG ∈ MΓ with variables set XG and a clipping
reduction, Clip
j
G = (clipj(G),σG
j ), for a level-1 vertex, j, (with j′ = σG
j (j)) deﬁne,
X
j′
Clip
j
G(G) = XClip
j
G(G) \ Y j′
where Y j′
= {childj′,0, childj′,1, ..., childj′,N−1, adj j′, no of requestsj′}.
For G ∈ Γ we let AP
j′
Clip
j
G(G) be the set of atomic propositions over X
j′
Clip
j
G(G).122
Now we show how MΓ, with clipping reductions, is degenerative, by demonstrating that
each of the conditions of Deﬁnition 5.5.1 is fulﬁlled.
Condition 1 (Reduced Variables and Actions)
Lemma 5.6.11. Given a graph G ∈ Γ that is not a star, a level-1 vertex j, and a clipping
reduction, Clip
j
G = (clipj(G),σ
j
G) then
XG \ CG = Xσ
j
G(G) \ CG,D(XG) = D(Xσ
j
G(G)),ActG = Actσ
j
G(G).
Lemma 5.6.12. Given a graph G ∈ Γ that is not a star, a level-1 vertex j, and a clipping
reduction, Clip
j
G = (clipj(G),σ
j
G) then
XClip
j
G(G) ⊆ Xσ
j
G(G),D(XClip
j
G(G)) ⊆ D(Xσ
j
G(G)),ActClip
j
G(G) ⊆ Actσ
j
G(G).
The proofs of Lemmas 5.6.11 and 5.6.12 follow from the deﬁnition of the variable sets XG
and ActG (for G ∈ Γ) and the deﬁnition of σ
j
G given previously.
Condition 2 (Matching Adversaries)
We partition the adversaries of a TIP model according to their behaviour with respect to
the level-1 vertices. Speciﬁcally, we classify them according to which level-1 vertex receives
bmp requests from all its leaf vertices, but not its inner vertex, ﬁrst. If j is such a vertex
then the value of variable statej will change from start to child. The leaf neighbours of j
are then guaranteed to terminate without being elected leader and their eﬀect under the
adversary can be ignored. This is key to showing that MΓ is degenerative. The following
deﬁnitions and lemmas are adapted from those given in [49] for the non-probabilistic case.
Deﬁnition 5.6.13. Let G ∈ Γ and let JG be the set of all level-1 vertices of G. An
adversary A ∈ AdvMG is said to be ﬁrst-full with respect to a level-1 vertex, j ∈ JG (or
ﬁrst-full with respect to j) with inner vertex h if and only if,
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= START U CHILDh
j}) = 1
where START = (∧k∈JGstatek = start) and, CHILDh
j = (∧i∈JG,i =jstatei = start) ∧
(statej = child) ∧ (remaining partnerj = h).123
Deﬁnition 5.6.14. Given MG, for any level-1 vertex j, let Adv
j
MG ⊆ AdvMG denote the
set of adversaries which are ﬁrst-full with respect to j.
We can now show that the set of adversaries that are ﬁrst-full with respect to some level-1
vertex are the set of all adversaries for each model in MΓ. Intuitively, at the initialisation
of the protocol only leaf processes can progress beyond their starting state. Thus we must
reach a state where a level-1 process receives be my parent requests from all of its leaf
neighbours but not its inner vertex. The adversary corresponding to this scheduling must
therefore be ﬁrst-full with respect to a level-1 process. The proof of Lemma 5.6.15 is
similar to the proof given in [49] for the non-probabilistic case.
Lemma 5.6.15. For G ∈ Γ \ Φ, let JG = {j1,j2,...,jk} be the set of indices of all the
level-1 vertices. Then,
 
j∈J
Adv
j
MG = AdvMG.
Let G ∈ Γ\Φ and for some level-1 vertex j let (clipj(G),σG
j ) be a clipping reduction of G.
Let APG be the set of atomic propositions over XG and let APσG
j (G) be the set of atomic
propositions over XσG
j (G).
Let ςG
j denote the index map induced by σG
j and let ΣG
j : APG → APσG
j (G) denote the
proposition index map induced by σG
j . Note that the mapping, ΣG
j , is a bijective function
between the labelling of states in Aj and the labelling of states in Aj′ since σ
j
G is a
permutation. We show the eﬀect of this mapping in Table 5.5.
Lemma 5.6.16. Let G ∈ Γ \ Φ. Let j be a level-1 vertex and let Clip
j
G = (clipj(G),σ
j
G)
be the clipping reduction for j. For every adversary Aj of MG that is ﬁrst-full w.r.t. j,
there exists some adversary Aj′ of Mσ
j
G(G) that is ﬁrst-full with respect to j′ = σG
j (j) such
that ρG
j , the path index map induced by σ
j
G, is an isomorphism between Aj and Aj′.
Proof. Let G ∈ Γ \ Φ and let j be a level-1 vertex. Let MG = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L)
and Mσ
j
G(G) = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′). Let Aj be an adversary of MG that is ﬁrst-full
with respect to j. Let α be a ﬁnite path in Pathfin(s0) and suppose Aj(α) = (a, ) for
(a, ) ∈ Steps(last(α)). Let α′ = ρG
j (α) be the ﬁnite path in Pathfin(s′
0) obtained under
the path index map induced by σ
j
G.124
Suppose that (a, ) = (r
j
m, ) corresponds to the transition type shown in Figure 5.2 with
 (t1) =  (t2) = 0.25 for t1,t2 ∈ S and  (last(α)) = 0.5. If r
j
m is enabled from last(α) then
since last(α′) = ςG
j (last(α)), r
σ
j
G(j)
σ
j
G(m) is enabled from last(α′). Let (a′, ′) = (r
σ
j
G(j)
σ
j
G(m), ′)
where  ′(last(α′)) = 0.5 and  ′(t′
1) =  ′(t′
2) = 0.25 such that t′
1,t′
2 ∈ S′. It should be clear
that t′
1 = ςG
j (t1), t′
2 = ςG
j (t2) and  (t1) =  (t′
1) =  (t2) =  (t′
2) = 0.25 and  (last(α)) =
 ′(last(α′)) = 0.5. We can choose adversary Aj′ such that Aj′(last(α′)) = (a′, ′).
We can consider each of the transitions in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 in a similar way. Thus
we can construct Aj′ so that, from Deﬁnition 3.5.18, Aj′ is isomorphic to Aj under ρG
j .
We now prove that Aj′ is ﬁrst-full with respect to j′ = σ
j
G(j).
Consider the path,
α = s0
a1, 1 → s1
a2, 2 → ...
an, n → sn
such that α ∈ Path
Aj
ﬁn(s0), sn |= CHILDh
j and for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, si |= START and
si  |= CHILDh
j where h is the inner vertex of j and CHILDh
j is deﬁned as per Deﬁnition
5.6.13. Since Aj is ﬁrst-full with respect to j, α is guaranteed to exist. Root contention
cannot occur before state sn and therefore every transition along α is a non-probabilistic
action and thus P(α) = 1.
Let α′ = ρG
j (α) ∈ PathAj′(s′
0). Thus P(α′) = 1 and for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1,
ςG
j (si) |= ΣG
j (START) = START,
ςG
j (si)  |= ΣG
j (CHILDh
j ) = CHILDh′
j′ ,
and
ςG
j (si)  |= ΣG
j (CHILDh
j ) = CHILDh′
j′ ,
where h′ is the inner vertex of j′.
Thus, by Deﬁnition 5.6.13, Aj′ is ﬁrst-full with respect to j′.
In Lemma 5.6.17 we show that, for every adversary in MσG
j (G), ﬁrst full with respect
to j′ = σG
j (j), there exists an adversary of MClip
j
G(G), that is stuttering equivalent with
respect to the set of atomic propositions deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.6.10.
Lemma 5.6.17. Let G ∈ Γ \ Φ, j a level-1 vertex and Clip
j
G = (clipj(G),σ
j
G) be the
clipping reduction for j. For every adversary A of MσG
j (G), there exists some adversary
A′ of MClip
j
G(G) such that A and A′ are stuttering equivalent w.r.t. AP
j′
Clip
j
G(G).125
Proof. Let MσG
j (G) = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and MClip
j
G(G) = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′). Let
A be an adversary of MσG
j (G) and let AP∗   AP
j′
σG
j (G)[clipj(G)]. Let H ⊆ Pathfin(s0) ×
Pathfin(s′
0) be the relation given by ∀α ∈ Pathfin(s0), α′ ∈ Pathfin(s′
0), H(α,α′) iﬀ
traceAP∗(α) ≃ traceAP∗(α′).
We deﬁne an adversary, A′ over MClip
j
G(G) and sets, D0, D1, D2,... such that ∀n ≥ 0,
Dn ⊆ Pathfin(s′
0), by induction over the cuts of A at depth i. We show that for all n ≥ 0,
IH1 For every α ∈ cutA
s0, α′ ∈ Dn, if H(α,α′) then for every m < n there exists preﬁxes
β ≤ α and β′ ≤ α′ such that β ∈ cutA(m), β′ ∈ Dm and H(β,β′).
IH2 If  n, ′
n are the distributions over cutn(A) and Dn, respectively, deﬁned by, for
α ∈ cutA(n), α′ ∈ Dn,  n(α) = P(α) and  ′
n(α′) = P(α′) then  n ⊑H  ′
n.
IH3 For every α ∈ cutA
s0, α′ ∈ Dn, if H(α,α′) then for every β ∈ cutA
s0, β′ ∈ Dn such that
β  = α and β′  = α′, (β,α′) / ∈ H and (α,β′) / ∈ H.
Base case: Clearly cutA(0) = {s0}. Let D0 = {s′
0}. Immediately, IH1 and IH3 hold. By
deﬁnition P(s0) = P(s′
0) = 1. Therefore,  0 ⊑H  ′
0 and so IH2 holds.
Induction step: Assume that IH1, IH2 and IH3 hold for some n ≥ 0. Suppose α ∈
cutA(n + 1). Then for γ ∈ PathA
fin(s0), (a, ) ∈ Steps(last(γ)), α = γ
a, 
−→ s. Since
|γ| = n, γ ∈ cutA(n) and since  n ⊑H  ′
n by IH2, there exists γ′ ∈ Dn such that H(γ,γ′)
and by IH3 no other path is related to γ′ or γ. We now deﬁne Dn+1 by considering the
transition last(γ)
a, 
−→ s. Consider the following cases.
1. Suppose a ∈ ∪i∈leaf (j)Acti.
Notice that for process j to send a be my parent request to one of its leaves (k say)
then it must have received a be my parent request from its inner node and all of its
other leaves. This would imply, however, that A is not ﬁrst-full with respect to j.
Therefore, process j cannot send a be my parent request to any of its leaves and so
none of the leaves can reach a contention state with j. In other words,
ProbA
s0(ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |=   ∧i∈leaf (j) statei  = contention) = 1.
Thus, we only need to consider the actions ∪i∈leaf (j){ai
j,bi
j,ci
j,di
j,ei
j,fi
j} as shown in
Tables 5.2 and 5.3. It is apparent that each of these actions is a non-probabilistic126
stutter action w.r.t. AP∗ i.e.  (s) = 1 and L(last(γ)) ∩ AP∗ = L(s) ∩ AP∗. Thus,
since we also have that γ is stuttering equivalent to γ′ w.r.t. AP∗, α and γ′ are
stuttering equivalent w.r.t. AP∗.
2. Suppose that a / ∈ ∪i∈leaf (j)Acti and that a / ∈ {hi
m|i / ∈ leaf (j),(m,i) ∈ E}.
Thus a is an action associated with a process other than the leaves of j and a is not
a contention resolution action. We have γ ≃ γ′ w.r.t. AP∗ so L(last(γ)) ∩ AP∗ =
L′(last(γ′)) ∩ AP∗. Suppose that a = ai
m for some vertex i / ∈ leaf (j), i  = j and for
some vertex m such that (i,m) ∈ E i.e. a is the action such that a process is in
the start state and receives be my parent requests from all its neighbours except m.
Thus statei = start ∈ L(last(γ)) and ∀k ∈ V s.t. (k,i) ∈ E and k  = m, ck,i = bmp ∈
L(last(γ)) and cm,i = empty ∈ L(last(γ)). Each of these propositions are in AP∗
and therefore also belong to L′(last(γ′)). Thus action ai
m must also be enabled from
last(γ′) and so last(γ′)
ai
m, ′
−→ s′ where  ′(s′) = 1 and L(s) ∩ AP∗ = L′(s′) ∩ AP∗.
By arguing in a similar way for each of the actions given in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and
5.3, it is straightforward to determine that for an action a / ∈ ∪i∈leaf (j)Acti and that
a  = hi
m, if (a, ) ∈ Steps(last(γ)) then (a, ′) ∈ Steps(last(γ′) where  ′(s′) = 1 for
some s′ ∈ S′ such that L(s) ∩ AP∗ = L(s′) ∩ AP∗. Let α′ = γ′ a, ′
−→ s′ then α is
stuttering equivalent to α′ w.r.t. AP∗.
3. Suppose that a / ∈ ∪i∈leaf (j)Acti and that a ∈ {hi
m|i / ∈ leaf (j),(m,i) ∈ E}.
We have γ ≃ γ′ w.r.t. AP∗ so L(last(γ))∩AP∗ = L′(last(γ′))∩AP∗. Suppose that
a = hi
m for some vertex i / ∈ leaf (j), and for some vertex m such that (i,m) ∈ E i.e. a
is the action corresponding to contention resolution between i and m (i < m). Thus
statei = contention,tossm = 0 ∈ L(last(γ)). Each of these propositions are in AP∗
and therefore also belong to L′(last(γ′)). Thus action ai
m must also be enabled from
last(γ′) and so (ai
m, ′) ∈ Steps(last(γ)) where  ′(s′) = 1
2,  ′(s′
1) = 1
4 and  ′(s′
2) = 1
4.
If s = last(γ) (so that  (s) = 1
2)) then let α′ = γ′ a, ′
→ s′. If statej = winner ∈ L(s)
then let α′ = γ′ a, ′
→ s′
1. If statej = loser ∈ L(s) then let α′ = γ′ a, ′
→ s′
2.
We let Dn+1 be the set of ﬁnite paths, {α′|α ∈ cutA(n), and α′ is derived from α as
described above}. By the deﬁnition of this set, IH1, IH2 and IH3 are satisﬁed. By
Lemma 3.5.13, it follows that A is stuttering equivalent to A′.127
Table 5.5: Result of applying ΣG
j to an atomic proposition, a, for 0 ≤ h,k ≤ N and
0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 (where σ is an abbreviation of σG
j ).
a ΣG
j (a)
positionh = x positionσ(h) = x
childh,i = x childσ(h),i = σ(x − 1) + 1
adj h = x adj σ(h) = x
remaining partnerh = x remaining partnerσ(h) = σ(x−1)+1
no of requestsh = x no of requestsσ(h) = x
electedh = x electedσ(h) = σ(x − 1) + 1
tossh = x tossσ(h) = x
ch,k = x cσ(h),σ(k) = x
From Lemmas 5.6.15, 5.6.16 and 5.6.17 it follows that,
Lemma 5.6.18. For every adversary A in MG (G ∈ Γ\Φ) there exists a clipping reduction
Clip
j
G = (clipj(G),σG
j ) such that A is isomorphic to an adversary A′ in MσG
j (G) with A′
stuttering equivalent to some adversary A′′ in MClipG
j (G) w.r.t. AP
j′
ClipG
j (G) (for j′ = σG
j (j)).
5.6.5 Proof of Theorem 5.6.2
Proof. From Lemma 5.6.9 it follows that the set of clipping reductions is reducible to Φ.
By Lemmas 5.6.11, 5.6.12 and 5.6.18, the conditions of Deﬁnition 5.5.1 are satisﬁed by MΓ
(under the clipping reductions). Thus, MΓ is deterministically degenerative with base Φ.
By Lemma 5.6.3 Property 1 holds for all star topologies. Since Property 1 is unindexed
and has appropriately deﬁned propositions, by Theorem 5.5.2, it is satisﬁed by MG for all
G ∈ Γ.
5.7 Extending the Properties we can prove for determinis-
tically degenerative families of models
In the previous sections we considered QLTL properties that were unindexed. We extend
the class of properties that we can prove using our inductive proof schema to indexed
properties of a certain form. In particular, we deﬁne a QLTL\X property φ to be I-indexed128
if it has the form,
P≥p[∨i∈Iψi] or, P≤p[∧i∈Iψi].
The ψi are (isomorphic up to indexing) LTL path formulae indexed only by i ∈ I. For
example, suppose that I = {0,1,2}, and that x0,x1,x2 are indexed variables, each with
domain {0,1}. Then
P≥0.75[(♦(x0 = 1)) ∨ (♦(x1 = 1)) ∨ (♦(x2 = 1))]
is an I-indexed QLTL\X property.
Theorem 5.7.1. Let S be a speciﬁcation over a set of communication topologies, Γ, where
Γ is reducible to Φ under the family of sets of reductions, QΓ. Suppose that the set of
models, MΓ, is deterministically degenerative under QΓ with base Φ. For G = (E,V,I) ∈
Γ, let I(G) denote the set of indices of G. For every F ∈ Φ, let φ(I(F)) be an I(F)-indexed
quantitative QLTL\X property with atomic propositions in
 
G∈Γ
 
(W,σ)∈QG AP′
σ(G)[W]. If
MF |= φ(I(F)) for all F ∈ Φ, MG |= φ(I(G)) for all G ∈ Γ.
Proof. Let S be a system and Γ a set of communication topologies. Suppose that there
exists a set of models,
MΓ = {MG over XG|G ∈ Γ},
for S over Γ, with sets of atomic propositions APG over XG, that is deterministically
degenerative with base Φ, under QΓ, a family of sets of reductions such that Γ is reducible
to Φ under QΓ. Assume that G ∈ Γ is not in Φ and let QG be the set of reductions of G
in QΓ.
For each G ∈ Γ and R = (W,σ) ∈ QG, let X′
R(G) ⊆ XR(G) be a set of variables such
that Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 5.5.1 holds. Let AP′
R(G) ⊆ APR(G), be the set of atomic
propositions over X′
R(G).
For each R = (W,σ) ∈ QG, let φ(I(R(G))) be an I(R(G))-indexed QLTL\X property with
atomic propositions in
 
R∈QG AP′
R(G). Suppose that MR(G) |= φ(I(R(G))), for every
R ∈ QG. Then we can show that MG |= φ(I(G)) as follows.
Let A ∈ AdvMG. Choose R = (W,σ) ∈ QG such that A is isomorphic to some adversary
A′ ∈ AdvMσ(G) under the path index isomorphism, ρ, induced by σ, with A′ stuttering
equivalent to some adversary A′′ ∈ AdvMR(G) w.r.t. AP′
R(G). The property φ(I(R(G)))129
has the form P≥p[∨i∈I(R(G))ψi] or P≤p[
 
i∈I(σ(G)[W]) ψi]. We consider only the former here
(the proof of the latter case is similar). Note that,
{ω |= ∨i∈I(R(G))ψσ−1(i)} ⊆ {ω |= ∨i∈I(G)ψσ−1(i)}) (5.2)
For every adversary B of MR(G),
ProbB
s′′
0({ω′′ ∈ PathB
s′′
0|ω′′ |= ∨i∈I(G)ψi}) ≥ p. (5.3)
If MG, Mσ(G) and MR(G) have initial states s0, s′
0 and s′′
0 respectively then,
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ∨i∈I(G)ψi})
= ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ∨i∈I(G)ψσ−1(i)}) since σ is bijective
≥ ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ∨i∈I(R(G))ψσ−1(i)}) by 5.2
= ProbA′
s′
0({ω′ ∈ PathA′
s′
0|ω′ |= Σ(∨i∈I(R(G))ψσ−1(i))}) since A = A′ under ρ
= ProbA′
s′
0({ω′ ∈ PathA′
s′
0|ω′ |= ∨i∈I(R(G))ψi}) since Σ is induced by σ
= ProbA′′
s′′
0 ({ω′′ ∈ PathA′′
s′′
0 |ω′′ |= ∨i∈I(R(G))ψi}) since A ≃ A′ w.r.t. AP′
R(G)
≥ p by 5.3.
Since the above is true for every adversary of MG, MG |= φ(I(G)).
For each F ∈ Φ let φ(I(F)) be an I(F)-indexed quantitative LTL\X formula with atomic
propositions in
 
G∈Γ
 
R∈QG AP′
R(G) and let G ∈ Γ. If G ∈ Φ then, by the statement of
the theorem, MG |= φ(I(G)). Otherwise, G ∈ Γ \ Φ and since φ(I(G)) is I(G)-indexed,
with atomic propositions in
 
G∈Γ
 
R∈QG AP′
R(G), φ(I(G)) is deﬁned over ∩R∈QGAP′
R(G).
Hence, by the above, MG |= φ(I(G)) if Mσ(G)[W] |= φ(I(σ(G))[W]) for all (W,σ) ∈ QG.
For each R ∈ QG, either R(G) is in Φ or it can be reduced further. Continuing in this
way, since Γ is reducible to Φ under QΓ, we can construct a tree of graphs in which every
terminal node is a graph in Φ. Finally, by statement of the theorem, each model associated
with the graph, F at these terminal nodes satisfy ψ(I(F)) and, by propagation up the
tree of graphs, it follows that MG |= φ(I(G)).130
5.8 Discussion
5.8.1 Analysing the TIP
Much work has been carried out on analysing the TIP (see for example, [46]). We men-
tion [3] since it describes an inductive proof for a spanning tree leader election protocol
that is similar to the TIP. The authors observe that only a leaf can initially transmit an
“up” (bmp) message and it will then move to a “dead” state, after which the protocol be-
haves as if started in the graph with that leaf deleted. They note that, continuing in this
manner, eventually a graph with only one or two vertices will be reached. The protocol is
not speciﬁed formally and, unlike our approach, is not veriﬁed using state-based methods.
Summary We have described an inductive proof technique for a class of randomised
distributed systems described as degenerative. The systems are modelled as MDPs. The
technique is an induction schema over the underlying communication topologies, repre-
sented by undirected graphs. The key idea is that topologies are reduced such that every
adversary of a model of a system with some topology is stuttering equivalent to an adver-
sary of a model of a system with a reduced topology. Reduction involves the removal of one
or more vertices from the communication topology. The base case(s) are those topologies
that are not reduced. We have applied this technique to the IEEE 1394 (Firewire) tree
identify protocol showing that certain unindexed QLTL\X properties that are true of the
system with a base topology will hold for a system with any acyclic topology. In this case,
reduction is by removal of the leaf vertices of level one vertices. The base cases are star
topologies.Chapter 6
Probabilistic Parameterised
Veriﬁcation of Probabilistically
Degenerative Systems
Outline In this chapter we extend the deﬁnition of a deterministically degenerative
family of MDP models of a randomised distributed system. We deﬁne a probabilistically
degenerative family of models, and show that a family of MDP models of the Itai Rodeh
leader election protocol for rings satisfy this deﬁnition. Establishing that a family of
models is probabilistically degenerative enables us to verify certain properties of the family
by considering just a subset of models. We use this result to determine properties of the
Itai Rodeh leader election protocol.
6.1 Introduction
We note that our technique described in the previous chapter is only applicable to families
of models of systems under which processes degenerate deterministically. For example,
in the TIP case study, a level-1 process is determined to be degenerate according to the
scheduling of the leaves of all the level-1 processes. Since the scheduling of processes
is modelled non-deterministically, under any adversary it is known which level-1 process
degenerates. Therefore the protocol degenerates deterministically and so our technique is
applicable in this instance.
131132
In the TIP, the probabilistic element of the protocol is restricted to the resolution of
contention and is not relevant to the removal of the leaves of a level-1 process. However,
for other randomised distributed protocols that can be deemed degenerative, processes are
removed in a probabilistic fashion. Consider, for example, the Itai-Rodeh leader election
protocol for rings. Initially all processes are active and, in each round of the protocol,
a subset of the processes is chosen to become passive according to a simple probabilistic
choice made by each process. Since the passive processes only transmit received messages
they can be considered to be degenerate processes. Since the passive processes are chosen
randomly, the protocol can be considered probabilistically degenerative.
We therefore extend our deﬁnition of a degenerative family of models to include those that
degenerate probabilistically. The main diﬀerence from our original deﬁnition is that we
consider a set of distributions over graph reductions, such that every adversary of a model
of a system with some communication graph is stuttering equivalent to a set of paths of
an adversary of a model of a system with a reduced communication graph.
Note that in the case of deterministically degenerative families of models we did not
consider inﬁnite cyclic behaviour i.e. where we continuously return to a state that we pre-
viously visited having performed some set of actions. For a model to degenerate determin-
istically, it cannot exhibit cyclic behaviour (unless under some set of fairness constraints).
In the probabilistic case, however, a model can cycle and still be degenerative, assuming
that the cycle is probabilistic i.e. occurs with probability less than one. Therefore, the
point of execution when the system degenerates is probabilistic. In other words the system
degenerates at diﬀerent times. In terms of a model of a system this represents the case
that for sets of paths under some adversary there are diﬀerent states when the system
degenerates.
6.1.1 Incomplete Cyclic Reductions
It should be apparent that our earlier deﬁnition of reductions did not take into account
families of graphs that are cyclic, such as rings. To remedy this we extend our deﬁnition
to allow reductions to include an insertion operation that can add edges to a subgraph.
In the sequel, for a graph G = (E,V,I) and a set of edges E′ ⊆ ¯ E (where ¯ E is the set of
edges in the complement of G), let G ⊕ E′ = (E ∪ E′,V,I).133
Deﬁnition 6.1.1. Let Γ be a set of graphs and let G = (E,V,I) ∈ Γ. Let σ be a per-
mutation of vertex labels, let V ′ ⊂ V and let E′ be a subset of the set of edges in the
complement of G[V ′]. The tuple (E′,V ′,σ) is a cyclic reduction of G in Γ if and only if
σ(G)[V ′]⊕E′ ∈ Γ. We describe σ(G)[V ′]⊕E′ as a (the) cyclically reduced graph of G (with
E′ under V ′ by σ).
When considering cyclic behaviours, as discussed above, in probabilistic degenerative sys-
tems we must consider behaviours such that no set of processes degenerate. In terms of
the communication topology of a system we therefore must further extend our deﬁnition
of graph reductions to include an identity reduction under which a graph is ‘reduced’ to
itself.
Deﬁnition 6.1.2. Let Γ be a set of graphs and let G = (E,V,I) ∈ Γ. Let σ be a permu-
tation of vertex labels, V ′ ⊆ V and F ⊆ ¯ E′ (for G[V ′] = (E′,V ′,I′)). Suppose that either
V ′ = V , σ = ι (the identity permutation) and F = ∅ or V ′ ⊂ V . The tuple, R = (F,V ′,σ)
is then an incomplete cyclic reduction of G in Γ if and only if R(G) = σ(G)[V ′] ⊕ F ∈ Γ.
The reduction (∅,V,ι) is the identity reduction on G.
We give an extension to our deﬁnition of a reducible family of graphs (see Deﬁnition 5.2.6).
Here we consider a family of distributions over incomplete cyclic reductions. In the sequel
let IRedG denote the set of all incomplete cyclic reductions of G.
Deﬁnition 6.1.3. Let Γ be a topology and let QΓ = { G|G ∈ Γ} be a family of distributions
over incomplete cyclic reductions for graphs in Γ where, for G ∈ Γ,  G : IRedG → [0,1]
is a discrete distribution over the set of reductions of G. Let Φ ⊂ Γ such that for all
G = (E,V,I) ∈ Φ,  G((∅,V,ι)) = 1.
It is possible to construct an inﬁnite state DTMC GΓ = (Γ,Γ,P,L) over the set of propo-
sitions AP = {g = 0,g = 1} where, for G,G′ ∈ Γ,
P(G,G′) =
 
R∈support( G),G′=R(G)
 G(R)
with, for all G ∈ Γ, L(G) = {g = 1} if G ∈ Φ, L(G) = {g = 0}, otherwise. Then Γ is
reducible to Φ with probability 1 under QΓ if and only if, for all G ∈ Γ, G |= P≥1[♦(g = 1)].134
6.1.2 Probabilistically Degenerative Families of Models
Whereas for deterministically degenerative sets of models we know which processes will
degenerate under each adversary, for probabilistically degenerative sets of models under
an adversary diﬀerent sets of processes will degenerate with associated probabilities. We
therefore need to partition the sets of paths under an adversary.
Deﬁnition 6.1.4. Let M be a MDP and A be an adversary of M. A set {P0,P1,...,Pn}
is a measurable partition of PathA
s0 if and only if ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n, Pi ⊆ PathA
s0 such that Pi is
a measurable set of paths with, for 0 ≤ j ≤ n, i  = j Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ and ∪n
i=0Pi = PathA(s0).
Proposition 6.1.5 follows from the deﬁnition of a measurable partition and standard results
of probability theory (namely the Law of Total Probability).
Proposition 6.1.5. Let M be a MDP and let A be an adversary of M. For a measurable
partition, {P0,...,Pn} of PathA
s0 and a LTL path formula, ψ,
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ψ}) =
n  
i=0
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ Pi|ω |= ψ}).
We now give a deﬁnition of a probabilistically degenerative set of models.
Deﬁnition 6.1.6. Let Γ be a communication topology that is reducible to some topology Φ
under a family of distributions over sets of incomplete cyclic reductions, QΓ = { G|G ∈ Γ}.
Furthermore, suppose S(Γ) is set of speciﬁcations over Γ, and let MΓ = {MG|G ∈ Γ} be
the set of models over S(Γ).
For G ∈ Γ let XG be the set of variables of S(G) (with CG ⊆ XG the set of channel
variables) and let APG the set of atomic propositions over XG. For each G ∈ Γ and
each R ∈ support( G) that is not the identity reduction, let X′
R(G) ⊆ XR(G) be a set of
variables (with AP′
R(G) ⊆ APR(G), the set of atomic propositions over X′
R(G)). Then MΓ
is probabilistically degenerative with base Φ under QΓ if and only if,
1. (Reduced Variables and Actions:)For G ∈ Γ and a complete cyclic reduction
R = (F,R,σ) where  G(R) > 0,
Xσ(G) \ CG = XG \ CG,D(Xσ(G)) = D(XG),Actσ(G) = ActG,
XR(G) ⊆ Xσ(G),D(XR(G)) ⊆ D(Xσ(G)),ActR(G) ⊆ Actσ(G),135
2. (Matching Adversaries:) For G ∈ Γ \ Φ, for every deterministic adversary A of
MG, if
support( G) = {R0 = (F0,R0,σ0),R1 = (F1,R1,σ1),...,Rm = (Fm,Rm,σm)},
there exists a measurable partition P = {P0,P1,...,Pm} of PathA
s0 with (for 0 ≤ j ≤
m), ProbA
s0({α ∈ Pj}) =  G(Rj) and Pj isomorphic to P′
j under the path index map
induced by σ for some P′
j ⊆ PathA′
s′
0 for some adversary A′ of Mσj(G) such that, P′
j is
stuttering equivalent, with respect to AP′
R(G), to E′′, for some randomised adversary
E′′ of MR(G).
We then have that,
Theorem 6.1.7. Let Γ be a communication topology that is reducible to Φ under the
family of distributions over sets of incomplete cyclic reductions, QΓ and let S(Γ) be a
parameterised speciﬁcation over Γ. Suppose that for each G ∈ Γ, R ∈ support( G), there
is a set of variables X′
R(G) ⊆ XR(G) (with AP′
R(G) ⊆ APR(G), the set of atomic propositions
over X′
R(G)) such that the set of models over S(Γ), MΓ, is probabilistically degenerative with
base Φ under QΓ. Then for any unindexed QLTL\X property φ with atomic propositions
in
 
G∈Γ
 
R∈support( G) AP′
R(G), if MF |= φ for all F ∈ Φ, MG |= φ for all G ∈ Γ.
Proof. Assume that G ∈ Γ is not in Φ, and let  G be the distribution deﬁned over reductions
for G. Let φ be an unindexed QLTL\X property with atomic propositions in AP =
 
R∈support( G) AP′
R(G). Suppose that MR(G) |= φ, for every complete reduction, R =
(F,R,σ) ∈ support( G) (i.e. R  = (∅,V,ι)). We show that MG |= φ as follows.
Let Σ be the proposition index map induced by σ. Note that φ has the form P⊲⊳p[ψ] and
that Σ(ψ) = ψ since φ is unindexed and that, for every adversary B of MR(G),
ProbB
s′′
0({ω ∈ PathB
s′′
0|ω |= ψ}) ⊲⊳ p. (6.1)
Suppose that
support( G) = {R0 = (F0,R0,σ0),R1 = (F1,R1,σ1),...,Rm = (Fm,Rm,σm)}
and that P = {P0,P1,...,Pm} is a partition of PathA
s0 with (for 0 ≤ j ≤ m),
ProbA
s0({α ∈ Pj}) =  G(Rj)136
and Pj isomorphic to P′
j under the path index isomorphism induced by σ, ρ, say, for some
P′
j ⊆ PathA′
s′
0 for some adversary A′
j of Mσj(G) such that P′
j is stuttering equivalent, with
respect to AP′
Rj(G), to E′′
j , for some randomised adversary E′′
j of MRj(G). Let MG, Mσj(G)
and MRj(G) have initial states s0, s
j′
0 and s
j′′
0 respectively.
We consider two separate cases. One, that every reduction of G is a complete reduction
and, two, that one of the reductions is the identity reduction. Suppose that (∅,V,ι) / ∈
support( G) and let A ∈ AdvMG, then,
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ψ})
=
m  
i=0
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ Pi|ω |= ψ}) since P is a measurable partition
=
m  
i=0
Prob
A′
i
si′
0
({ω′ ∈ P′
i|ω′ |= Σ(ψ)}) since ψ has propositions in AP and P′
i = Pi
=
m  
i=0
Prob
A′
i
si′
0
({ω′ ∈ P′
i|ω′ |= ψ}) since ψ is unindexed
=
m  
i=0
Prob
A′
i
si′
0
(P′
i).Prob
E′′
i
si′′
0
({ω′′ ∈ Path
E′′
i
si′′
0
|ω′′ |= ψ}) since P′
i ≃ E′′
i w.r.t. AP′
R(G)
⊲⊳
m  
i=1
Prob
A′
i
si′
0
(P′
i).p by 6.1
= p.
m  
i=0
ProbA
s0(Pi) since P′
i = Pi
= p since P is measurable partition and so
 m
i=0 ProbA
s0(Pi) = 1
Since the above is true for every adversary of MG, MG |= φ.
Now, suppose that (∅,V,ι) ∈ support( G) and, without loss of generality, that R0 =
(∅,V,ι). Let GΓ = (Γ,Γ,P,L) be the inﬁnite state DTMC constructed as per Deﬁnition
6.1.3. Also, for ⊲⊳∈ {>,≥<,≤}, deﬁne ⊲⊳ ∈ {≥,≤} such that, ≥ ≡≥, > ≡≥, ≤ ≡≤,
< ≡≤.137
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ψ})
=
m  
i=0
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ Pi|ω |= ψ}) since P is a measurable partition
=
m  
i=0
Prob
A′
i
si′
0
({ω′ ∈ P′
i|ω′ |= Σ(ψ)}) since P′
i = Pi
=
m  
i=0
Prob
A′
i
si′
0
({ω′ ∈ P′
i|ω′ |= ψ}) since ψ is unindexed
=
m  
i=0
Prob
A′
i
si′
0
(P′
i).Prob
E′′
i
si′′
0
({ω′′ ∈ Path
E′′
i
si′′
0
|ω′′ |= ψ}) since P′
i ≃ E′′
i w.r.t. AP′
Rj(G)
=
m  
i=0
ProbA
s0(Pi).Prob
E′′
i
si′′
0
({ω′′ ∈ Path
E′′
i
si′′
0
|ω′′ |= ψ}) since P′
i = Pi
⊲⊳ ProbA
s0(P0).Prob
E′′
0
s0 ({ω′′ ∈ Path
E′′
0
s0 |ω′′ |= ψ})
+
m  
i=1
ProbA
s0(Pi).p by (6.1)
⊲⊳ ProbA
s0(P0).ProbA0
s0 ({ω ∈ PathA0
s0 |ω |= ψ})
+
m  
i=1
ProbA
s0(Pi).p for A0 ∈ AdvMG by Lemma 3.3.4
=  G((∅,V,ι)).ProbA0
s0 ({ω ∈ PathA0
s0 |ω |= ψ})
+p.
m  
i=1
 G(Ri) from Deﬁnition 6.1.6
Since A is arbitrary in the above, for some A1 ∈ AdvMG,
ProbA0
s0 ({ω ∈ PathA0
s0 |ω |= ψ}) ⊲⊳  G((∅,V,ι)).ProbA1
s0 ({ω ∈ PathA1
s0 |ω |= ψ})
+ p.
m  
i=1
 G((Fi,Ri,σi))
Substituting this into the above,
ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA0
s0 |ω |= ψ}) ⊲⊳  G(∅,V,ι))2.ProbA1
s0 ({ω ∈ PathA1
s0 |ω |= ψ})
+  G(∅,V,ι)).p.
m  
i=1
 G(Ri)
+ p.
m  
i=1
 G((Ri))138
Continuing in this manner,
ProbA
s0 ⊲⊳
∞  
j=1
 G(∅,V,ι)j−1.p.
m  
i=1
 G(Ri)
= p.
m  
i=1
 G(Ri).
∞  
j=1
 G(∅,V,ι)j−1
= p.
m  
i=1
 G(Ri).
1
1 −  G(∅,V,ι)
by standard results on geometric series
= p.(1 −  G(∅,V,ι)).
1
1 −  G(∅,V,ι)
= p
Hence, for every A ∈ AdvMG, ProbA
s0({ω ∈ PathA
s0|ω |= ψ}) ⊲⊳ p and therefore, MG |= φ.
Let φ be an unindexed QLTL\X formula with propositions in
 
G∈Γ
 
R∈support( G) AP′
R(G)
and let G ∈ Γ. If G ∈ Φ then, by the statement of the theorem, MG |= φ. Other-
wise, G ∈ Γ \ Φ. Since φ is not indexed by any process index, and φ is deﬁned over
 
R∈support( G) AP′
R(G), by the above, MG |= φ if MR(G) |= φ for every complete reduc-
tion, R ∈ support( G)). For each complete reduction, R ∈ support( G)), either R(G) is
in Φ or it can be reduced further. Continuing in this way, we will reach a graph in Φ
(since Γ is reducible to Φ with probability 1 under QG). Finally, by the statement of the
theorem, each of the models associated with the graphs in Φ satisfy φ and it follows that
MG |= φ.
6.2 Case Study: The Itai Rodeh Leader Election Protocol
6.2.1 Introduction
To illustrate our technique, we consider the PMCP for a particular randomised distributed
protocol designed to elect a leader from a set of processes arranged in a ring, which we
will demonstrate later is probabilistically degenerative. More speciﬁcally, we analyse the
asynchronous version of the Itai Rodeh leader election protocol (IRP) [35]. This protocol
has already been analysed, using PRISM, for ﬁxed size systems [1]. In addition, some
formal analysis has been carried out for the Itai Rodeh leader election protocol, by hand.
However, we are not aware of any work to date that attempts to tackle the parameterised139
model checking problem for these protocols using a similar approach to ours. The protocol
is described in full in [35], we give an overview below.
We ﬁrst note that it has been shown for an anonymous ring of processes (i.e. where the
process id’s are unknown) that are identical up to renaming, there is no deterministic
algorithm that can elect a unique leader [3]. However, if we loosen the condition ‘a unique
leader must be chosen’ to ‘a unique leader must be chosen with probability 1’ then it is
possible to employ a probabilistic algorithm to break the symmetry of the processes and
allow a unique leader to be elected (assuming we know the size of the ring). This is the
basis of the IRP.
The algorithm proceeds in two phases. Initially all processes are deemed active. In the ﬁrst
phase a process selects 0 or 1, each with probability a half. Having chosen its preference,
a process can then send its selection to the next process in the ring (the ring being unidi-
rectional). When a process receives its neighbours choice, if it is 1 and its own choice was
0 then the process will become passive and will then only pass on messages that it receives
(although incrementing any counter it receives, see below). For any other combination of
choices the process remains active and moves to phase two.
In the second phase, any active process transmits a counter, initialised to 0, that is passed
around the ring. Each time this counter passes through a passive process it is incremented
by one. Therefore, if an active process receives a counter with value N − 1 (where N is
the size of the ring) it must be the only remaining active process and so can declare itself
leader. On the other hand, if an active process receives a counter with value less than
N − 1 it cannot be unique and so will proceed to phase 1 and select its preference again.
This continues until a leader is chosen.
Note that in practice, although we describe the protocol as proceeding in phases, in reality,
because the system is asynchronous, the processes do not execute phases together, so for
example one process may be in phase one while another has completed phase two. The
sequence of actions, however, for a single process is as described above.140
6.2.2 Parameterised Models of the IRP
The IRP has been modelled and veriﬁed (for rings of a ﬁxed size) using the PRISM
probabilistic model checker [1,30]. We have modiﬁed these PRISM deﬁnitions to model the
IRP using asynchronous communication with neighbouring processes transmitting along
channels of length N, where N is the size of the ring. As an example, a PRISM deﬁnition
for a ring of size three is given in Appendix F.
We let Γ denote the set of rings (of size greater than one), with the vertices of each graph
G in Γ labelled by the values 0,1...,|G|−1. Also, we let Φ = {G(2)} where G(2) is the ring
of size two. We have written a script program that can generate PRISM speciﬁcations of
the IRP for every member of Γ, based on PRISM speciﬁcations that we deﬁned for rings
up to size 5. We denote the set of speciﬁcations that can be generated by this script by
S(Γ) = {S(G)|G ∈ Γ} and the family of models over S(Γ) by MΓ = {MG|G ∈ Γ}.
For G = (E,V,I) ∈ Γ, the set of variables associated with SG is the set XG = ∪N−1
i=0 Xi
G ∪
CG ∪ GG where Xi
G denotes the set of local variables of process i, GG the set of global
variables and CG the set of channel variables with, for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
Xi
G = {statei,senti,receivei,pi,ci},
CG = {chi,j|(i,j) ∈ E}
GG = {leader}
The variable domains are given by, for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, chi,j ∈ CG,
D(statei) = {active,passive,leader,finish},
D(senti) = {0,1,2},
D(receivei) = {0,1,2},
D(ci) = {0,1,... ,N − 1},
D(pi) = {0,1,2},
D(leader) = {⊥,0,1,... ,N − 1},
D(chi,j) = {empty,0,1,...,N − 1}.
We let ActG denote the set of actions associated with MG.
For communication graph, G, a ring of size N the corresponding PRISM deﬁnition S(G)
describes modules for the set of processes in the ring and for the set of channels. We141
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Figure 6.1: State graph for a single process, processi, in a model, MG, of the Itai Rodeh
protocol142
consider the module speciﬁcation for processi (0 ≤ i ≤ |G| − 1. The variable statei
represents the state of process i. The variable senti stores a value from {0,1,2} where 0
indicates that no messages have been sent, 1 means that process i has sent its preference
and 2 that process i has also sent its counter. Similarly receivei has domain {0,1,2} and
if receivei = 0 then process i has received no messages, if receivei = 1 then process i
has received its neighbours preference and if receivei = 2 then process i has also received
its neighbours counter. The variable ci stores the value of any counter that process i
receives. When process i chooses its preference this is stored in pi which has value 2
before the process has chosen its preference or preference value 0 or 1 once chosen. Also, if
statei = passive, pi also stores the value of any preference it receives from its neighbour.
The modules for all other processes have the same local variables as processi but are
renamed with the process id.
The unique global variable, leader, has an indexed domain and is set to the value of a
process index if a process is elected leader. We assume that processh is the left neighbour
of processi and processj is the right neighbour (h  = i, i  = j, h  = j, 0 ≤ j,h ≤ |G − 1|).
The module for the channel from process i to process j (channel i,j) has local variables
ch1
i,j,ch2
i,j,...,chN
i,j, representing each of the positions in a channel of length N. Each local
variable may store the value of a process’s preference or a process’s counter and therefore
has a value in the range empty,0,1,...,N − 1. Note that empty is a default value used
to initialise the variables and to represent the fact that nothing is stored in that position
in the channel. The channel is FIFO and so whenever an item is sent on the channel it is
stored in the ﬁrst free position. If the channel is full, i.e. if ch1
i,j is not equal to empty, then
the send cannot occur. Similarly, whenever process j receives a message from channel i,j,
this will be read from ch1
i,j and all other messages will be ‘shifted’ one place up the channel
i.e. the message in ch2
i,j will be moved into ch1
i,j, the message in ch3
i,j will be moved into
ch2
i,j etc. If the channel is empty i.e. ch1
i,j = empty then process j cannot perform a read.
For convenience, we use chi,j to denote channel i,j and let chi,j[n] = chn
i,j. The variables
for all other channels are the same as for channel i,j up to renaming of the channel index.
Initially, processi will have statei = active, senti = 0, receivei = 0, ci = 0, pi = 0 and sim-
ilarly for all the other process modules. Also, initially chh,i = chi,j = [empty,...,empty]
(and similarly for all channel modules). From this state, the only executable statement
for processi sets sets pi = 0 or pi = 1 with equal probability.143
Having chosen a preference, processi can then either receive its neighbours preference if
this is available from its in channel or it can send its own preference on its out channel.
If processi sends its preference then chi,j[1] is set to the value of pi and senti is set to 1.
From this state it is only possible for processi to read its neighbours preference. Whenever
processi reads its neighbours preference from its in channel then it sets receivei = 1 and if
pi = 0 and chh,i[1] = 1 then state1 = passive, otherwise statei = active. First we assume
that statei = active. If senti = 0 then processi can send its preference, setting senti = 1
and sending pi on its out channel. If senti = 1 and receivei = 1 then processi can send
its counter (which will have value 0), setting senti = 2. If senti = 1 and receivei = 2 then
processi must have received a counter from another active process. Hence, once it has sent
its counter processi must choose another preference and so we set senti = 0, receivei = 0,
ci = 0 and pi = 0 and can then proceed as described above.
When statei = active, if receivei = 1 then processi can receive its neighbours counter.
In this case, if senti < 2, i.e. processi has not yet sent its counter then this must be the
counter of another process and receivei is set to 2. If, on the other hand, senti = 2 and
processi receives a counter with value less than N − 1 then there must be other active
processes present in the ring and it is necessary to choose again. Thus, statei = active,
senti = 0, receivei = 0, ci = 0, pi = 0 and the protocol proceeds as described above.
If, however, processi receives a counter value of N−1 then processi must be the only active
process in the ring and so the local variables are set so that statei = leader, senti = 0,
receivei = 0, ci = 0 and pi = 0. From this state, the assignments are made such that
leader = i and statei = finish and the protocol terminates.
Assume that pi = 0 and processi has received its neighbours choice which is equal to 1
so that statei = passive. In this case, processi can then receive its neighbours counter if
this is available. Assuming that value C is received then ci is set to C + 1 and receivei is
set to 2.
If statei = passive and senti = 0 then processi can send its preference, setting senti = 1.
Having sent its preference, if processi has received its neighbours counter i.e. receivei = 2
then processi can pass on the counter, setting senti = 0, receivei = 0, ci = 0, pi = 0.
From this state, processi can only receive its neighbours preference, in which case it sets
receivei = 1. The process will continue to behave as described above until a process is144
elected leader. Note that the behaviour of any of the process or channel modules will be
identical to that described above.
Figure 6.1 gives the local state graph associated with processi. Note that only the variables
of processi are included in the labelling of the states and we omit action labels (and
associated ‘dashed edges’) for clarity of presentation. We use the notation < g > to
indicate a guard g that must be true in order for a transition to be taken. It is assumed,
however, that guards referring to the state of the channels (a send can only take place if
a channel is not full, a read can only take place if a channel is not empty) are implicit.
Figure 6.2 also gives an example execution for the PRISM speciﬁcation for a ring of size
three. In the ﬁgure, we abbreviate the values active, passive, leader and finish by A,P,L
and F respectively. The value of the channel variables are given in the square brackets
([]). We do not use the default value of empty to indicate an empty position but instead
only show values that are sent on the channel. The ﬁrst value between the square brackets
is the ﬁrst to be read from the channel.
6.2.3 Model checking the IRP using PRISM
The table in Figure 6.2.3 gives the results of building and then verifying (with respect to
Property 1, below) a model in PRISM from our deﬁnition for rings of size N = 2,3,4,5.
It displays the time taken to build the model, the number of states of the MDP and the
number of nodes in the MTBDD. The last column also gives the time taken to verify the
property deﬁned below (where leader represents the global boolean variable of the PRISM
speciﬁcation that is initially equal to zero and is set to the value of the process index when
that process is elected leader). Note that Property 1 is an unindexed QLTL\X property.
Property 1 A leader is elected with probability 1.
P≥1[♦¬(leader = ⊥)]
6.2.4 Parameterised model checking of the IRP
Having veriﬁed the Itai Rodeh leader election protocol for ﬁxed sizes of ring using the
PRISM model checking tool, we now tackle the problem of proving properties for an arbi-145
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Figure 6.2: Example execution of the PRISM speciﬁcation of the Itai Rodeh protocol for
a ring of size three146
Table 6.1: Model sizes and build and veriﬁcation times
N Time(s) States Nodes Property 1
2 0.077 91 1882 0.052
3 0.405 994 10874 0.609
4 1.956 12177 50297 5.248
5 11.370 150507 181253 37.510
trary size of ring. In order to do so, we can exploit the proof technique for probabilistically
degenerative systems described above.
We aim to show that the Itai Rodeh protocol is probabilistically degenerative. Intuitively,
for a ring of some size, once a set of processes become passive then the protocol behaves
like a smaller ring of processes. However, it cannot be described as deterministically
degenerative as for the Firewire protocol since a passive process is chosen probabilistically.
Note also that a passive process can still pass on messages and increment the value of any
counter it receives (the maximum value of which is dependent on the size of the ring).
Nonetheless, it is still possible to employ an inductive proof in the manner described
above if we restrict the set of propositions that we consider. Speciﬁcally, for the models
MG ∈ MΓ of the IRP, for a ring of size greater than or equal to two, we intend to prove
the following.
Theorem 6.2.1. Let φ be Property 1, then for any G ∈ Γ, MG satisﬁes φ.
Using the methodology described in Section 6.1.2 above, we prove properties of our base
family of models ({MG(2)}) by model checking and then for N > 2, establish a relationship
between MG and MG′ for each reduced graph G′ of G under a particular type of incomplete
cyclic reduction.
Lemma 6.2.2. For all G ∈ Φ, MG |= φ, where φ is Property 1.
Proof. By model checking (see entry for N = 2 in Table 6.2.3).
In a similar manner as for the TIP, we show that MΓ is (probabilistically) degenerative
with base Φ by considering each of the conditions given in Deﬁnition 6.1.6 in turn, having147
deﬁned an appropriate set of reductions and corresponding set of variables for each model
in MΓ.
Join Reductions
We deﬁne a family of distributions QΓ over sets of reductions on graphs in Γ.
Deﬁnition 6.2.3. Given G = (E,V,I) ∈ Γ and 0 ≤ i ≤ N −1, let disjointi(G) denote the
family of sets of i vertices of G such that no two vertices in a set in disjointi(G) has an
edge between them. Furthermore, let joini(G) be the family of sets of vertices of G such
that, for each {k1,k2,...,ki} ∈ disjointi(G), V \ {k1,k2,...,ki} ∈ joini(G).
Note that for G = (E,V,I) ∈ Γ, disjoint0(G) = {∅} and therefore join0(G) = {V }.
Lemma 6.2.4. If G is a ring, then for ⌊N/2⌋ < i ≤ N, disjointi(G) = ∅ and for 1 ≤ i ≤
⌊N/2⌋, |disjointi(G)| ≥ 1.
Proof. Let G ∈ Γ for |G| = N. Deﬁne K as the set of all vertices of G that are labelled by
an odd value. It should be apparent that there are no bigger sets of disjoint vertices of G:
adding any vertex to K would result in a sequence of vertices that are not disjoint. For
N even, |K| = N/2 and for N odd, |K| = (N − 1)/2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ |K|, a set of disjoint
vertices of size i can be derived by removal of vertices from K.
In the sequel, we let σG
Ji be a permutation (for ⌊N/2⌋ ≥ i ≥ 0, Ji ∈ jointi(G)) on the
vertex labels of G = (E,V,I) ∈ Γ, which permutes the indices such that the vertices of
G in V \ Ji have the largest indices and the order of the indices of the vertices in Ji is
preserved.
Deﬁnition 6.2.5. Let G = (E,V,I) ∈ Γ with |G| = N and for ⌊N/2⌋ ≥ i ≥ 0 let
Ji = {j0,j1,...,jN−1−i} ∈ jointi(G) with jt < jt+1 for 0 ≤ t < N − 1 − i. Let ¯ Ji =
V \Ji = {k0,...,ki−1} where ku < ku+1 for 0 ≤ u < i−1. Deﬁne the bijective map σG
Ji on
the set {⊥,0,1,2,... ,N − 1} such that σG
Ji(⊥) = ⊥, σG
Ji(jt) = t for all 0 ≤ t ≤ N − 1 − i
and σG
Ji(ku) = u + N − i for all 0 ≤ u ≤ i − 1.
Furthermore, because we want to reduce to a new ring, we must identify a set of edges
that will close the subgraph induced by any subset of the vertices of a ring in joini(G).148
Deﬁnition 6.2.6. Let VJi be the subset of the set of vertices in a set Ji in joini(G) (for
G ∈ Γ, ⌊N/2⌋ ≥ i ≥ 0) such that for each v ∈ VJi there is no outgoing edge from v in the
graph G[J]. Similarly, let UJi be the set of vertices such that for each u ∈ UJi there is no
incoming edge to u in the graph G[Ji]. For v0 ∈ VJi, u ∈ UJi, let (v0,u) ∈ FG
Ji if and only
if there exists edges (v0,v1),(v1,v2),...,(vn−1,vn),(vn,u) for some N ≥ n ≥ 1 such that
for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, (vi,vi+1) is in the edge set of G but not in the edge set of G[Ji],
and similarly for (vn,u).
Deﬁnition 6.2.7. For G ∈ Γ \ Φ, deﬁne a set of join reductions on G as
JoinG = {(FG
Ji,Ji,σG
Ji)| for all Ji ∈ joini(G) for every ⌊N/2⌋ ≥ i ≥ 0}.
Note that for i = 0 in Deﬁnition 6.2.7, the unique join reduction (FG
J0,J0,σG
J0) is equivalent
to the identity reduction. An example of a graph obtained under a join reduction for N = 5
and i = 2 is shown in Figure 6.3.
Let G ∈ Γ (with |G| = N and let Di = {j0,j1,...,ji−1} ∈ disjointi(G) with jt−1 < jt for
1 ≤ t ≤ i − 1. We want the probability that in the ﬁrst round of the Itai-Rodeh protocol,
every process in Di becomes passive and all other processes remain active. In order for this
to happen we must have a sequence of preference choices (assuming that j0’s preference is
the ﬁrst in the sequence) of the form
(0z01y0)(0z11y1)...(0zi−11yi−1) for zr,yr ≥ 1,zr + yr = dr (6.2)
where dr is the number of processes between each pair of processes jr, jr⊕i1 in Di. The
number of sequences of the form (0z1y), z,y ≥ 1 is given by z+y−1. Therefore, the total
number of sequences of the form of 6.2 is given by
i−1  
r=0
dr − 1
and hence the probability of the processes in Di becoming passive while the remaining
processes remain active is given by
 i−1
r=0 dr − 1
2N .
Deﬁnition 6.2.8. For G ∈ Γ let  G : JoinG → [0,1] be a distribution over the set of join
reductions of G such that, for the ring of size 2, G(2),
 G(2)((∅,V,ι)) = 1149
and for G ∈ Γ \ Φ,
 G((∅,V,ι)) =
2
2N ,
and for every Ji ∈ disjointi(G), for all ⌊N/2⌋ ≥ i ≥ 0,
 G((FJi
G ,Ji,σG
Ji)) =
 i−1
r=0 dr − 1
2N .
We can now deﬁne a set of reductions on a graph G ∈ Γ.
Deﬁnition 6.2.9. Deﬁne the set of join reductions over Γ as
QΓ = { G|G ∈ Γ}
Essentially, a join reduction is a reduction in which a covering set of vertices is removed,
the removing vertices are relabelled to have the smallest index values and edges are added
to preserve the ring. We can show that the set of join reductions is reducible to the
singleton set containing the ring of size two, with probability 1.
Lemma 6.2.10. The set QΓ is reducible to Φ with probability 1.
Proof. For all G ∈ Γ, construct an inﬁnite state DTMC G = (Γ,Γ,P,L) over G = {g}
where, for ∆,∆′ ∈ Γ,
P(∆,∆′) =
 
R∈support( ∆),∆′=R(∆)
 ∆(R),
and D(g) = {0,1} with, for all G ∈ Γ, L(G) = {g = 1} if G ∈ Φ, L(G) = {g = 0},
otherwise.
We prove, by induction on the size of a graph that for all G, G |= P≥1[♦g = 1].
Base Case: Let G ∈ Γ be the ring of size two. Then by deﬁnition of the labelling function
of G, g = 1 ∈ L(G) and thus GG |= P≥1[♦g = 1].
Induction Step: Suppose that, for all F ∈ Γ with |F| = N for N ≥ 2, F |= P≥1[♦g = 1].
Let G ∈ Γ with |G| = N + 1. Let  G ∈ QΓ be the distribution over the join reductions
on G. Since |G| ≥ 3, there must be at least one complete join reduction in support( G).
Note that for any complete join reduction of G, the reduced graph F will be such that
2 ≤ |F| ≤ N. Let ∆ be the set of reduced graphs of G under some complete join reduction
in support( G) then clearly the probability of reaching a state in ∆ from G is 1. By the150
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Figure 6.3: An example of graph G (left) and the graph σJ2
G (G)[J2]⊕FJi
G (right) obtained
under a join reduction where J2 = {1,3,4}.
induction hypothesis, the probability of reaching a state with g = 1 from a state in ∆ is
equal to 1 and therefore, G |= P≥1[♦g = 1].
By induction, Γ is therefore reducible to Φ with probability 1 under QΓ.
We now deﬁne a subset of the variable set of a model of a join reduced graph.
Deﬁnition 6.2.11. Given MG over XG and a join reduction, R = (FG
i ,Ji,σG
i ), deﬁne,
X
′
R(G) = {leader} ∪ ∪j∈Ji{statej}.
Deﬁne AP′
R(G) to be the set of atomic propositions over X
′
R(G).
Now we show how MΓ, with join reductions, is probabilistic degenerative, by demonstrat-
ing that each of the conditions of Deﬁnition 6.1.6 is fulﬁlled.
Condition 1 (Reduced Variables and Actions)
Lemma 6.2.12. Given a graph G ∈ Γ that is not the ring of size two and a complete join
reduction, (FJi
G ,Ji,σJi
G ) then,
XG \ CG = XσJi
G (G) \ CG,D(XG) = D(XσJi
G (G)),ActG = ActσJi
G (G).
Lemma 6.2.13. Given a graph G ∈ Γ that is not the ring of size two and a complete join
reduction, JoinJi
G = (FJi
G ,Ji,σJi
G ) then,
X
JoinJi
G (G) ⊆ XσJi
G (G),D(X
JoinJi
G (G)) ⊆ D(XσJi
G (G)),Act
JoinJi
G (G) ⊆ ActσJi
G (G).151
The proofs of Lemmas 6.2.12 and 6.2.13 follow from the deﬁnition of the variable sets,
variable domains and action sets over S(Γ) and from the deﬁnition of the join reductions
given previously.
Condition 2 (Matching Adversaries)
We partition the paths of the adversaries of an IRP model according to their behaviour
with respect to the processes that become passive. Speciﬁcally, we classify them according
to the processes that choose zero and their left neighbour chooses 1 in the ﬁrst round. If j
is such a vertex then the value of variable statej will change from active to passive when
it receives its neighbours choice. Process j is then guaranteed to remain passive and its
eﬀect under the adversary can be ignored.
Deﬁnition 6.2.14. Let G ∈ Γ \ Φ and let Ji ∈ joini(G) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌊N/2⌋. For an
adversary A ∈ AdvMG, a path ω ∈ PathA
s0 is said to be ﬁrst-full with respect to Ji iﬀ,
ω |= ∧j∈Ji receivej = 0U (receivej = 1 ∧ statei = PASSIVE)
∧k/ ∈Ji receivek = 0U (receivek = 1 ∧ statek = ACTIVE).
Deﬁne PA
s0(Ji), the set of paths under A that are ﬁrst-full w.r.t. Ji.
Lemma 6.2.15. Let G ∈ Γ and let A ∈ AdvMG. The set
{PA
s0(Ji)|Ji ∈ disjointi(G),0 ≤ i ≤ ⌊N/2⌋}
is a measurable partition of PathA
s0.
Proof. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ ⌊N/2⌋, for Ji ∈ disjointi(G), the set of paths PA
s0(Ji) is described
by a LTL property and is therefore measurable.
The set of paths PA
s0(Ji) represents the paths under which exactly the Ji processes become
passive in the ﬁrst round. For any Kj, 0 ≤ j ≤ ⌊N/2⌋, Kj  = Ji, it is not possible to
choose the Kj processes as passive in the ﬁrst round as well as the Ji processes. Therefore
PA
s0(Ji) ∩ PA
s0(Kj) = ∅.
In the ﬁrst round, either the Ji processes are chosen to become passive for some Ji ∈
disjointi(G), 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌊N/2⌋ or no processes are selected to become passive. Therefore,
ProbA
s0(
 
0≤i≤⌊N/2⌋ PA
s0(Ji)) = 1.152
Table 6.2: Result of applying ΣG
Ji to an atomic proposition, a, for 0 ≤ h,i ≤ N (where σ
is an abbreviation of σG
Ji)
.
a ΣG
Ji(a)
stateh = x stateσ(h) = x
senth = x sentσ(h) = x
receiveh = x receiveσ(h) = x
ch = x cσ(h) = x
ph = x pσ(h) = x
leaderh = x leaderσ(h) = σ(x)
chh,i = x chσ(h),σ(i) = x
Let G ∈ Γ \ Φ and for some Ji ∈ joini(G), let JoinJi
G = (FJi
G ,Ji,σG
Ji) be a join reduction
of G. Let APG be the set of atomic propositions over XG and let APσG
Ji(G) be the set
of atomic propositions over XσG
Ji(G). We deﬁne a bijective map ΣG
Ji : APG → APσG
Ji(G)
as shown in Table 6.2. The mapping ΣG
Ji permutes any process indices appearing in an
atomic proposition according to σG
Ji (abbreviated in the table to σ). We can show that
ρG
Ji, the path index map induced by σG
Ji is an isomorphism between adversaries in Adv
j
MG
and adversaries in Adv
j′
M
σG
j (G)
.
Lemma 6.2.16. Let G ∈ Γ\Φ. Let Ji ∈ joini(G) and let (FJi
G ,Ji,σG
Ji) be a join reduction
for Ji. For every adversary A of MG, there exists some adversary A′ of MσJi
G (G) such that
A is isomorphic to A′ under ρG
Ji, the path index mapping induced by σG
Ji.
Proof. Let G ∈ Γ \ Φ and let Ji ∈ joini(G) and let (FJi
G ,Ji,σG
Ji) be a join reduction for
Ji. Let MG = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and MσJi
G (G) = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′). Let A be an
adversary of MG that is ﬁrst-full with respect to Ji. Let α be a ﬁnite path in Pathfin(s0)
and suppose A(α) = (a, ) for (a, ) ∈ Steps(last(α)). Let α′ = ρG
Ji(α) be the ﬁnite path
in Pathfin(s′
0) obtained under the path index map induced by σJi
G .
Suppose that (a, ) = (rk, ) corresponds to a transition associated with processk choosing
a preference value of 0 or 1. Then  (t1) =  (t2) = 0.5 for t1,t2 ∈ S. If rk is enabled from
last(α) then since last(α′) = ςG
Ji(last(α)), rσJi
G (k) is enabled from last(α′) (where ςG
Ji is the
index map induced by σJi
G ). Let (a′, ′) = (rσ
j
G(k), ′) where  ′(t′
1) =  ′(t′
2) = 0.5 such
that t′
1,t′
2 ∈ S′. It should be clear that t′
1 = ςG
Ji(t1), t′
2 = ςG
Ji(t2) and  (t1) =  (t′
1) = 0.5
and  (t2) =  ′(t′
2) = 0.5. We can choose adversary A′ such that A′(last(α′)) = (a′, ′).153
We can consider each of the transitions shown in Figure 6.1 in a similar way. Thus we can
construct A′ so that, from Deﬁnition 3.5.18, A′ is isomorphic to A under ρG
Ji.
In Lemma 6.2.17 we show that, for every set of paths in the partition of an adversary of
MσG
Ji(G)[Ji] there exists a randomised adversary of MσG
Ji(G)[Ji] ⊕ FJi
G , that is stuttering
equivalent with respect to the set of atomic propositions deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6.2.11.
Lemma 6.2.17. Let G ∈ Γ \ Φ, Ji ∈ disjointi(G) and R = (FJi
G ,Ji,σG
Ji) be the join
reduction for Ji. Let A be an adversary of MG, and let A′ be an adversary of MσJi
G (G)
such that A is isomorphic to A′ under ρG
Ji, the path index mapping induced by σG
Ji. Then
there exists some randomised adversary E′ of MR(G) such that ρG
Ji(PA
s0(Ji)) and E′ are
stuttering equivalent w.r.t. AP′
R(G).
Proof. Let MσG
Ji(G) = (S,s0,Steps,Act,L) and MR(G) = (S′,s′
0,Steps′,Act′,L′). Let A
be an adversary of MG, and let A′ be an adversary of MσJi
G (G) such that A is isomorphic
to A′ under ρG
Ji, the path index mapping induced by σG
Ji. Let AP∗   AP′
R(G) and Π =
ρG
Ji(PA
s0(Ji)).
For a path, α, such that α ≤ γ for γ ∈ Π let,
¯ P(α) =
P(α)
ProbA′
s0(Π)
.
Furthermore if,
α = s0
a1, 1 −→ s1
a2, 2 −→ ...sn−1
an, n −→ sn,
then for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let si−1
ai, i −→ si be a ﬁrst-round transition under α if and only
if ai is an action local to processk and in every state in α up to si−1, processk has not
yet received and sent a counter. Let the set of actions occurring in ﬁrst-round transitions
under α be denoted by First(α). Also, for γ ∈ Π with, γ = s0
a1, 1 −→ s1
a2, 2 −→ ...sn−1
an, n −→
sn
an+1, n+1 −→ ..., let secondsi(γ) denote the ﬁnite path α starting in si with ﬁnal state,
sj+1 such that sj
aj+1, j+1 −→ sj+1 is not a ﬁrst-round transition and every transition up to
sj is a ﬁrst-round transition. Deﬁne,
Seconds(Π) = {seconds(γ)|γ ∈ Π}.
Let H ⊆ Pathfin(s0) × Pathfin(s′
0) be the relation given by ∀α ∈ Pathfin(s0), α′ ∈
Pathfin(s′
0), H(α,α′) iﬀ
traceAP∗(α) ≃ traceAP∗(α′),154
and,
actAct
σG
Ji(G)
\First(α)(α) = actActR(G)
(α).
We deﬁne a randomised adversary, E′, over MR(G) and sets, D0, D1, D2,... such that
∀n ≥ 0, Dn ⊆ {α ≤ γ|γ ∈ Π}, by induction. We show that for all n ≥ 0,
IH1 For every α ∈ Dn, α′ ∈ cutE′
(n), if H(α,α′) then for every m < n there exists
preﬁxes β ≤ α and β′ ≤ α′ such that β ∈ Dm, β′ ∈ cutE′
(m) and H(β,β′).
IH2 If  n, ′
n are the distributions over Dn and cutE′
(n), respectively, deﬁned by, for
α ∈ Dn, α′ ∈ cutE′
(n),  n(α) = ¯ P(α) and  ′
n(α′) = ProbE′
s0 (C(α′)) then  n ⊑H  ′
n.
Base case: For n = 0, cutE′
(0) = {s′
0}. Let D0 = {s0}. Immediately, IH1 holds. By
deﬁnition ¯ P(s0) = ProbE′
s′
0 (C(s′
0)) = 1. Therefore,  ′
0 ⊑H  0 and so IH2 holds.
Induction step: Assume that IH1 and IH2 hold for some n ≥ 0. We deﬁne Dn+1 and
E′(α′) for all α′ ∈ cutA′
(n).
Suppose Dn = {α0,α1,...,αkn}. For 0 ≤ j ≤ kn, let sj = last(αj). Deﬁne Dn+1 =
∪kn
j=0{αj.β|β ∈ Secondsj(Π)}.
Suppose that α = αj.β ∈ Dn+1. Then β = γ
a, 
−→ t such that last(γ)
a, 
−→ t is not a
ﬁrst-round transition under α while every transition in γ is.
Suppose, for α′ ∈ cutE′
(n), H(αj,α′). Therefore,
actAct
σG
Ji(G)
\First(α)(αj) = actActR(G
(α′).
Since the transitions in γ are all ﬁrst-round transitions under α and last(γ)
a, 
−→ t is not a
ﬁrst-round transition, it should be clear that a is enabled from last(α′). Let
E′(α′)(a, ′) =
P(γ)
 
β∈Secondsj(Π)
.
By the deﬁnition of Dn+1 and cutE′
(n+1), IH1 and IH2 are satisﬁed. From Lemma 3.5.13
it follows that Π ≃ A′.
It should be apparent from Lemmas 6.2.16 and 6.2.17 and the deﬁnition of the path index
map that,155
Lemma 6.2.18. For every adversary A in MG (G ∈ Γ \ Φ) there exists a join reduction
R = (FJi
G ,Ji,σG
Ji) such that PA
s0(Ji) is isomorphic to PA′
s′
0 (σJi
G (Ji))(= ρG
Ji(PA
s0(Ji))) for
some adversary A′ in MσG
Ji(G) with PA′
s′
0 (σJi
G (Ji)) stuttering equivalent to some randomised
adversary E′ in MR(G) w.r.t. AP
′
R(G).
6.2.5 Proof of Theorem 6.2.1
Proof. From Lemma 6.2.10, the set Γ is reducible to {MG(2)} with probability 1. By
Lemmas 6.2.12, 6.2.13 and 6.2.18, the conditions of Deﬁnition 6.1.6 are satisﬁed by MΓ
(under the join reductions). Thus, MΓ is probabilistic degenerative with base Φ. By
Lemma 6.2.2 Property 1 holds for M2. Since Property 1 is unindexed with appropriate
atomic propositions, by Theorem 6.1.7, it is satisﬁed by MG for all G ∈ Γ.
6.3 Discussion
6.3.1 Specifying Degenerative Systems
Clearly the applicability of our approach is strongly dependent on the form of the model
used to represent a system: a parameterised family of models of a system that appears
to degenerate may not be degenerative. Therefore, it would be useful to identify some
heuristics that can be used to guide the manner in which the system is modelled. For
example, it is clear that in order for a family of models to be degenerative then for a
process there must be a reachable local state that once reached guarantees that the process
will ‘acquiesce’ (for example by terminating or by only passing on received messages). It
must also be the case that with probability 1 some process (or set of processes) will reach
this state. Furthermore, we must have that, for any execution along which a process or
set of processes reach a quiescent state, any action performed by such a process must be
a stutter action.
Note that these heuristics do not guarantee that a family of models is degenerative. In
fact, much of the work in establishing this is based on identifying the sets of ‘reduced’
variables and domains. In terms of the IRP, for example, it was necessary to consider a
very small subset of the variables and their domains. This was due to the cyclic behaviour156
of each process in the protocol. In the TIP example a process did not return to a previously
visited state and therefore it was only necessary to ensure that actions of the degenerating
processes were stuttering actions. For IRP, on the other hand, it was necessary to ensure
that every action that occurred before a degenerate state was reached was a stutter action.
This can therefore be quite a severe restriction (but note that in practice this need not
limit the properties in which we are interested, as was the case for the IRP).
6.3.2 Convergent Properties
In terms of work closely related to our inductive schema for degenerative systems we
mention the work by Duﬂot et al. described in [27] and [28]. In [27], an approach to
proving the convergence of self-stabilising randomised protocols for parameterised rings is
given. By appealing to results of Markov theory it is shown that, given a non-increasing
measure on the state space of the model, if there exists a ‘distance’ measure between states
and an ordering relation on the measure that satisﬁes certain conditions then it is possible
to deduce that the protocol will converge to some legitimate set of states with probability
1. In [28] this technique is applies to an adaptation of Lehmann-Rabins solution to the
dining philosophers problem that does not require fairness constraints, and show that for
the modiﬁed algorithm a philosopher will eventually eat with probability 1.
The technique is described only in terms of rings with synchronous communication, al-
though it appears possible that it could be extended to other topologies and perhaps also
for asynchronous communication. The technique is also limited to proving ‘convergence’
to a set of states with probability 1 and therefore temporal logic is not considered. Our
technique, on the other hand, provides a theoretical framework to prove quantitative prop-
erties of systems expressed as (a restricted class of) LTL\X formula. However, it may be
that the type of properties that are of interest that we can actually analyse by this method
are in practice only converging probability 1 properties: the two properties that we con-
sider for the TIP and IR examples are of this form. This would require further rigorous
study to determine.
As with our technique, the approach of Duﬂot et al. is not automated and in particu-
lar requires the identiﬁcation of a measure on the set of states along with an ordering.
Similarly our technique requires reductions to be deﬁned and the identiﬁcation of sets of157
reduced variables. One of the beneﬁts of the convergence technique is that the conditions
on the measure and the ordering are deﬁned locally i.e. it is only necessary to consider
single transitions of the probabilistic model rather than paths. This is a weakness of our
technique that is inherent to establishing stutter equivalence. It might be that we can
consider other relations, such as the weak simulation relations described in [58], that are
deﬁned ‘locally’, i.e. with respect to individual transitions. Note, however, that these are
deﬁned in terms of MDPs rather than in terms of adversaries, and we would therefore need
to modify our approach to take this into account. Using a relation of this type would have
the added beneﬁt of allowing us to consider PCTL, rather than LTL properties. Under a
simulation style relation we can only establish properties of the form P≥p[φ] (where φ is a
PCTL path formula).
Assuming that the convergence approach of [27] and [28] can be extended to prove con-
vergence properties of protocols arranged in arbitrary topologies, it seems likely that this
technique would also be applicable to degenerative systems. In fact, it might be particu-
larly useful in showing that a set of topologies is reducible to some base with probability
1. In the case of the TIP, for example, we can deﬁne a distance measure to be the number
of level 1 nodes and an ordering <, the usual ordering on positive natural numbers and
for Itai Rodeh we could use the same order and deﬁne a distance measure to be the size of
the ring. It remains to be determined whether these satisfy the deﬁnitions of [27] and [28].
On the other hand, it might be also true that our technique could be extended to veriﬁca-
tion of, for example, self-stabilising protocols. Consider, for example, the self-stabilising
protocol of [34]. Although this does not degenerate in the manner we have deﬁned, it
seems apparent that for a system with N > 1 processes, once a conﬁguration has been
reached in which there are m, say, tokens then this system is related to the system with
m processes and m tokens. The main diﬃculty in showing this would be in determining a
relation of an appropriate form such that we could generalise this principle to any system
of this type.
One of the weaknesses of our approach as it stands is that we consider families of models
derived from PRISM speciﬁcations. PRISM provides support for veriﬁcation of PCTL
properties, whereas we establish results for a class of quantitative LTL properties. Al-
though we can still verify a subset of properties that are in both LTL and PCTL, this
is a severe restriction. One solution to this, described above, would be to adapt our re-158
sults to consider a relation other than stuttering equivalence. Alternatively, our approach
could be adapted to consider families of models speciﬁed in other modelling languages,
such as Probmela, which is supported by the Liquor model checking tool. Liquor can be
used to verify both LTL and PCTL properties and therefore may be a more appropriate
veriﬁcation tool in this instance.
Summary We have presented a deﬁnition of a probabilistically degenerative family of
models parameterised by a communication topology. Based on this deﬁnition we have
established that in order to verify certain types of property for a probabilistically de-
generative family of models, it is suﬃcient to consider some subset of the family that
corresponds to a base subset of the communication topology. This is demonstrated by
considering a family of MDP models of the Itai-Rodeh leader election protocol, which we
show is probabilistically degenerative.Chapter 7
Probabilistic Parameterised
Veriﬁcation of Semi-Degenerative
Systems
Outline We consider randomised distributed systems that are degenerative but that
cannot be considered as deterministically or probabilistically degenerative. We give a
deﬁnition for a family of probabilistic models to be semi-degenerative. A simple gossip
protocol is provided as an example of a semi-degenerative family of models and the degen-
erative nature of the protocol is exploited in order to establish that given PCTL properties
that hold for a base system model hold for the entire family.
7.1 Introduction
In Chapters 5 and 6 we presented a technique for veriﬁcation of degenerative systems by
induction, establishing that, for a degenerative family of models, if a property is true for
some base family of models then it is true for the entire family of models. We considered
two example systems in which, for each model the system was guaranteed to reach a state
that corresponded to a state in a ‘smaller’ model. The deﬁnition of deterministically and
probabilistically degenerative families of MDP models from these chapters are such that
the models must ‘converge’ to a base system model with probability 1. We consider now
159160
families of models that degenerate, but that may also terminate. Thus, with probability
1 a model reaches a degenerate state or it reaches a terminal state from which it is not
possible reach a state in a smaller model. It is possible that we could extend the approach
described in the previous two chapters to be applicable to these systems. However, we
consider here an illustration of an alternative approach through analysis of a simple gossip
protocol example.
7.2 Semi-Degenerative Families of Models
Like in the previous chapters we give the deﬁnition for a family of models to be degenerative
by considering a structural relation between models in the family. We consider here a
relation between models where one is ‘embedded’ in the other. Whereas in the previous
chapters we considered MDPs, here we consider DTMC models. We discuss the possibility
of extending this work to MDP models at the end of this chapter.
Deﬁnition 7.2.1. Let D = (S,s0,P,L) be a DTMC. A DTMC D′ = (S′,s′
0,P′,L′) is a
sub-chain of D (denoted D′ ⊑ D) if and only if S′ ⊆ S, s′ ∈ S′ ⇔ s′ is reachable from s′
0,
and for all s′,t′ ∈ S′, P′(s′,t′) = P(s′,t′).
Based on Deﬁnition 7.2.1 we can give a deﬁnition for a family of models (over a set of
speciﬁcations) to be semi-degenerative. A family of DTMC models is semi-degenerative if
every ‘smaller’ model is a sub-chain of a ‘larger’ model (we formalise this below). The use
of the sub-chain relation in our deﬁnition is somewhat diﬀerent from that of the stuttering
equivalence relation employed for the deterministically and probabilistically degenerative
families of models of the previous two chapters. Intuitively, this relation implies that the
behaviour of some model, before it reaches some state of a ‘smaller’ model, is independent
of the behaviour of the smaller model, but thereafter it is identical to that of the smaller
model. Under the stuttering equivalence relation, on the other hand, the behaviour of a
model before and after a state of a smaller model is reached, need only be equivalent to
the behaviour of the smaller model up to stuttering.
In this chapter we assume that the topology of the system is regular and therefore we can
consider the family of speciﬁcations to be parameterised by the size of the system (number
of processes) rather than by the communication topology.161
Deﬁnition 7.2.2. For some c ≥ 2, let S = {S(N)|N ≥ 1} be a family of speciﬁcations for
a system of size N and let D = {D(S(N))|N ≥ 1} be the corresponding family of DTMC
models. D is semi-degenerative with base c if and only if for all N > c, D(S(N − 1)) ⊑
D(S(N)).
We describe a family of models satisfying the above conditions as semi-degenerative be-
cause it is not necessarily possible to reach the ‘base’ system model D(S(c)) from every
state. In other words there may exist states from which the probability of reaching a state
in D(S(c)) is zero. This highlights another diﬀerence between the semi-degenerative sys-
tems and the those types of degenerative behaviour given in the previous chapters, where
we assumed that we were guaranteed to reach a ‘base’ system model. In Deﬁnition 7.2.3 we
distinguish between three types of states of a DTMC in terms of some sub-chain: terminal,
degenerative and semi-degenerative. For a DTMC, D = (S,s0,P,L), a set T ⊆ S, and a
state s ∈ S, let ps(T) = Probs({ω ∈ Path(s)|ω = s0 → ... → t → ... for some t ∈ T}).
Deﬁnition 7.2.3. Suppose D = (S,s0,P,L) is a DTMC and D′ = (S′,s′
0,P′,L′) is a
sub-chain of D. Then, for s ∈ S, s is terminal w.r.t. S′ if and only ps(S′) = 0, s is
degenerative w.r.t. S′ if and only if ps(S′) = 1, and s is semi-degenerative w.r.t. S′
otherwise.
We prove reachability properties for a family of semi-degenerative models. As discussed
above the behaviour of a model prior to reaching a state of a sub-chain is independent of
the sub-chain’s behaviour. In order to prove properties of a family of semi-degenerative
models we need to establish some results for the behaviour of each model in the family
with respect to the property. This is strictly dependent on the property and model under
consideration, thus it is diﬃcult to provide a general theorem for proving results of semi-
degenerative families of models. In the following section we prove two example properties,
by induction, for an example semi-degenerative system.162
7.3 Case Study: A Gossip Protocol
7.3.1 Gossip Protocols
We consider a class of randomised, distributed algorithms commonly known as gossip or
epidemic protocols, which disseminate information in a peer-to-peer network. The ideas
behind gossip protocols are originally derived from the ﬁeld of epidemiology, the study of
disease spread.
The SIR model of disease spread (see for example [11]) subdivides a population into those
that are susceptible (have not yet contracted a disease), those that are infective (have
contracted the disease and may pass it on) and those that are removed (had the disease
and are now immune or dead). In the simplest form of the model, susceptible individuals
become infective (with some probability, B, say) and infective individuals then become
removed (again with some associated probability, Q say). It is also possible to extend
this model to consider births, natural deaths, vaccination, spatial spread, mutation of
the disease etc. but only the basic model will be considered here. It is usual to employ
a system of diﬀerential equations to model the spread of disease in a population. This
deterministic approach is an accurate representation for large populations, but for smaller
populations it is more appropriate to use stochastic methods.
Gossip protocols are designed to propagate information throughout a network of sites, in
much the same way as diseases. An ‘infection’ will appear at some site and the information
that this represents must be propagated throughout the network. This is done by randomly
choosing a (set of) site(s) to ‘infect’. Each ‘infected’ site may then eventually become
‘removed’, according to some mechanism, and stop transmitting the information. Whereas
the study of epidemiology is concerned with the containment of a disease, gossip protocols
are designed to rapidly propagate information to as many sites as possible.
In spite of their advantages, gossip protocols are not suitable in every situation and have
two signiﬁcant weaknesses. Firstly, because the protocol is based on randomised behaviour,
there is no guarantee that everyone will receive an ‘infection’. This problem can be alle-
viated by infrequently executing a more heavyweight protocol, that gives a deterministic
guarantee on the spread of the information, in parallel with the gossip protocol.
However, this solution conﬂicts with the second weakness, which is that, although the163
behaviour of the protocol at a local level is relatively simple, the precise nature of the global
behaviour is often diﬃcult to understand. This means that the use of gossip protocols in
conjunction with other protocols can be unpredictable. The analysis of these systems is
therefore very important. Most of the investigations into the behaviour of these protocols
so far has relied on manual proof, experimentation and simulation. However, by making
use of probabilistic model checking, for systems of a ﬁxed size, the protocols can be veriﬁed
automatically.
In the following sections we consider a simple gossip-style protocol and discuss how the
PRISM probabilistic model checking tool is employed to verify it. We then tackle the
PMCP based on the degenerative nature of the protocol using the approach described in
the previous section.
7.4 SIR Protocol
We consider a distributed peer-to-peer network of sites with a fully connected topology. At
the start of the protocol one site will be considered infective, i.e. it has some information
for distribution to the remaining susceptible sites. Any infective site can then infect
any susceptible site, with the susceptible site choosing to become infective with some
probability, β. Any infective site may also, at any point, choose to become removed with
probability ρ, in which case that site is no longer interested in forwarding information and
no longer participates in the protocol.
7.4.1 Model Checking the SIR Protocol with PRISM
We make some simplifying assumptions for the protocol. The ﬁrst, is that there is only
ever one form of information present in the system at any one time. Second, we consider
our system to be free from failure, a common assumption when performing model checking.
The PRISM speciﬁcation for the SIR protocol with three network sites is given in Appendix
G. Notice that the protocol is modelled as a DTMC. For a system of size N, we consider
each network site as a process and model a single site as a PRISM module sitei (1 ≤ i ≤ N).
Each module has a single local variable, statei (0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1), tracking the state of the
process. There are three possible states: Susceptible, Infective, Removed. Any process164
that is in the Susceptible state randomly chooses an Infective process (assuming that
there is one) and will then become Infective with probability B, where B is a global
constant in the range [0...1]. An Infective process is only able to move to the Removed
state, which it does so with probability Q, where Q is also a global constant in the range
[0...1]. Note that initially one module is in the Infective state while the remainder are
initialised to be Susceptible.
There are a number of properties that are of interest to us when verifying our model. Here
we concentrate on two properties, which we respectively deﬁne informally and formally (in
PCTL) below.
Property I1 With probability 1, the spread of the update will terminate.
P≥1 [♦(state1! = Infective & state2! = Infective &...& stateN! = Infective)]
Property I2 Upon the spread of the update terminating, with probability greater than
or equal to a half, there will be no susceptibles remaining.
P≥1/2 [♦(state1! = Infective & ...& stateN! = Infective &
!(state1 = Susceptible | state2 = Susceptible |...| stateN = Susceptible))]
These properties have been veriﬁed using PRISM for N = 2,3,...,15 sites.
A Population Model of the SIR Protocol
The model in Appendix E is an individuals model. Our model is highly symmetric and
our properties are not dependent on the identity of any particular site. We can therefore
employ a ‘population’ level model, with fewer states where, rather than maintaining the
state for each process in a system, we instead count the number of processes in each state.
A PRISM speciﬁcation of the population model is given in Appendix H. We model the
protocol with a single module that has two state variables, s and i, which maintain the
number of susceptible and infective sites in the protocol. Note that we omit the number of
removed sites since this can be calculated from the total number of sites and the number of
susceptible and infective sites. If a susceptible site becomes infective then s is decremented
by one and i incremented accordingly. If an infective site becomes removed then i is165
decremented by one. The only other possible transition is a self-loop in which case s and
i are unchanged.
Consider the probabilities of a site changing its state. Let s and i denote the number
of susceptibles and infectives respectively. Let P[S → I] denote the probability of a
susceptible site becoming infective. Let P[I → R] denote the probability of an infective
site becoming removed and let P[S → S] denote the probability of remaining in the same
state. Then:
P[S → I] =
i
s.i + i
.B.s = B.
s
s + 1
P[I → R] =
1
s.i + i
.Q.i = Q.
1
s + 1
P[S → S] = 1 − (P[S → I] + P[I → R])
= 1 − (B.
s
s + 1
+ Q.
1
s + 1
)
= 1 −
B.s + Q
s + 1
Note that we also introduce a global positive integer constant, N, the total number of
sites, to our population speciﬁcation. Rather than deﬁning separate speciﬁcations for each
size of system as for the individual speciﬁcation, with the population speciﬁcation we can
deﬁne a single speciﬁcation using the parameter N to represent the number of sites.
We can verify the three properties speciﬁed below for at least one hundred sites, greater
than the number of sites for which we could verify the individual level SIR protocol. Note
the comparability of Property P1 and Property P2 to Property I1 and Property I2 of the
individual level models given above.
Property P1 With probability 1, the spread of the update will terminate.
P≥1[♦(i = 0)]
Property P2 With probability at least a half, when the spread of the infection termi-
nates, there will be no susceptibles remaining.
P≥1/2[♦(i = 0&s = 0)]166
Figure 7.1: Probability of Property P2 holding against N
Property P3 With probability at least a half, eventually the number of infectives will
be greater than the number of susceptibles.
P≥1/2[♦(i > s)]
As discussed in Section 3.4, PRISM can return the actual probability of a property holding,
as well as simply checking a bound. This probability can be plotted against a varying
parameter, as can be seen in Figure 7.1, where the total number of sites (N) is plotted
against the probability of the update spread completing with no remaining susceptible
sites, for N = 2,3,...50.
7.5 Parameterised Model Checking of the SIR Protocol
The SIR protocol is a degenerative system. Intuitively, for any network of N sites, once a
site becomes removed, the protocol behaves as a system of N − 1 sites. However, notice
that upon removing a site we may no longer have any infective sites and the protocol will
terminate, possibly with some susceptible sites remaining. Figure 7.2 shows the DTMCs
generated from the population level model for two, three, four and ﬁve sites (note that
each state is shown as x,y, where s = x and i = y). It should be apparent that the167
Figure 7.2: DTMCs for the SIR protocol for 2,3,4 and 5 sites
smaller models are subgraphs of the larger ones. Note also, however, that there exist
states where the protocol terminates without reaching a state of the smaller model D2.
For example, state (4,0) is a terminal state. Hence, it would appear that the protocol is
semi-degenerative in the manner deﬁned in Section 7.2.
In the sequel, for n ≥ 2, let S(n) denote the population SIR protocol PRISM speciﬁcation
with N = n. Let Dn = D(S(n)), S = {S(n)|n ≥ 2} and D = {Dn|n ≥ 2}.
Lemma 7.5.1. The family of models D is semi-degenerative with base 3.
Proof. For N ≥ 3 let DN = (SN,sN
0 ,PN,LN). Let N > 3. Clearly SN−1 ⊆ SN. Suppose
that s ∈ SN−1. Then s = (x,y) such that x + y ≤ N − 1. It should be clear that s is
reachable from sN−1
0 . If s = (x,y) is reachable from sN−1
0 = (N − 2,1) then s ∈ SN−1.
Since S(N) is identical to S(N −1) except for the initialisation of parameter N and since
S(N) is independent of N, ∀s,s′ ∈ SN−1, PN(s,s′) = PN−1(s,s′).
By employing Lemma 7.5.1 we now prove that Property P2 and Property P3 are satisﬁed
by DN for all N ≥ 3.168
Property P2
We show that the probability of the SIR protocol terminating with no remaining suscep-
tibles is at least a half for any size of system. We verify this property in terms of the
population level speciﬁcation of the SIR protocol.
Theorem 7.5.2. If φ denotes Property P2 then for any n ≥ 2, Dn |= φ.
Proof. By induction on N, the number of processes.
As should be apparent from the DTMCs given in Figure 7.2, from the initial state in a
model SN+1, it is possible to reach a state in SN that is not the initial state. In fact,
any path from the initial state in SN+1 must pass through a state, (s,i), in SN such that
s + i = N. Therefore, it is not enough to prove our property holds in the initial state of
every model. We must also show that it holds in any state where s + i = N.
Base Case:
For N = 3, we have veriﬁed by model checking in PRISM that,
∀r = (s,i) s.t. s + i = 3, S3,r |= P≥1/2[♦(s = 0&i = 0)].
Induction Step:
For N ≥ 3 assume that
∀r = (s,i) s.t. s + i = N, SN,r |= P≥1/2[♦(s = 0&i = 0)]
Let px,y denote the probability of reaching state (s = 0,i = 0) from the state (s = x,i = y).
Then, for 0 ≤ m ≤ N −1, we can write the probability of reaching (s = 0,i = 0) from any
state with s + i = N + 1 as the sum of the probability of states with s + i = N.169
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Notice that, with the exception of the ﬁnal term, the denominators and numerators in
each of the products all cancel, hence,
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Finally, notice that the behaviour of the initial state (i.e. when m = N) is actually
somewhat diﬀerent from the other states since removing an infective results in a transition
into the state (s = N − 1,i = 0), and note that pN−1,0 = 0 for any N. Therefore we need
to resolve this case separately as follows:
pN,1 =
N
N + 1
.pN−1,2
≥
N
N + 1
.
N + 1
N
.
1
2
=
1
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Therefore, by induction,
∀N ≥ 3,∀r = (s,i) s.t. s + i = N SN,r |= P≥1/2[♦(s = 0&i = 0)].
Since, for s = N − 1,i = 1, s + i = N,
∀N ≥ 3, SN |= P≥1/2[♦(s = 0&i = 0)]
Property P3
Notice that the set of states satisﬁed by (i > s) is not a subset of S2 as for Property P2.
Nonetheless our proof follows similar lines to that for Property P2.
Theorem 7.5.3. For N ≥ 2,SN |= P≥1/2[♦(i > s)].
Proof. By induction on N.
Base Case:
For N = 2, we have veriﬁed by model checking in PRISM that,
∀r = (s,i) s.t. s + i = 3, S3,r |= P≥1/2[♦(i > s)].
Induction Step:
For N ≥ 2 assume that
∀r = (s,i) s.t. s + i = N, SN,r |= P≥1/2[♦(i > s)]
Let px,y denote the probability of reaching state (s = 0,i = 0) from the state (s = x,i = y).
Note that for s + i = N + 1, ps,i = 1 if i > s. In particular, this is true if s is less than or
equal to (N + 1)/2 for N odd and less than or equal to N/2 for N even.171
If N is odd then we have that, for (N + 1)/2 ≤ m < N,
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Thus,
pm,N−m+1 ≥
1
2
⇐⇒
(N + 3)/2 + m
m + 1
≥ 1
⇐⇒ N + 3 ≥ 2
⇐⇒ N ≥ −1
We have that N ≥ 2 and thus pm,N−m+1 ≥ 1
2.
Finally, notice that the behaviour of the initial state (i.e. when m = N) is actually
somewhat diﬀerent from the other states since removing an infective results in a transition
into the state (s = N − 1,i = 0), and note that pN−1,0 = 0 for any N. Therefore we need
to resolve this case separately as follows:
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Since N ≥ 2, pN,1 ≥ 1
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Similarly, if N is even, for N/2 ≤ m < N,
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Thus,
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Then, for the initial state,
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Therefore, by induction,
∀N ≥ 3,∀r = (s,i) s.t. s + i = N SN,r |= P≥1/2[♦(i > s)].
Since, for s = N − 1,i = 1, s + i = N,
∀N ≥ 3, SN |= P≥1/2[♦(i > s)]
7.6 Discussion
A ‘Continuum’ of Degenerative Systems The distinction between degenerative and
semi-degenerative families of models is not absolute and indeed depends on the property
considered. For example, if we were to verify the property “with probability 1 eventually
the number of infectives equals zero” then we could consider the SIR protocol as proba-
bilistically degenerative since every model converges to the base system model (any system
model for which the number of infectives equals zero) with probability 1. However, other
system and property combinations may not conform to any of the degenerative deﬁnitions
outlined in this thesis.175
Convergent Properties In Section 6.3 we discussed the work of Duﬂot et al. [27,28]
and its relation to our work on degenerative systems. In the case of the SIR protocol
population models, it would appear that this work is again applicable. In particular, we
could deﬁne a measure on the states of the model based on the number of infectives and
then employ the usual ordering on the natural numbers. It should be apparent that the
measure is non-increasing and therefore, we can establish certain qualitative properties of
the protocol. Again, however, we cannot consider quantitative properties such as Property
P2 described above.
Inﬁnite-state Models of Probabilistic Systems It should be obvious that, rather
than considering the models derived from our PRISM speciﬁcation of the population ver-
sion of the SIR protocol as a family, we could instead deﬁne them in terms of a single
inﬁnite-state model. In [43], the authors describe a sound but incomplete algorithm for
determining the maximum probability of a reachability property holding in a inﬁnite state
MDPs. The method relies on establishing symbolic transition types. Since each model in
the family of SIR protocol models has a transition distribution over states that does not
correspond to a transition distribution in the smaller models, it is unclear whether this
method would be applicable to our example.
Families of MDPs Probabilistic distributed systems with concurrently executing pro-
cesses are normally modelled using a Markov Decision Process and therefore, ideally, our
technique should be applicable to MDP models. In this chapter, on the other hand, we
employ DTMC models. However, when considering probabilistic reachability (i.e. the
probability of reaching a set of states in a MDP from some state) as we do in this chapter,
it is only necessary to analyse simple adversaries [13]. For any ﬁnite path of a MDP, a
simple adversary chooses a distribution based only on the last state of the path regard-
less of the states previously visited. Hence, the Markov chain associated with a simple
adversary can be considered as a ﬁnite state DTMC. We can therefore apply the results
obtained in this chapter to the DTMCs derived from simple adversaries. Thus, it should
be possible to extend our results to families of MDPs.176
Summary In this chapter we considered an approach for families of DTMC models that
‘converge’ to a base system model with probability less than 1 i.e. for which with some
non-zero probability it is possible to reach a ‘terminal’ state from which it is not possible
to reach a state of the base system model. We formally deﬁne these models by considering
a sub-chain relation that, intuitively, relates two models if one is ‘embedded’ in the other.
Any family of models for which, for all N, the model of a system of size N is a sub-
isomorphism of the model of a system of size N + 1 are described as semi-degenerative.
We illustrated that induction can be employed to prove properties of semi-degenerative
systems by considering a simple example of a gossip protocol, which we speciﬁed in PRISM.
We deﬁned two types of speciﬁcations, one at the individual level and one at the population
level. We veriﬁed certain properties of these for ﬁxed sizes of system using PRISM and
then tackled the parameterised model checking problem for the population speciﬁcation
using inductive reasoning.Chapter 8
Open Problems
Outline In this chapter we highlight the limitations of our techniques by providing
examples of systems for which our methods are not currently applicable and then suggest
ways in which we can overcome these limitations.
8.1 A Replicated Databases Gossip Protocol
In Chapter 7 we described a class of protocols commonly referred to as gossip protocols.
Here we consider one such protocol due to Demers et al. [25]. Demers et al. describe a
gossip protocol for maintaining updates within a replicated distributed database environ-
ment that is based on a variation of the SIR model. A network site must maintain a list
of ‘infective’ updates (updates to the database which it has made and wishes to spread to
other sites). Any site with a non-empty list of updates chooses another site uniformly at
random and transmits the list of updates. If that site is susceptible with respect to any
of the updates, i.e. it has not yet received the update, it will make that update and add
it to its infective list. If, however, the site has already received some update on the list,
then the infecting site will, with some ﬁxed probability, remove the item from its list.
We have developed a PRISM ‘population’ speciﬁcation to model the rumour mongering
replicated databases protocol (RDP) of Demers et al. The speciﬁcation is very similar
to that given for the SIR protocol in Appendix H except that it is for a MDP and the
probabilities associated with the updates are diﬀerent.
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Figure 8.1: DTMCs for the replicated databases gossip protocol for 2,3,4 and 5 sites
Figure 8.1 shows the MDP models that would be generated from our PRISM population
speciﬁcation, for two, three, four and ﬁve sites and k = 1. Each state is labelled with
two values. The ﬁrst of these denotes the number of susceptible sites (that haven’t yet
received the update), and the second the number of infective sites (that have received the
update and are still passing it on). Note that there is only one non-deterministic choice
from each state and therefore we omit the dashed transition lines from the diagram. We
emphasise at this point that the probabilities associated with the transitions in the model
are dependent on N, the number of sites.
Consider the parameterised model checking problem for the RDP. We observe that, once a
site becomes removed, it no longer actively participates in the protocol. It would appear,
therefore, that the RDP is degenerative. However, on closer inspection, we realise that,
once a site becomes removed, it is still possible for other infective sites to send messages to
that site, whereby the infective site may then itself become removed. Therefore, a removed
site will maintain a passive role in the protocol.
The degenerative behaviour of the protocol can be seen structurally in the underlying
Markov chain (see Figure 8.1). It should be apparent that, ignoring the probabilities, the
smaller models are, structurally speaking, almost subgraphs of the larger ones (with the
exception of an additional transition from the state (N −1,1) to the state (N −1,0) in the
larger model). However, unlike the SIR protocol, the transition probabilities change as N179
changes. This is because the probabilities are dependent on N, the number of sites, which
is in turn related to the fact that a removed site still passively participates in the protocol.
In particular, notice that the ‘downward’ transition probabilities in the corresponding
subgraph decrease as N increases, while the ‘horizontal’ transition probabilities increase
with N. This means that the model MN is not embedded in MN+1 and therefore the
family of models associated with the population speciﬁcation of the RDP cannot be semi-
degenerative. This also makes it diﬃcult to devise an invariant for the protocol in the
manner of Chapter 4.
Veriﬁcation of qualitative properties is independent of the actual probabilities in a model
and therefore it may be appropriate to consider properties such as these, but note that the
terminating behaviour of the protocol precludes proving properties which ‘converge’ to the
base system since these inherently will hold with probability between 0 and 1. Nonetheless
it may be possible to prove a property such as “with probability 1 eventually the number
of infectives is zero” since this holds in every terminal state of the model.
This example illustrates well two of the limitations of the techniques described for de-
generative systems in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Namely, we require the behaviour of any
degenerative system once it has ‘degenerated’ to exactly match that of a ‘smaller’ system
and the behaviour of the system to be independent of the size of the system. In the case of
the RDP, the transition probabilities are dependent on the size of the system and therefore
the behaviour of a ‘degenerated’ system is diﬀerent from that of any ‘smaller’ system.
8.2 A Weak Shared Coin Protocol
In Section 1.4 we discussed the weak shared coin protocol of Aspnes and Herlihy [6]. This
protocol is used to return the result of a set of coin ﬂips by a set of concurrently executing
processes such that there is some bound on the probability of every process ﬂipping heads
(or tails). The protocol operates by employing a shared counter that each process can
read from and write to. The size of the counter is determined by the number of processes,
N and an independent parameter K > 1. Each process will ﬂip a coin, choosing heads or
tails with equal probability. If a process chooses heads then it will increment the counter
and if it chooses tails it will decrement the counter. It will then read the counter and if
the value lies between some upper and lower threshold values (determined by N and K)180
then it will ﬂip the coin again. If, on the other hand, the counter value is below the lower
threshold, the process will choose tails and terminate, and similarly if the counter value is
above the upper threshold it will choose heads and terminate.
Once a process has terminated, the protocol proceeds independently of that process. The
protocol therefore appears to exhibit degenerative behaviour. One of the diﬃculties in
formally establishing that the protocol is degenerative is due to the size of the counter,
which is dependent on N. However, if only the local state of each of the processes is con-
sidered (as was the case for the Itai Rodeh protocol in Chapter 6), it may still be possible
to prove that the protocol is degenerative. Note that the processes degenerate probabilis-
tically rather than deterministically and therefore we would need to establish that the
protocol was probabilistically (rather deterministically) degenerative. As an alternative,
it would be interesting to investigate whether the techniques described in Chapter 7 for
semi-degenerative systems could be extended to be applicable in this instance. This is
further work.
8.3 Determining the Size of a Ring
In Chapter 6 we considered the Itai Rodeh protocol for determining a leader in an anony-
mous ring. To ensure correct operation of the protocol it is necessary for each process in
the ring to know the size of the ring it is operating in. It has been shown that a leader
election protocol that terminates with probability 1 exists only if the size of the ring is
known to be within some bounds.
In some situations, this may not be known and must be determined. A randomised algo-
rithm has been devised that determines the correct size of the ring with probability 1 if it
is known that it lies in the bound −2N,...,2N [35]. We consider an alternative algorithm
that does not require any information about the size of the ring but that gives a guarantee
of correctness with probability arbitrarily close to 1 [35]. Each process participating in the
protocol chooses an id value of 0 or 1 with equal probability and then transmits this value
along with the a counter which contains the highest counter value it has seen so far. If
a process receives a message with id value equal to its own id then it updates its counter
depending on the counter value received and then transmits a new message. Each process
does this r times, where r is a constant parameter of the protocol.181
We have deﬁned PRISM speciﬁcations for the system described above based on the algo-
rithm given in [35]. Note that channels are assumed to be FIFO and of length two (this
is shown to be suﬃcient in [35]).
For this algorithm, for any size of ring N, in [35] it is proven that there is a lower bound of
2−Nr/2 for the probability of error in determining the ring size correctly (it is also shown
that the actual value is 2−(N−1)r, where N is prime).
Parameterised veriﬁcation of this protocol using the techniques described in the previous
chapters is diﬃcult. The complexity of the protocol inhibits the derivation of an invariant
in the manner of Chapter 4 and the protocol does not exhibit degenerative behaviour in
the manner prescribed in Chapters 5, 6 or 7. It would seem clear therefore that there are
systems for which it is not straightforward to apply any of our methods.
Summary In this chapter we have considered some open problems that remain to be
tackled. In particular, we considered three examples of systems that are not currently
accomodated by any of our techniques: a replicated databases gossip protocol, a proba-
bilistic protocol to determine the size of a ring and the weak shared coin protocol of Aspnes
and Herlihy. Each of these systems displayed properties that deemed our inductive and
abstraction techniques inapplicable. In some of these cases we provided suggestions for
extending our techniques such that they could be applied. In others it would appear that
new techniques are necessary.Chapter 9
Conclusions
Outline This chapter concludes the thesis, providing an overview of the work described
in the previous chapters.
9.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, model checking is a useful veriﬁcation technique for
the formal analysis of distributed systems. Model checking tools verify that properties
capturing the correct behaviour of some system are satisﬁed by a model of the system.
Properties are usually speciﬁed using a temporal logic (Section 2.3) and models as Kripke
structures (Section 2.2). Veriﬁcation is generally done by searching the state-space of
the model. However, the state-space of the model grows rapidly with the number of
components being modelled (the state-space explosion problem) and so model checking
tools must employ (a variety of) techniques to combat this problem.
In this thesis we have considered the veriﬁcation of randomised distributed systems. Prob-
abilistic model checking tools, such as PRISM (see Section 3.4), provide the means to
perform quantitative as well as qualitative analysis of systems. PRISM enables the veriﬁ-
cation of properties, speciﬁed in a probabilistic temporal logic, against probabilistic models
of a system, speciﬁed using PRISM. In particular, PRISM provides support for deﬁning
MDP models (described in Section 3.2.2) which display non-deterministic as well as prob-
abilistic behaviours and are therefore an appropriate model for randomised distributed
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systems. These are veriﬁed with respect to properties described in the PCTL temporal
logic (see Section 3.3).
One of the limitations of model checking of distributed systems is that it is only possible
to consider systems that have a ﬁxed number of components. The problem of verifying
a distributed system for an arbitrary number of components, the parameterised model
checking problem, was introduced in Chapter 1 along with a summary of some of the work
that has been undertaken on tackling the problem. A considerable body of work exists
on tackling the PMCP for non-probabilistic systems but the problem has not been widely
considered for probabilistic systems. The PMCP is undecidable, implying that, in order
to solve it, it is necessary to either consider methods that are sound but incomplete or
consider classes of distributed systems for which the problem is decidable.
9.2 Network Invariants and Abstraction
In Chapter 4 we tackled the PMCP for a token ring protocol by constructing a network
invariant using an approach based on data abstraction, employed previously for a number
of non-probabilistic systems. We speciﬁed models of the protocol, and the invariant, using
Promela and established that any properties that hold for the invariant are true for any
model of the protocol for an arbitrary sized ring. Using model checking we proved that
certain properties were satisﬁed by the invariant. Furthermore, we constructed an invariant
for probabilistic models of the token ring protocol speciﬁed using PRISM. By adapting the
proof for the non-probabilistic case, we established that certain properties that were true
of the invariant were also true of every model of the protocol. Since a network invariant
does not always exist [62], this approach is sound but incomplete.
We constructed our proof for the token ring protocol manually. It would be interesting to
establish whether we could automate the proof, for example by extending an automatic
invariant technique of [39] to the probabilistic domain. Furthermore, it would be conve-
nient to deﬁne an abstract speciﬁcation from any given concrete speciﬁcation, using a set
of generic restrictions to guide the construction. If suitable restrictions were used then
the abstract speciﬁcation would be guaranteed to be a valid abstraction of the concrete
speciﬁcation. Hence, an extension of this work is to analyse the use of abstraction, in
order to determine whether such restrictions exist and if so, what they are.184
9.3 Degenerative Systems
In Chapters 5 and 6 we solved the PMCP by considering a restriction on the types of
systems that we analyse. Speciﬁcally, we provided a technique for reasoning about a
class of parameterised probabilistic systems described as degenerative. We distinguished
between deterministically and probabilistically degenerative families of MDP models for a
system. Under a particular scheduler a deterministically degenerative system model will
degenerate to some system model with probability 1. For a probabilistically degenerative
system on the other hand, under some scheduler the system model will degenerate to some
set of system models with probability 1.
We presented inductive proof schemas for reasoning about these two classes of systems,
generalising an inductive proof that was introduced for a non-probabilistic parameterised
distributed system [49]. The proof schema provides a method for establishing that any
property that holds of a model of a system with some base topology will hold for a model
of any system size and conﬁguration. The technique relies on showing that any behaviour
in a model of the system of a given size is (observationally) ‘equivalent’ to a behaviour in
a model of a smaller system.
We employed two case studies to demonstrate our method. In Chapter 5 we considered
a family of models of the IEEE 1394 Firewire tree identify protocol [33] and provided an
inductive proof over the system topology (trees) to show that a certain class of probabilistic
temporal logic properties that are satisﬁed by a model of a system with a star topology
are satisﬁed by a model of a system with any acyclic topology. In Chapter 6 we considered
the Itai Rodeh leader election protocol for rings and proved a similar result, over the set
of rings.
In Chapter 7 we considered an extension to degenerative systems, by deﬁning a semi-
degenerative family of models of a system. Models of this type degenerate but may also
terminate before reaching a model of a smaller system. We gave an example of a simple
gossip protocol, showing that the family of models is semi-degenerative. We then exploited
the semi-degenerative property and employed induction to prove properties of the protocol
for an arbitrary number of network sites.185
9.4 Open Problems
Finally, in Chapter 8 we described three examples of parameterised randomised distributed
systems for which none of the approaches described above were applicable. Future work
is to extend our techniques to deal with these examples.
Summary We have provided a summary of the work described in the thesis, outlining
the approaches we have considered for tackling the parameterised model checking problem.Bibliography
[1] PRISM home page. http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/.
[2] R. Alur and T. A. Henzinger. Reactive modules. Formal Methods in System Design,
15(1), 1999.
[3] D. Angluin. Local and global properties in networks of processors (extended ab-
stract). In Proceedings of the Twelfth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Com-
puting (STOC’80), pages 82–93. ACM Press, 1980.
[4] K. R. Apt and D. C. Kozen. Limits for automatic veriﬁcation of ﬁnite-state concurrent
systems. Information Processing Letters, 22:307–309, 1986.
[5] T. Arons, A. Pnueli, and L. D. Zuck. Parameterized veriﬁcation by probabilistic
abstraction. In Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Foundations
of Software Science and Computational Structures (FoSSaCS’03)., volume 2620 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 87–102. Springer, 2003.
[6] J. Aspnes and M. Herlihy. Fast randomized consensus using shared memory. Journal
of Algorithms, 11(3):441–461, 1990.
[7] C. Baier, F. Ciesinski, and M. Groesser. Quantitative analysis of distributed ran-
domized protocols. In Proceedings of the Tenth International Workshop on Formal
Methods for Industrial Critical Systems (FMICS’05), pages 2–7. ACM Press, 2005.
[8] C. Baier, M. Groser, and F. Ciesinski. Partial order reduction for probabilistic sys-
tems. In Proceedings of the First International Conference on The Quantitative Eval-
uation of Systems (QEST’04), pages 230–239. IEEE Computer Society, 2004.
[9] C. Baier, H. Hermanns, J.-P. Katoen, and V. Wolf. Comparative branching-time
semantics for Markov chains. Information and Computation, 200:149–214, 2005.
186187
[10] C. Baier and M. Kwaitkowska. Model checking for a probabilistic branching time
logic with fairness. Distributed Computing, 11(3):125–155, 1998.
[11] N.T.J. Bailey. The Mathematical Theory of Infectious Diseases and its Applications.
Griﬃn, London, second edition, 1975.
[12] I. Balaban, A. Pnueli, and L. D. Zuck. Invisible safety of distributed protocols. In
Proceeding of the 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Pro-
gramming (ICALP’06), Part II, volume 4052 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 528–539. Springer, 2006.
[13] A. Bianco and L. de Alfaro. Model checking of probabalistic and nondeterministic
systems. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth Conference on Foundations of Software Tech-
nology and Theoretical Computer Science (FST TCS’95), pages 499–513. Springer-
Verlag, 1995.
[14] P. Billingsley. Probability & Measure. Springer-Verlag, New York, ﬁrst edition, 1979.
[15] J.A. Bondy and U.S.R. Murty. Graph Theory with Applications. Macmillan Press,
London and Basingstoke, 1978.
[16] M. Calder and A. Miller. Using SPIN to analyse the tree identiﬁcation phase of
the IEEE 1394 high performance serial bus (FireWire) protocol. In Maharaj and
Shankland [46], pages 247–266.
[17] M. Calder and A. Miller. Detecting feature interactions: how many components do
we need? In Objects, agents and features, Lecture Notes in Computing Science, pages
45–66. Springer-Verlag, 2004.
[18] E. M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and D. Peled. Model Checking. The MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, Masachusetts, 1999.
[19] E.M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and S. Jha. Verifying parameterized networks using ab-
straction and regular languages. In Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference
on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR ‘95), volume 962 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 395–407. Springer-Verlag, August 1995.
[20] E.M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and D Long. Model checking and abstraction. In Confer-
ence Record of the Nineteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages (POPL ‘92), pages 343–354. ACM Press, January 1992.188
[21] P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation: a uniﬁed lattice model for static
analysis of programs by construction or approximation of ﬁxpoints. In Conference
Record of the Fourth Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of
Programming Languages, pages 238–252. ACM Press, 1977.
[22] S. J. Creese and A. W. Roscoe. Verifying an inﬁnite family of inductions simulta-
neously using data independence and FDR. In Proceedings of Formal Techniques
for Networked and Distributed Systems (FORTE’99), volume 156 of IFIP Conference
Proceedings, pages 437–452. Kluwer, 1999.
[23] S.J. Creese and A.W. Roscoe. Data independent induction over structured networks.
In Proceedings of the International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Processing
Techniques and Applications (PDPTA’00), volume II. CSREA Press, 2000.
[24] P. D’Argenio, B. Jeannet, H.E. Jensen, and K.G. Larsen. Reduction and reﬁnement
strategies for probabilistic analysis. In Process Algebra and Probabilistic Methods
- Performance Modelling and Veriﬁcation (PAPM-PROBMIV’02), volume 2399 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Sciences, 2002.
[25] A. Demers, D. Greene, C. Hauser, W. Irish, J. Larson, S. Shenker, H. Sturgis,
D. Swinehart, and D. Terry. Epidemic algorithms for replicated database mainte-
nance. In Proceedings of the Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of dis-
tributed computing (PODC’87), pages 1–12. ACM Press, August 1987.
[26] A. Donaldson and A. Miller. Symmetry reduction for probabilistic model checking
using generic representatives. In Proceedings of the fourth International Symposium
on Automated Technology for Veriﬁcation and Analysis (ATVA’06), volume 4218 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 9–23. Springer, 2006.
[27] M. Duﬂot, L. Fribourg, and C. Picaronny. Randomized ﬁnite-state distributed algo-
rithms as Markov chains. In Distributed Algorithms, volume 2180 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 240–254, 2001.
[28] M. Duﬂot, L. Fribourg, and C. Picaronny. Randomized dining philosophers without
fairness assumption. Distributed Computing, 17(1):65–76, 2004.189
[29] E. A. Emerson and K. S. Namjoshi. Reasoning about rings. In Conference Record of
the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL
‘95), pages 85–94. ACM Press, 1995.
[30] W. Fokkink and J. Pang. Variations on Itai-Rodeh leader election for anonymous rings
and their analysis in PRISM. Journal of Universal Computer Science, 12(8):981–1006,
2006.
[31] D. Graham, M. Calder, and A. Miller. An inductive technique for parameterised
model checking of degenerative distributed randomised protocols. In Proceedings of
the Seventh International Workshop on Automated Veriﬁcation of Critical Systems
(AVoCS’07), Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier ScienceDi-
rect, 2007. To appear.
[32] G. J. Holzmann. The SPIN model checker: primer and reference manual. Addison
Wesley, Boston, 2003.
[33] IEEE 1394-1995. IEEE Standard for a High Performance Serial Bus Std 1394-1995.
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, August 1995.
[34] A. Israeli and M. Jalfon. Token management schemes and random walks yield self-
stabilizing mutual exclusion. In Proceedings of the ninth annual ACM symposium on
Principles of distributed computing (PODC’90), pages 119–131. ACM Press, 1990.
[35] A. Itai and M. Rodeh. Symmetry breaking in distributed networks. Information and
Computation, 88(1):60–87, 1990.
[36] B. Jeannet, P. R. D’Argenio, and K. G. Larsen. RAPTURE: A tool for verifying
Markov Decision Processes. In Tools Day, International Conference on Concurrency
Theory, (CONCUR’02), 2002. Technical Report, Faculty of Informatics at Masaryk
University Brno.
[37] J. G. Kemeny, J. L. Snell, and A. W. Knapp. Denumerable Markov Chains, volume 40
of Graduate Texts in Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, New York, second edition, 1976.
[38] Y. Kesten and A. Pnueli. Control and data abstraction: The cornerstones of practical
formal veriﬁcation. International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer
(STTT), 2(4):328–342, 2000.190
[39] Y. Kesten, A. Pnueli, E. Shahar, and L. D. Zuck. Network invariants in action.
In Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Concurrency Theory
(CONCUR ’02), pages 101–115. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[40] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, and D. Parker. Probabilistic symbolic model check-
ing with PRISM: A hybrid approach. International Journal on Software Tools for
Technology Transfer (STTT), 6(2):128–142, 2004.
[41] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, and D. Parker. Game-based abstraction for Markov
Decision Processes. In Proceedings of the Third international conference on the Quan-
titative Evaluation of Systems (QEST’06), pages 157–166. IEEE Computer Society,
2006.
[42] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, and D. Parker. Symmetry reduction for probabilis-
tic model checking. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on
Computer Aided Veriﬁcation (CAV’06), volume 4114 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 234–248. Springer-Verlag, 2006.
[43] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, and J. Sproston. Symbolic computation of maximal
probabilistic reachability. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference
on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR’01), volume 2154 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 169–183. Springer, 2001.
[44] L. Lamport. What good is temporal logic? Information Processing, 83:657–668, 1983.
[45] R. Lazic and B. Roscoe. Data independence with generalised predicate symbols. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Processing
Techniques and Applications (PDPTA’99), pages 319–326. CSREA Press, 1999.
[46] J. Maharaj, S. Romijn and C. Shankland, editors. Formal Aspects of Computing: Spe-
cial issue on IEEE 1394 Tree Identiﬁcation Protocol, volume 14(3). Springer-Verlag,
2003.
[47] K.L. McMillan. Getting started with SMV. http://www.cis.ksu.edu/santos
/smv-doc/tutorial/tutorial.html.
[48] S. Merz. Model checking: A tutorial overview. In Proceedings of the Fourth Summer
School on Modeling and Veriﬁcation of Parallel Processes (MOVEP’00), volume 2067
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 3–38. Springer, 2000.191
[49] A. Miller and M. Calder. Two veriﬁcation results for networks of arbitrary size. Tech-
nical Report TR2006-220, University of Glasgow,Department of Computing Science,
2006.
[50] G. Norman. Analyzing randomized distributed algorithms. In Validation of Stochastic
Systems: A Guide to Current Research, volume 2925 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (Tutorial Volume), pages 384–418. Springer, 2004.
[51] S. Owre, N. Shankar, and J. Rushby. PVS: A prototype veriﬁcation system. In
Automated Deduction - Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Au-
tomated Deduction (CADE’92), volume 607 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 748–752. Springer-Verlag, June 1992.
[52] A. Pnueli and E. Shahar. Liveness and acceleration in parameterized veriﬁcation. In
Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Computer Aided Veriﬁcation
(CAV’00), pages 328–343. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[53] A. Pnueli, J. Xu, and L. D. Zuck. Liveness with (0, 1, ∞)-counter abstraction.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer Aided Veriﬁcation
(CAV’02), pages 107–122. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[54] M. L. Puterman. Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Program-
ming. John Wiley and Sons, New York, ﬁrst edition, 1994.
[55] J.J.M.M Rutten, M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, and D. Parker. Mathematical Tech-
niques for Analyzing Concurrent and Probabilistic Systems, volume 23 of CRM Mono-
graph Series. American Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island, 2004.
[56] R. Segala. Modeling and Veriﬁcation of Randomized Distributed Real-Time Systems.
PhD thesis, MIT, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 1995.
[57] R. Segala. Veriﬁcation of randomized distributed algorithms. Lectures on formal
methods and performance analysis: ﬁrst EEF/Euro summer school on trends in com-
puter science, 2090:232–260, 2001.
[58] R. Segala and N.A. Lynch. Probabilistic simulations for probabilistic processes. Nordic
Journal of Computing, 2(2):250–273, 1995.192
[59] J. Song and O.W.W. Yang. Rotation counter protocol - a token-ring protocol for
integrated services. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth Conference on Local Computer
Networks (LCN’93), pages 474–481, 1993.
[60] M. Stoelinga. Fun with ﬁrewire: A comparative study of formal veriﬁcation methods
applied to the IEEE 1394 root contention protocol. Formal Aspects of Computing,
14(3):328–337, 2003.
[61] Moshe Y. Vardi. Automatic veriﬁcation of probabilistic concurrent ﬁnite-state pro-
grams. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science (FoCS’85), pages 327–338. IEEE, 1985.
[62] P. Wolper and V. Lovinfosse. Verifying properties of large sets of processes with
network invariants. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Automatic Veri-
ﬁcation Methods for Finite State Systems (AVMFSS’90), volume 407 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 68–80. Springer-Verlag, 1990.Appendix A
Promela Speciﬁcation for Counter
Token Ring Protocol
/**************************************************************
*
* COUNTER TOKEN RING PROTOCOL (CONCRETE VERSION)
*
* Several processes pass a token counter between them.
* When work is true, token counter is decremented
* When work is reset the protocol recommences.
*
**************************************************************/
#define N 4 //no of processes
#define c 5 //initial value of counter
//define channels for token to be passed on (ch[1] = process 0
//to process 1, ch[3] = process 2 to process 3 etc..)
chan ch[N] = [1] of {int};
bool work=false; // whether process should work
bool done=false; // once work is false, can’t be reset until !done
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// and once work is true, can’t be set false until done
bool end=false; // when the token=0 this is set to true
int finished=0; // add 1 to finished when token decremented
//(only used for verifying properties)
/*****************************************************************
* Arbiter process
*/
proctype arbiter()
{
change:
if
:: atomic{(done && work)-> work=false; goto change;} // 7.
:: atomic{(!done && !work)-> work=true; goto change;} // 8.
fi;
}//arbiter
/****************************************************************/
proctype process(chan in,out;int id)
{
int token=0; // stores counter value
bool possess=false;// set possess to true when token is received,
// (only used for verifying properties)
bool working=false;// set working to true when process does work
// set back to true once done to pass token (for verification)
idle:
do
::atomic{full(in)->in?token; possess=true;} // 1. accept token195
rcvd: if
::atomic{!work && empty(out) -> // 2. pass token
out!token;
possess=false;}
::atomic{work && token>1 && empty(out)->//3.decrement token
working=true;
token--;
done=true;
fi;}
pass: atomic{!work && empty(out) -> // 4. pass token
out!token;
possess=false;
done=false;
working=false;}
::atomic{work && token==1 -> // 5. finished
working=true;
token--;
finished++; end = true; goto finish;
fi;
od;
finish:
goto finish; // 6. finished so loop
}//process
/*************************************************************/
init{
atomic{ // 0. initialise protocol
run process(ch[0],ch[1],0);
run process(ch[1],ch[2],1);
run process(ch[2],ch[3],2);
run process(ch[3],ch[0],3);
run arbiter();196
ch[0]!c; // always start with process 0
}
}//init
/************************************************************/Appendix B
Promela Invariant Speciﬁcation
for Counter Token Ring Protocol
/**************************************************************
*
* COUNTER TOKEN RING PROTOCOL (INVARIANT VERSION)
*
* Several processes pass a counter token between them.
* When the arbiter process decides, the counter is decremented
* and the protocol then recommences.
* Protocol finishes when process has token that
* equals zero.
*
*
**************************************************************/
#define m 3 //no of concrete processs+1
#define c 5 //initial value of counter
// channels for token to be passed on (ch[0] = process N to process 0,
// ch[1] = process 0 to process 1, ch[2] = process 1 to process 2 etc.)
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chan ch[m] = [1] of {int};
bool work=false; // whether process should work
bool done=false; // once work is false, can’t be reset until !done
// and once work is true it can’t be set false until done
bool end=false; // when the token=0 this is set to true
int finished=0; // add 1 to finished when token decremented
//(only used for verifying properties)
/****************************************************************
* Arbiter process
*/
proctype arbiter()
{
change:
if
:: atomic{(done && work)-> work=false; goto change;} // 7.
:: atomic{(!done && !work)-> work=true; goto change;} // 8.
fi;
}//arbiter
/****************************************************************/
proctype process(chan in,out;int id)
{
int token=0; // stores counter value
bool possess=false;// set possess to true when token is received,
// (only used for verifying properties)
bool working=false;// set working to true when process does work
// set back to true once done to pass token (for verification)
idle:199
do
::atomic{full(in)->in?token; possess=true;} // 1. accept token
rcvd: if
::atomic{!work && empty(out) -> // 2. pass token
out!token;
possess=false;}
::atomic{work && token>1 && empty(out)->//3.decrement token
working=true;
token--;
done=true;
fi;}
pass: atomic{!work && empty(out) -> // 4. pass token
out!token;
possess=false;
done=false;
working=false;}
::atomic{work && token==1 -> // 5. finish
working=true;
token--;
finished++; end = true; goto finish;
fi;
od;
finish:
goto finish; // 6. finished so loop
}//process
/************************************************************/
proctype abstract_process(chan in,out;int id)
{
int token=0; // abstract token counter200
idle:
do
::atomic{full(in)->in?token;} // 1. accept token
rcvd: if
::atomic{!work && empty(out) ->// 2.(a) pass token
out!token;}
::atomic{!work && empty(in) -> // 2.(b) keep token
in!token;}
::atomic{work && token>1 -> // 3. decrement counter
working=true;
token--;
done=true;}
if
pass: ::atomic{!work && empty(out) -> // 4.(a)
out!token; //pass token to neighbour
done=false;}
::atomic{!work && empty(in) -> // 4. (b)
in!token; //pass token back to self
done=false;}
fi;
::atomic{work && token==1 -> // 5. finish
token--;
finished++; end = true; goto finish;
fi;
od;
finish:
goto finish; // 6. finished so loop
}//abstract_process
/**************************************************************/
init{201
atomic{ // 0. initialise protocol
run process(ch[0],ch[1],0);
run process(ch[,ch[2],1);
run abstract_process(ch[2],ch[0],2);
run arbiter();
ch[0]!c;
}
}//init
/*************************************************************/Appendix C
PRISM Speciﬁcation for Counter
Token Ring Protocol
nondeterministic
const int c=5; // initial value of counter assumed to be at least 1
const int N=4; // number of processes
const int idle=0; const int rcvd=1;
const int pass=2; const int finish=3;
const int empty=0;
global ch0:[0..c] init c; global ch1:[0..c] init empty;
global ch2:[0..c] init empty; global ch3:[0..c] init empty;
global end : bool init false;
global finished : [0..N] init 0;
module process0
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possess0 : bool init false;
working0 : bool init false;
loc0 : [idle..finish] init idle;
token0 : [0..c] init 0;
// receive token
[] (loc0=idle & ch0!=empty) -> \\ 1.
1: (possess0’=true) & (ch0’=empty) & (loc0’=rcvd) & (token0’=ch0);
// randomly choose to work or just pass on token
// when decrementing counter, if it reaches zero, protocol terminates
// otherwise it is passed on
[] (loc0=rcvd & ch1=empty & token0=1) -> \\ 2.
0.5:(loc0’=finish)&(working0’=true)&(token0’=token0-1)
&(finished’=finished+1)&(end’=true)
+0.5: (loc0’=idle) & (possess0’=false) & (ch1’=token0) & (token0’=0);
[] (loc0=rcvd & ch1=empty & token0>1) -> \\ 3.
0.5: (working0’=1) & (token0’=token0-1) & (loc0’=pass)
+0.5: (loc0’=idle) & (possess0’=false) & (ch1’=token0) & (token0’=0);
// pass on token having decremented token counter
[] (loc0=pass & ch1=empty) -> \\ 4.
1:(loc0’=idle)&(ch1’=token0)&(possess0’=false)
&(working0’=false)&(token0’=0);
// counter has reached zero so process can finish
[] (loc0=finish) -> (loc0’=loc0); \\ 5.
endmodule
module process1=process0[loc0=loc1, token0=token1,
possess0=possess1, working0=working1, ch0=ch1, ch1=ch2] endmodule204
module process2=process0[loc0=loc2, token0=token2,
possess0=possess2, working0=working2, ch0=ch2, ch1=ch3] endmodule
module process3=process0[loc0=loc3, token0=token3,
possess0=possess3, working0=working3, ch0=ch3, ch1=ch0] endmoduleAppendix D
PRISM Invariant Speciﬁcation for
Counter Token Ring Protocol
nondeterministic
const int c=5; // initial value of counter, assumed to be at least 1
const int N=4; // number of processes
const int idle=0; const int rcvd=1;
const int pass=2; const int finish=3;
const int empty=0;
global ch0:[0..c] init c; global ch1:[0..c] init empty;
global ch2:[0..c] init empty;
global end : bool init false;
global finished : [0..N] init 0;
module process0
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possess0 : bool init false;
working0 : bool init false;
loc0 : [idle..finish] init idle;
token0 : [0..c] init 0;
// receive token
[] (loc0=idle & ch0!=empty) -> \\ 1.
1: (possess0’=true) & (ch0’=empty) & (loc0’=rcvd) & (token0’=ch0);
// randomly choose to work or just pass on token
// when decrementing counter if it reaches zero protocol terminates
// otherwise it is passed on
[] (loc0=rcvd & ch1=empty & token0=1) -> \\ 2.
0.5:(loc0’=finish)&(working0’=true)&(token0’=token0-1)
&(finished’=finished+1)&(end’=true)
+0.5: (loc0’=idle) & (possess0’=false) & (ch1’=token0) & (token0’=0);
[] (loc0=rcvd & ch1=empty & token0>1) -> \\ 3.
0.5: (working0’=true) & (token0’=token0-1) & (loc0’=pass)
+0.5: (loc0’=idle) & (possess0’=false) & (ch1’=token0) & (token0’=0);
// pass on token having decremented token counter
[] (loc0=pass & ch1=empty) -> \\ 4.
1:(loc0’=idle)&(ch1’=token0)&(possess0’=false)
&(working0’=false)&(token0’=0);
// counter has reached zero so process is finished
[] (loc0=finish) -> (loc0’=loc0); \\ 5.
endmodule
module process1=process0[loc0=loc1, token0=token1,
possess0=possess1, working0=working1, ch0=ch1, ch1=ch2] endmodule207
module abstract_process2
loc2 : [idle..finish] init idle;
token2 : [0..c] init 0;
// receive token
[] (loc2=idle & ch2!=empty) -> \\ 1.
1: (loc2’=rcvd) & (ch2’=empty) & (token2’=ch2);
// randomly choose to work or just pass on token
// when decrementing token, if it is zero protocol terminates
[] (loc2=rcvd & ch1=empty & token2=1) -> \\ 2.1
0.5: (loc2’=finish)&(token2’=token2-1)
&(finished’=finished+1)&(end’=true)
+0.5: (loc2’=idle) & (ch1’=token2) & (token2’=0);
[] (loc2=rcvd & ch1=empty & token2>1) -> \\ 3.1
0.5: (token2’=token2-1) & (loc2’=pass)
+0.5: (loc2’=idle) & (ch1’=token2) & (token2’=0);
// abstract process can non-deterministically choose
// to keep token by sending on abstract channel
[] (loc2=rcvd & ch2=empty & token2=1) -> \\ 2.2
0.5: (loc2’=finish)&(token2’=token2-1)
&(finished’=finished+1)&(end’=true)
+0.5: (loc2’=idle) & (ch2’=token2) & (token2’=0);
[] (loc2=rcvd & ch2=empty & token2>1) -> \\ 3.2
0.5: (token2’=token2-1) & (loc2’=pass)
+0.5: (loc2’=idle) & (ch2’=token2) & (token2’=0);
// pass on token having decremented token counter
// (abstract process can choose to pass to itself)208
[] (loc2=pass & ch1=empty) -> \\ 4.1
1: (loc2’=idle) & (ch1’=token2) & (token2’=0);
[] (loc2=pass & ch2=empty) -> \\ 4.2
1: (loc2’=idle) & (ch2’=token2) & (token2’=0);
// counter has reached zero and process is finished
[] (loc2=finish) -> (loc2’=finish); \\ 5.
endmoduleAppendix E
PRISM Speciﬁcation for TIP
nondeterministic
const int start=0;
const int child_handshake=1;
const int parent_handshake=2;
const int handshakes_complete=3;
const int response=4;
const int contention=5;
const int winner=6;
const int loser=7;
const int become_child=8;
const int finish=9;
const int empty=0;
const int be_my_parent=1;
const int be_my_child=2;
const int ack=3;
global elected : [0..N] init 0;
const int N=3;
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const int v0=1;
const int v1=2;
const int v2=1;
const int nodeid0=1;
const int nodeid1=2;
const int nodeid2=3;
global toss0 : [0..2] init 0;
global toss1 : [0..2] init 0;
global toss2 : [0..2] init 0;
global zeroone : [empty..ack] init empty;
global onezero : [empty..ack] init empty;
global onetwo : [empty..ack] init empty;
global twoone : [empty..ack] init empty;
module node0
position0 : [start..finish] init start;
child0_0 : [0..N] init 0;
child0_1 : [0..N] init 0;
child0_2 : [0..N] init 0;
adj0 : [0..v0] init v0;
remaining_partner0 : [0..N] init 0;
no_of_requests0 : [0..N] init 0;
[] (position0=start & onezero=be_my_parent) ->
(position0’=child_handshake) & (no_of_requests0’=1)
& (onezero’=empty) & (child0_0’=nodeid1); // 1.
[] (position0=start & onezero=empty) ->
(position0’=child_handshake) & (no_of_requests0’=0)
& (remaining_partner0’=nodeid1); // 4.
[] (position0=child_handshake & adj0=v0211
& remaining_partner0=0 & zeroone=empty) ->
(position0’=parent_handshake) & (zeroone’=be_my_child); // 2.
[] (position0=child_handshake & adj0=v0 &
remaining_partner0=nodeid1 & zeroone=empty) ->
(position0’=parent_handshake) & (zeroone’=be_my_parent); // 5.
[] (position0=child_handshake & adj0=1 & no_of_requests0=1
& child0_0=nodeid1 & zeroone=empty) ->
(position0’=parent_handshake) & (zeroone’=be_my_child); // 16.
[] (position0=parent_handshake & adj0=v0 & remaining_partner0=0
& onezero=ack) ->
(position0’=finish) & (no_of_requests0’=0) & (elected’=nodeid0) &
(adj0’=0)& (child0_0’=0)& (child0_1’=0)& (child0_2’=0) & (onezero’=empty); // 3.
[] (position0=parent_handshake & adj0=v0 & remaining_partner0=nodeid1) ->
(position0’=handshakes_complete); // 6.
[] (position0=parent_handshake & adj0=1 & no_of_requests0=1
& child0_0=nodeid1 & onezero=ack) ->
(position0’=finish) & (onezero’=empty) & (elected’=nodeid0)
& (no_of_requests0’=0) & (child0_0’=0) & (adj0’=0); // 17.
[] (position0=handshakes_complete & no_of_requests0=adj0-1)
-> (position0’=response); // 7.
[] (position0=response & remaining_partner0=nodeid1
& onezero=be_my_child) ->
(position0’=become_child) & (remaining_partner0’=0)
& (onezero’=empty); // 8.
[] (position0=response & remaining_partner0=nodeid1
& onezero=be_my_parent) ->
(position0’=contention) & (onezero’=empty); // 10.212
// contention (probabilistic choice always
// made by nodeid with smallest id)
[] (nodeid0<nodeid1 & position0=contention
& remaining_partner0=nodeid1 & toss0=0) ->
0.25 : (position0’=winner) & (toss0’=1)
+ 0.25 : (position0’=loser) & (toss0’=2)
+ 0.5 : (toss0’=0); // 11.
[] (nodeid0>nodeid1 & position0=contention
& remaining_partner0=nodeid1 & toss1=1) ->
(position0’=loser) & (toss1’=0); // 13.
[] (nodeid0>nodeid1 & position0=contention
& remaining_partner0=nodeid1 & toss1=2) ->
(position0’=winner) & (toss1’=0); // 12.
// winner
[] (position0=winner & remaining_partner0=nodeid1 & zeroone=empty) ->
(zeroone’=be_my_parent) & (position0’=response); // 14.
// loser
[] (position0=loser & remaining_partner0=nodeid1 & onezero=be_my_parent) ->
(onezero’=empty) & (position0’=child_handshake) & (adj0’=1)
& (remaining_partner0’=0) & (no_of_requests0’=1) & (child0_0’=nodeid1)
& (child0_1’=0) & (child0_2’=0); // 15.
[] (position0=become_child & zeroone=empty) ->
(position0’=finish) & (zeroone’=ack) & (no_of_requests0’=0)
& (remaining_partner0’=0) & (adj0’=0) & (child0_0’=0)
& (child0_1’=0) & (child0_2’=0); // 9.
[] (position0=finish& position1=finish& position2=finish) ->
(position0’=finish);
endmodule213
module node1
position1 : [start..finish] init start;
child1_0 : [0..N] init 0;
child1_1 : [0..N] init 0;
child1_2 : [0..N] init 0;
adj1 : [0..v1] init v1;
remaining_partner1 : [0..N] init 0;
no_of_requests1 : [0..N] init 0;
[] (position1=start & zeroone=be_my_parent & twoone=be_my_parent) ->
(position1’=child_handshake) & (no_of_requests1’=2)
& (zeroone’=empty) & (twoone’=empty) & (child1_0’=nodeid0)
& (child1_1’=nodeid2); // 1.
[] (position1=start & zeroone=empty & twoone=be_my_parent) ->
(position1’=child_handshake) & (no_of_requests1’=1)
& (remaining_partner1’=nodeid0) & (twoone’=empty)
& (child1_0’=nodeid2); // 4.
[] (position1=start & zeroone=be_my_parent & twoone=empty) ->
(position1’=child_handshake) & (no_of_requests1’=1)
& (remaining_partner1’=nodeid2) & (zeroone’=empty)
& (child1_0’=nodeid0); // 4.
[] (position1=child_handshake & adj1=v1 & remaining_partner1=0
& onezero=empty & onetwo=empty) ->
(position1’=parent_handshake) & (onezero’=be_my_child)
& (onetwo’=be_my_child); // 2.
[] (position1=child_handshake & adj1=v1 & remaining_partner1=nodeid0
& onezero=empty & onetwo=empty) ->
(position1’=parent_handshake) & (onezero’=be_my_parent)
& (onetwo’=be_my_child); // 5.214
[] (position1=child_handshake & adj1=v1 & remaining_partner1=nodeid2
& onezero=empty & onetwo=empty) ->
(position1’=parent_handshake) & (onezero’=be_my_child)
& (onetwo’=be_my_parent); // 5.
[] (position1=child_handshake & adj1=1 & no_of_requests1=1
& child1_0=nodeid0 & onezero=empty) ->
(position1’=parent_handshake) & (onezero’=be_my_child); // 16.
[] (position1=child_handshake & adj1=1 & no_of_requests1=1
& child1_0=nodeid2 & onetwo=empty) ->
(position1’=parent_handshake) & (onetwo’=be_my_child); // 16.
[] (position1=parent_handshake & adj1=v1 & remaining_partner1=0
& zeroone=ack & twoone=ack) ->
(position1’=finish) & (no_of_requests1’=0) & (elected’=nodeid1)
& (adj1’=0)& (child1_0’=0)& (child1_1’=0)& (child1_2’=0)
& (zeroone’=empty) & (twoone’=empty); // 3.
[] (position1=parent_handshake & adj1=v1 & remaining_partner1=nodeid0
& twoone=ack) ->
(position1’=handshakes_complete) & (twoone’=empty); // 6.
[] (position1=parent_handshake & adj1=v1 & remaining_partner1=nodeid2
& zeroone=ack) ->
(position1’=handshakes_complete) & (zeroone’=empty); // 6.
[] (position1=parent_handshake & adj1=1 & no_of_requests1=1
& child1_0=nodeid0 & zeroone=ack) ->
(position1’=finish) & (zeroone’=empty) & (elected’=nodeid1)
& (no_of_requests1’=0) & (child1_0’=0) & (adj1’=0); // 17.
[] (position1=parent_handshake & adj1=1 & no_of_requests1=1
& child1_0=nodeid2 & twoone=ack) ->
(position1’=finish) & (twoone’=empty) & (elected’=nodeid1)
& (no_of_requests1’=0) & (child1_0’=0) & (adj1’=0); // 17.215
[] (position1=handshakes_complete & no_of_requests1=adj1-1) ->
(position1’=response); // 7.
[] (position1=response & remaining_partner1=nodeid0
& zeroone=be_my_child) ->
(position1’=become_child) & (remaining_partner1’=0)
& (zeroone’=empty); // 8.
[] (position1=response & remaining_partner1=nodeid0
& zeroone=be_my_parent) ->
(position1’=contention) & (zeroone’=empty); // 10.
[] (position1=response & remaining_partner1=nodeid2
& twoone=be_my_child) ->
(position1’=become_child) & (remaining_partner1’=0)
& (twoone’=empty); // 8.
[] (position1=response & remaining_partner1=nodeid2
& twoone=be_my_parent) ->
(position1’=contention) & (twoone’=empty); // 10.
// contention (probabilistic choice always
// made by nodeid with smallest id)
[] (nodeid1<nodeid0 & position1=contention
& remaining_partner1=nodeid0 & toss1=0) ->
0.25 : (position1’=winner) & (toss1’=1)
+ 0.25 : (position1’=loser) & (toss1’=2)
+ 0.5 : (toss1’=0); // 11.
[] (nodeid1>nodeid0 & position1=contention
& remaining_partner1=nodeid0 & toss0=1) ->
(position1’=loser) & (toss0’=0); // 13.
[] (nodeid1>nodeid0 & position1=contention
& remaining_partner1=nodeid0 & toss0=2) ->
(position1’=winner) & (toss0’=0); // 12.
[] (nodeid1<nodeid2 & position1=contention
& remaining_partner1=nodeid2 & toss1=0) ->216
0.25 : (position1’=winner) & (toss1’=1)
+ 0.25 : (position1’=loser) & (toss1’=2)
+ 0.5 : (toss1’=0); // 11.
[] (nodeid1>nodeid2 & position1=contention
& remaining_partner1=nodeid2 & toss2=1) ->
(position1’=loser) & (toss2’=0); // 13.
[] (nodeid1>nodeid2 & position1=contention
& remaining_partner1=nodeid2 & toss2=2) ->
(position1’=winner) & (toss2’=0); // 12.
// winner
[] (position1=winner & remaining_partner1=nodeid0 & onezero=empty) ->
(onezero’=be_my_parent) & (position1’=response); // 14.
[] (position1=winner & remaining_partner1=nodeid2 & onetwo=empty) ->
(onetwo’=be_my_parent) & (position1’=response); // 14.
// loser
[] (position1=loser & remaining_partner1=nodeid0
& zeroone=be_my_parent) ->
(zeroone’=empty) & (position1’=child_handshake) & (adj1’=1)
& (remaining_partner1’=0) & (no_of_requests1’=1) & (child1_0’=nodeid0)
& (child1_1’=0) & (child1_2’=0); // 15.
[] (position1=loser & remaining_partner1=nodeid2 & twoone=be_my_parent) ->
(twoone’=empty) & (position1’=child_handshake) & (adj1’=1)
& (remaining_partner1’=0) & (no_of_requests1’=1) & (child1_0’=nodeid2)
& (child1_1’=0) & (child1_2’=0); // 15.
[] (position1=become_child & onezero=empty & child1_0=nodeid2) ->
(position1’=finish) & (onezero’=ack) & (no_of_requests1’=0)
& (remaining_partner1’=0) & (adj1’=0) & (child1_0’=0)
& (child1_1’=0) & (child1_2’=0); // 9.
[] (position1=become_child & onetwo=empty & child1_0=nodeid0) ->
(position1’=finish) & (onetwo’=ack) & (no_of_requests1’=0)217
& (remaining_partner1’=0) & (adj1’=0) & (child1_0’=0) & (child1_1’=0)
& (child1_2’=0); // 9.
endmodule
module node2
position2 : [start..finish] init start;
child2_0 : [0..N] init 0;
child2_1 : [0..N] init 0;
child2_2 : [0..N] init 0;
adj2 : [0..v2] init v2;
remaining_partner2 : [0..N] init 0;
no_of_requests2 : [0..N] init 0;
[] (position2=start & onetwo=be_my_parent) ->
(position2’=child_handshake) & (no_of_requests2’=1) & (onetwo’=empty)
& (child2_0’=nodeid1); // 1.
[] (position2=start & onetwo=empty) ->
(position2’=child_handshake) & (no_of_requests2’=0)
& (remaining_partner2’=nodeid1); // 4.
[] (position2=child_handshake & adj2=v2 & remaining_partner2=0
& twoone=empty) ->
(position2’=parent_handshake) & (twoone’=be_my_child); // 2.
[] (position2=child_handshake & adj2=v2 & remaining_partner2=nodeid1
& twoone=empty) ->
(position2’=parent_handshake) & (twoone’=be_my_parent); // 5.
[] (position2=child_handshake & adj2=1 & no_of_requests2=1
& child2_0=nodeid1 & twoone=empty) ->
(position2’=parent_handshake) & (twoone’=be_my_child); // 16.218
[] (position2=parent_handshake & adj2=v2 & remaining_partner2=0
& onetwo=ack) ->
(position2’=finish) & (no_of_requests2’=0) & (elected’=nodeid2)
& (adj2’=0)& (child2_0’=0)& (child2_1’=0) & (child2_2’=0)
& (onetwo’=empty); // 3.
[] (position2=parent_handshake & adj2=v2 & remaining_partner2=nodeid1) ->
(position2’=handshakes_complete); // 6.
[] (position2=parent_handshake & adj2=1 & no_of_requests2=1
& child2_0=nodeid1 & onetwo=ack) ->
(position2’=finish) & (onetwo’=empty) & (elected’=nodeid2) &
(no_of_requests2’=0) & (child2_0’=0) & (adj2’=0); // 17.
[] (position2=handshakes_complete & no_of_requests2=adj2-1) ->
(position2’=response); // 7.
[] (position2=response & remaining_partner2=nodeid1
& onetwo=be_my_child) ->
(position2’=become_child) & (remaining_partner2’=0) & (onetwo’=empty); // 8.
[] (position2=response & remaining_partner2=nodeid1
& onetwo=be_my_parent) ->
(position2’=contention) & (onetwo’=empty); // 10.
// contention (probabilistic choice always made by nodeid with smallest id)
[] (nodeid2<nodeid1 & position2=contention
& remaining_partner2=nodeid1 & toss2=0) ->
0.25 : (position2’=winner) & (toss2’=1)
+ 0.25 : (position2’=loser) & (toss2’=2)
+ 0.5 : (toss2’=0); // 11.
[] (nodeid2>nodeid1 & position2=contention
& remaining_partner2=nodeid1 & toss1=1) ->
(position2’=loser) & (toss1’=0); // 13.219
[] (nodeid2>nodeid1 & position2=contention
& remaining_partner2=nodeid1 & toss1=2) ->
(position2’=winner) & (toss1’=0); // 12.
// winner
[] (position2=winner & remaining_partner2=nodeid1 & twoone=empty) ->
(twoone’=be_my_parent) & (position2’=response); // 14.
// loser
[] (position2=loser & remaining_partner2=nodeid1 & onetwo=be_my_parent) ->
(onetwo’=empty) & (position2’=child_handshake) & (adj2’=1)
& (remaining_partner2’=0) & (no_of_requests2’=1) & (child2_0’=nodeid1)
& (child2_1’=0) & (child2_2’=0); // 15.
[] (position2=become_child & twoone=empty) ->
(position2’=finish) & (twoone’=ack) & (no_of_requests2’=0)
& (remaining_partner2’=0) & (adj2’=0) & (child2_0’=0)
& (child2_1’=0) & (child2_2’=0); // 9.
endmoduleAppendix F
PRISM speciﬁcation for Itai
Rodeh protocol
nondeterministic
const int ACTIVE = 0;
const int PASSIVE = 1;
const int LEADER = 2;
const int FINISH = 3;
global leader : [0..N] init 0;
const int id0=1;
const int id1=2;
const int id2=3;
const int N=3; // number of processes
module process0
// COUNTER
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c0 : [0..N-1];
// STATES
s0 : [ACTIVE..FINISH];
// PREFERENCE
p0 : [0..2] init 2;
// VARIABLES FOR SENDING AND RECEIVING
receive0 : [0..2];
// 0 not received anything
// 1 received choice
// 2 received counter
sent0 : [0..2];
// 0 not send anything
// 1 sent choice
// 2 sent counter
// pick value
[] (s0=ACTIVE & p0=2) -> 0.5 : (p0’=0) + 0.5 : (p0’=1);
// send preference
[p_0_1snd] (s0=ACTIVE) & (p0<2) & (sent0=0) -> (sent0’=1);
// receive preference
// stay active
[p_2_0rcv] (s0=ACTIVE) & (p0<2) & (receive0=0)
& ((p0=1 & ch_2_0_1=0) | (p0=1 & ch_2_0_1=1) | (p0=0 & ch_2_0_1=0)) ->
(receive0’=1);
// become inactive
[p_2_0rcv] (s0=ACTIVE) & (p0<2) & (receive0=0) & (p0=0) & (ch_2_0_1=1) ->
(s0’=PASSIVE) & (receive0’=1);222
// send counter (already sent preference)
// not received counter yet
[c_0_1snd] (s0=ACTIVE) & (p0<2) & (sent0=1) & (receive0=1) ->
(sent0’=2);
// received counter (pick again)
[c_0_1snd] (s0=ACTIVE) & (p0<2) & (sent0=1) & (receive0=2) ->
(p0’=2) & (c0’=0) & (sent0’=0) & (receive0’=0);
// receive counter and not sent yet
// (note in this case do not pass on as will send own counter)
[c_2_0rcv] (s0=ACTIVE) & (p0<2) & (receive0=1) & (sent0<2) ->
(receive0’=2);
// receive counter and sent counter
// only active process (decide)
[c_2_0rcv] (s0=ACTIVE) & (p0<2) & (receive0=1) & (sent0=2) & (ch_2_0_1=N-1) ->
(s0’=LEADER) & (p0’=2) & (c0’=0) & (sent0’=0) & (receive0’=0);
// other active process (pick again)
[c_2_0rcv] (s0=ACTIVE) & (p0<2) & (receive0=1) & (sent0=2) & (ch_2_0_1<N-1) ->
(p0’=2) & (c0’=0) & (sent0’=0) & (receive0’=0);
// send preference (must have received preference)
[p_0_1snd] (s0=PASSIVE) & (p0<2) & (receive0>0) & (sent0=0) ->
(sent0’=1);
// send counter (must have received counter first) and can now reset
[c_0_1snd] (s0=PASSIVE) & (p0<2) & (receive0=2) & (sent0=1) ->
(s0’=PASSIVE) & (p0’=2) & (c0’=0) & (sent0’=0) & (receive0’=0);
// receive preference
[p_2_0rcv] (s0=PASSIVE) & (p0=2) & (receive0=0) & (ch_2_0_1<2) ->
(p0’=ch_2_0_1) & (receive0’=1);223
// receive counter
[c_2_0rcv] (s0=PASSIVE) & (p0<2) & (receive0=1) & (ch_2_0_1<N-1) ->
(c0’=ch_2_0_1+1) & (receive0’=2);
// store leader
[] (s0=LEADER) -> (leader’=id0) & (s0’=FINISH);
// finished (loop)
[done] (s0=FINISH) -> (s0’=s0);
[done] (s0=PASSIVE) -> (s0’=s0);
endmodule
module chan_0_1
ch_0_1_1 : [0..N] init N;
ch_0_1_2 : [0..N] init N;
ch_0_1_3 : [0..N] init N;
// buffer preference
[p_0_1snd] (ch_0_1_1=N) -> (ch_0_1_1’=p0);
[p_0_1snd] (ch_0_1_1!=N& ch_0_1_2=N)-> (ch_0_1_2’=p0);
[p_0_1snd] (ch_0_1_1!=N& ch_0_1_2!=N& ch_0_1_3=N)-> (ch_0_1_3’=p0);
// buffer counter
[c_0_1snd] (ch_0_1_1=N) -> (ch_0_1_1’=c0);
[c_0_1snd] (ch_0_1_1!=N& ch_0_1_2=N)-> (ch_0_1_2’=c0);
[c_0_1snd] (ch_0_1_1!=N& ch_0_1_2!=N& ch_0_1_3=N)-> (ch_0_1_3’=c0);
// transmit preference
[p_0_1rcv] (ch_0_1_1!=N) ->224
(ch_0_1_1’=ch_0_1_2) & (ch_0_1_2’=ch_0_1_3) & (ch_0_1_3’=N);
//transmit counter
[c_0_1rcv] (ch_0_1_1!=N) ->
(ch_0_1_1’=ch_0_1_2) & (ch_0_1_2’=ch_0_1_3) & (ch_0_1_3’=N);
endmodule
module process1=process0[
id0=id1,s0=s1,p0=p1,c0=c1,sent0=sent1,receive0=receive1,
p_0_1snd=p_1_2snd,p_2_0rcv=p_0_1rcv,c_0_1snd=c_1_2snd,
c_2_0rcv=c_0_1rcv,ch_2_0_1=ch_0_1_1] endmodule
module chan_1_2=chan_0_1[
p0=p1,c0=c1,p_0_1snd=p_1_2snd,p_0_1rcv=p_1_2rcv,
c_0_1snd=c_1_2snd,c_0_1rcv=c_1_2rcv,
ch_0_1_1=ch_1_2_1,ch_0_1_2=ch_1_2_2,ch_0_1_3=ch_1_2_3
] endmodule
module process2=process0[
id0=id2,s0=s2,p0=p2,c0=c2,sent0=sent2,receive0=receive2,
p_0_1snd=p_2_0snd,p_2_0rcv=p_1_2rcv,c_0_1snd=c_2_0snd,
c_2_0rcv=c_1_2rcv,ch_2_0_1=ch_1_2_1] endmodule
module chan_2_0=chan_0_1[
p0=p2,c0=c2,p_0_1snd=p_2_0snd,p_0_1rcv=p_2_0rcv,
c_0_1snd=c_2_0snd,c_0_1rcv=c_2_0rcv,ch_0_1_1=ch_2_0_1,
ch_0_1_2=ch_2_0_2,ch_0_1_3=ch_2_0_3] endmoduleAppendix G
PRISM ‘Individuals’ Speciﬁcation
for SIR Protocol
probabilistic
const double B=1; // probability of infection
const double Q=1; // rate of removal
const int Susceptible=0;
const int Infective=1;
const int Removed=2;
module site1
state1 : [Susceptible..Removed] init Susceptible;
[] (state1=Infective) ->
Q : (state1’=Removed) + (1-Q) : (state1’=state1);
// site is susceptible and is contacted by an infected site
[] state1=Susceptible & state2=Infective ->
B : (state1’=Infective) + (1-B) : (state1’=state1);
225226
[] state1=Susceptible & state3=Infective ->
B : (state1’=Infective) + (1-B) : (state1’=state1);
endmodule
module site2 =site1[
state1=state2,deliver1=deliver2,state2=state1
] endmodule
module site3
state3 : [Infective..Removed] init Infective;
[] (state3=Infective)
-> Q : (state3’=Removed) + (1-Q) : (state3’=state3);
endmoduleAppendix H
PRISM ‘Population’ Speciﬁcation
for SIR Protocol
// population model derived from individual SIR model
probabilistic // DTMC model
const int N=3; // number of sites
const double B=1; // probability of infection
const double Q=1; // protbability of removal
module population
s : [0..N] init N-1; // number of susceptibles
i : [0..N] init 1; // number of infectives
[] (i>0 & s>0) -> (B*s/(s+1)) : (s’=s-1) & (i’=i+1)
+ (Q/(s+1)) : (i’=i-1)
+ (1-((B*s+R)/(s+1))) : (s’=s);
[] (i>0 & s=0) -> (Q/(s+1)) : (i’=i-1)
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+ (1-((B*s+Q)/(s+1))) : (s’=s);
[] (i=0) -> 1 : (i’=i);
endmodule